Implementing urban design policy by Elliott, M. L. P.
DISCLAIMER: 
This document has been proofed and 
its original formatting has been retained. 
Implementing Urban Design Policy: 
An Assessment of Codified and Managerial 
Design Intervention Strategies 
Under Varying Political Cultures 
by 
Michael Elliott 
Graduate City Planning Program 
The College of Architecture 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
with support from 
Design Arts Program 
National Endowment for the Arts 
May 10, 1990 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Implementing Urban Design Policy 
II. San Francisco: Pluralist-Contested 
III. Seattle: Pluralist-Contested 
IV. Savannah: Pluralist-Collaborative 
V. Baltimore: Elite-Centralized 
VI. Boston: The Tensions Illustrated 
VII. Atlanta: The Tensions Resolved 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The research upon which this report is based could not have succeeded without 
the cooperation and assistance of numerous individuals. In each city visited, scores 
of public officials, civic leaders, citizen activists and private professionals shared their 
time, materials and knowledge. For all these people, my deep felt thanks. 
In like manner, the generous support of the National Endowment for the Arts 
deserves special acknowledgement. Their financial support was essential to the 
conduct of this research. 
Finally, I would like to extend my appreciation to three individuals who have been 
particularly supportive: to Gary Hack for knowledge, to Jeann Greenway for hard 
work and to Elaine Poirier for perseverance. 
CHAPTER I 
IMPLEMENTING URBAN DESIGN POLICY 
Key Assumptions 
The main problems with modern urban design stem from four concurrent changes 
the urban environment: 1) societal change is accelerating, 2) the United States is 
ilready three-quarters urban, and hence existing urban structure will greatly influence 
Jture investments in the city, 3) locational and design choices of private developers 
lave and are continuing to evolve in response to changes in economic, legal and 
echnological constraints and 4)-urban-designhas _gradually moved away from an 
ithic of master planning and toward an ethic of wider participation in design decision 
naking. In all likelihood, urban design in the future will require incremental change 
tategies, strategies that will increasingly require the cooperation of producers 
designers, planners, land owners and developers), facilitators (financiers, government, 
wokers and design advocates), and consumers (citizens and end users). The 
iterdependencies of these groups will increase as the urban structure becomes 
Jrther developed. 
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essence, the diversity is seen as a consequence of strategic elements in effective 
urban design policies. As local communities seek to assess their physical environ-
ments, initiate policies to promote particular design objectives, build the local capacity 
necessary for long term effectiveness, and carry through with implementation, they do 
so in response to the local context of design, development and political decision 
making. Since local contexts vary widely, so do techniques for intervening into the 
design process. As a consequence, urban design and implementation systems are 
highly idiosyncratic, with each city creating its own special mix of techniques and 
strategies. Comparisons between cities is therefore difficult. 
Based on case studies conducted in six cities, however, this paper argues that 
urban design and implementation systems developed by different cities are 
considerably less varied than first appears, that these differences can be explained in 
large part by differences in the political culture of design decision making, that 
selection of intervention techniques are a result of a learning process in which 
—techniques become less functional over_time_as changes occur in the political culture 
surrounding design, and that effective urban design implementation systems evolve 
in predictable ways in response to changes in the political culture of a city. More 
specifically, the paper argues that 
a city's political culture can be effectively described based on the degree to 
which city issues are resolved through centralized or decentralized modes 
of decision making. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1983. 
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in two districts selected from within each city. The study involved approximately 200 
interviews and site visits lasting an average of 10 days for each city. 
III. The Impact of Political Culture on Urban Design Implementation 
This paper seeks to examine the relationship between political culture and urban 
design implementation. By political culture I mean the accepted norms and 
customary process by which issues are resolved and decision made within the public 
domain of the city. More specifically, for purposes of this analysis, I will measure 
political culture along a scale of political centralization. I operationalize this through 
two measures: 
• 	Legitimacy: the number of constituent groups who are afforded direct 
access to public decision making under specific conditions and 
Power: the perceived degree to which these constituent groups can 
effectively block policies, whether or not they have direct access to decision 
processes. 
In examining the six cities utilized in this study, three general types of political culture 
can be identified. In elite-centralized cities, decision making power is highly 
concentrated, with relatively few active constituency groups seeking to influence 
design considerations and even fewer wielding enough power to effect change. In 
pluralist-collaborative cities, decision making power is more diffuse, but a workable 
consensus amongst the most powerful constituency groups exists, with a relatively 
strong institutionalized process for resolving issues. In pluralist-contested cities, 
decision making power is widely diffused, with many constituency groups wielding 
sufficient power to block policymaking and none able to consistently advocate their 
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own interests in the absence of a coalition of support. The six cities in our study are 












Before we can assess what the impact of political culture is on urban design 
systems, however, we must develop a vocabulary for discussing the wide range of 
techniques employed within those systems. The next section  look for similarities 
amongst the myriad techniques employed to influence urban design and suggest that 
these techniques can be reduced to seven modes of intervention. 
IV. Patterns of Urban Design Practice: Seven Modes of Intervention 
This research, in conjunction with research conducted by othei :s, suggests that 
urban design interventions, while wide-ranging in their detailed application, nonetheless 
-rave common-patterns in their generaLapplication. _have identified seven modes of 
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Lion commonly used by these local governments 2. The study suggests that 
:egies for influencing urban design are based on one or more of these modes 
ention and that these seven approaches can serve as a general framework 
ssing the effectiveness of alternative urban design strategies. The seven 
intervention include: 
Sole Development of Projects. Cities influence urban design through 
projects that are developed within the public domain, with little private 
participation. Public control over the design of these projects is extensive. 
Examples include not only traditional examples of civic architecture and 
parks, but also public infrastructure projects such as transit malls and 
sidewalk improvements and special function facilities such as stadiums and 
markets. 
Co -Development of Projects. Frequently, cities own property or equity 
rights in a private development, or directly finance that development. This 
partnership role, which exists independent of the city's police powers, can 
provide cities with direct participation in project development and leverage 
over design issues. Examples include public-private joint ventures, 
development competitions for parcels owned by government, developments 
requiring air rights or street closings that are subject to disposition and 
development agreements, and design controls exercised through the 
purchase of particular aspects of property rights such as facade easements. 
Nondiscretionary Regulations. The exercise of private property rights is 
subject to government restrictions designed to protect health, safety and 
public welfare. Cities use regulations to enhance the quality of urban 
design within a district or a class of buildings. These regulations have clear 
criteria which are applied uniformly to all development projects affected. 
Examples include traditional zoning, subdivision controls, building ordinanc-
es, mandatory facade improvement programs, and mandatory design 
criteria linked to district plans. 
Discretionary Regulations. 	Regulations which provide for flexible 
evaluations of individual projects are also used by cities. These regulations 
enable design choices to be balanced between varying (and sometimes 
competing) urban design objectives. Tradeoffs are possible due to the 
schema builds on work first developed by Mark Schuster of MIT. 
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) in design and as to the impacts they have on the ways in which developers 
1gners conceive of their design options. Moreover, at a more general level, 
n modes of intervention also share similarities. As discussed in the next 
these modes of intervention can be further schematized into two broad styles 
bntion. As we shall see later, these similarities between modes of intervention 
systematic link between the style of intervention and the political culture 
bd with the city's decision making. 
gerial and Codified Styles of Intervention 
er examination of the modes of intervention reveals that important similarities 
een them. These similarities can be classified into two styles of intervention. 
pe styles managerial and codified interventions. 
Igerial interventions. 	Modes of intervention that allow for selective 
on of policies and programs to particular projects are called managerial 
ions. These include the following modes of intervention: 
sole develop by a public agent, 
co-develop with private agents, 
regulate using discretionary guidelines, 
provide discretionary incentives and 
inform and guide design choices made by developers and architects. 
)f these modes of intervention, the public agent has a wide range of discretion 
application of particular policies. Because of this discretion, policies can be 
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Because of this, the application of these modes requires relatively fewer 
irces and personnel to influence a wider array of projects. Furthermore, by 
porating the goals and mechanisms of implementation into statutory require-
s, these policies are more difficult to influence once enacted. In turn, the codes 
age conflict by defining the rules of exchange and decision making. As such, 
shift power away from one set of constituent groups and towards another set 
)nding on what the codes are designed to accomplish and how effective they are 
;complishing those goals. 
•ese two styles of intervention, then, describe the relationship between the public 
Icy and the various constituencies (and in particular, private developers and 
itects) seeking to influence urban design. The two styles differ by the flexibility 
allow, their major focus, the active agents, their relation to the design process, 
resources required, their susceptibility to influence and their management of 
lict. Furthermore, each style defines a coherent urban design and implementation 
BM. 
Linkage Between Political Culture and Styles of Intervention 
Vhile no city can be described as engaged purely in one or the other of these 
ems, it is clear that cities differ greatly in their relative mix. Some cities codify 
ively little of their urban design policies, relying instead on an array of flexible 
;ies that can be applied by specific agencies and institutions. At the same time, 
r cities codify the requirements associated with urban design to a much greater 
The linkages are as follows. In elite -centralized cities, interventions are flexibly 
designed and executed. Codes, where they exist, are permissive instead of restrictive. 
Interventions are managerial. The processes of decision making for these interven-
tions provides for a great deal of latitude, with agency heads usually responsible only 
to upper-echelon public officials. The partnership between the public agency and the 
private developer is frequently strong, and is seen as a partnership of peers, with the 
goals of each agent seen as complimentary to the goals of the other. Negotiations 
are frequently limited to the public agency and the private developer, with few external 
constraints as to the process and openness of these negotiations. In many instances, 
once these negotiations have taken place, the public agent acts as an advocate of the 
private agent's objectives within city government and in front of other constituency 
groups. 
Pluralist-collaborative cities have the greatest flexibility as to their choice of 
appropriate urban design and implementation techniques. These cities employ both 
codified and managerial styles of intervention. They rely heavily on highly institutional-
ized processes for intervening. As with more centralized cities, collaborative cities 
create one or more public or quasi-public institutions through which most urban 
design work is conducted. While organizations established in more centralized cities 
typically negotiate with one group and then advocate the negotiated agreement, 
institutions in collaborative cities are more prone to brokering between constituency 
groups. The resulting programs and projects are more flexible in terms of the 
interests they serve. The process of decision making itself is rarely open to direct 
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public scrutiny and accountability. The focus is instead on the quality of the 
outcomes. Codified interventions are also used with increasing frequency, but these 
codes are usually specific in their application, with codes developed to manage 
particular problems in designated districts. Codes developed by the city rarely 
stipulate blanket prohibitions across wide expanses of design policy. 
On the opposite extreme, pluralist-contested cities employ highly codified 
interventions. Codes are restrictive, specifying in considerable detail the criteria for 
development. While managerial interventions are still employed, the process by which 
decisions are made is considerably more specified, inclusive of divergent constituen-
cies, and openly accountable to the political decision making process. Both the 
process and outcomes of technical analysis used to support negotiated positions are 
subject to review and comment. The partnership between the public agent and the 
private agent is more tenuous, with the public agent serving much more as a broker 
or mediator between groups with divergent interests and perspectives. 
These differences can be illustrated by comparing the urban design and 
implementation systems associated with the downtown districts of three cities: 
Baltimore, Savannah and San Francisco. In Baltimore, widespread use of urban 
renewal powers has given the city latitude to intervene into the design process. To 
implement its policies, the city created a number of district-based non-profit 
corporations, of which the Charles Center - Inner Harbor Management Corporation 
is the best known. These corporations work under contract with the city, have 
considerable latitude to operate as they see fit, and have a specific mandate to forge 
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one has move toward centralization (Baltimore). In each city, changes in centralization 
of political decision making were followed by a transition to intervention styles 
associated with the newly emergent political culture. 
This transition can be illustrated through the experience of Boston. The Boston 
Redevelopment Agency has a long history of innovation in urban development and 
design. During the 1960s, the agency worked with a considerable degree of latitude. 
In the 1970s, however, a number of constituency groups became increasingly vocal. 
Projects supported by the BRA, such as Park Plaza, became controversial. Citizen 
advisory boards were increasingly appointed for projects such as Park Plaza, the New 
England Life Building and the Prudential Center redesign. More recently, the BRA is 
moving to codify much of the planning and design decision making. A Civic Design 
Commission is being created. Interim plans for districts were created, with more 
permanent plans currently under development. These changes reflect a general, 
although admittedly slow, movement from patterns associated with centralized 
decision making to those associated with more decentralized decision making. 
VII. The Link Between Political Culture and Design Interventions 
In this paper, I have argued that a shift in political culture will lead to shifts in the 
urban design and implementation systems employed by the city. I have further 


























































What are the implications that can be drawn from these relationships? Why do these 
patterns develop? What do they suggest concerning urban design practice. In the 
final section, we explore some of these implications briefly. 
VIII. Implications for Practice 
Four implications can be drawn from the discussion presented in this paper. 
These implications concern the management of conflict, the realignment of goals, 
empowerment in design, and ease of implementation. 
Management of Conflict. The management of conflict differs considerably 
amongst the  modes of intervention. For codified interventions, the primary locus of 
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conflict is over the creation of the regulations and statutes that govern design. Once 
established, disputes are managed in reference to established policy since the policy 
provides only limited flexibility to the administrator. Managerial interventions, however, 
provide considerably more leeway in interpretation, and hence are more open to 
alternative perspectives. As political decision making in communities shift from 
centralized to decentralized, interventions also shift from serving the elite to managing 
conflict in a increasingly contentious process. When important differences exist within 
communities, these differences can be accentuated by managerial interventions. 
Flexibility of intervention is restricted in decentralized cities because each constituency 
seeks to dominate the process while at the same time demanding accountability 
concerning actions taken at the behest of other interest groups. Thus, managerial 
interventions must shift toward providing a more open, clearly defined process of 
decision making, and conflict must be reduced by increasingly relying on codification 
of the design process. 
Realignment of Goals. At the same time, the systems of intervention developed 
by cities do not simply realign themselves to cope with conflict. Techniques of 
intervention partially define the range of goals that are possible and, in turn, changes 
in these techniques help realign goals. Disparate intervention techniques differ in their 
ability to influence individual projects. These techniques can alter design by seeking 
ownership of property rights, altering the objectives of the principal owners, influencing 
equity and finance partners, modifying legal requirements associated with property 
rights, transforming perceptions concerning market or technology constraints on 
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design, institutionalizing support for design or reshaping the political and aesthetic 
culture of design. In as much as different techniques alter the locus and influence of 
the public intervention, they also subtly modify the goals that can be achieved. In like 
manner, as goals shift to accommodate new interests, the modes of intervention must 
also be altered to prevent a mismatch. 
Empowerment in Design. Changes in the modes of intervention are also closely 
related to redefinitions of power in urban deign decision making. When city decision 
making is highly centralized, managerial systems provide the flexibility essential to 
work with a powerful partner in the development process. It allows cities to act 
strategically, while at the same time provides benefits to the private agent that would 
otherwise not be available. The model, however, fits best when relatively few actors 
of relatively equal power are involved. As the system becomes more codified, this 
partnership is increasingly displaced by processes, policies and institutions that are 
accountable to a wider public. This shift reinforces changes in power which have 
occurred in the general political culture by providing new groups access -to -goal-
setting and decision making. 
Ease of Implementation. Finally, the ability of the city to implement urban design 
policies decreases considerably when a mismatch exists between the city's political 
culture and its choice of intervention strategies. The problem is in part based on 
conflict management and in part on scale. The use of highly codified interventions in 
elite-centralized cities is likely to generate conflict amongst private agents seeking 
exception to regulations, and to slow the rate of development. On the other hand, the 
use of highly managerial interventions in pluralist-contested cities opens up each 
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project to public scrutiny, and tends to slow the decision making process consider-
ably. At the same time, while managerial interventions focus on strategically important 




SAN FRANCISCO: PLURALIST-CONTESTED 
1. History of Development in Downtown San Francisco 
The topography of San Francisco is highly distinctive. Bounded on three sides 
by the Pacific Ocean and San Francisco Bay and on the fourth by a mountain mass, 
the city contains 45 square miles of generally hilly terrain. These hills are predomi-
nantly residential. Lightly colored and densely packed,' the residential neighborhoods 
are built on streets that provide exceptional vistas of the city and the ocean or bay 
beyond. 
The central business district occupies the relatively flat plain wedged between 
the hills and the Bay. Located in the northeast quadrant of the city, the CBD is 
bounded by residential communities to the west and north, the bay to the east and 
a redeveloping industrial area to the south. The residential communities -- Telegraph 
Hill, North Beach, Russian Hill, Nob Hill and Chinatown -- are each distinctive in their 
identity. 
The core of the CBD is Market Street. Appropriately named, Market Street 
forms the axis along which commercial enterprises serve the needs of residents, 
industries and institutions alike. Rapidly rebuilt after the earthquake, the district 
'According to Allen Jacobs, in Making City Planning Work (p. 23-24), San 
Francisco is second only to New York City in its population density. 
Figure 1. A View of the Bay 
exhibited a remarkable architectural cohesiveness rarely achieved in American cities. 
During the period of growth between 1906 and the Depression, the architectural 
profession in San Francisco shared a common dedication to the ideals of the City 
Beautiful Movement. During this period, mid-rise construction dominated commercial 
and office development. These buildings used steel frame construction with well 
fenestrated masonry curtain walls. The construction of buildings to the lot line and 
beltlines at the third story created consistent streetwalls and human-scaled bases to 
most large buildings. Above the base, the shaft and capital of these buildings were 
equally well articulated, with many buildings sharing consistent cornices. Ornamenta- 
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Figure 2. Market Street 
tion was used to delineate the three-part vertical composition. 2 As such, the 
structures delineated clearly the public realm along streets and in plazas and formed 
an harmonious backdrop to pedestrian and other public activities. 
Rapid downtown real estate development collapsed with the Depression and 
did not resume until the mid 1960s. Between 1964 and 1969, three major highrise 
buildings were built in or adjacent to the financial district: the 33 story Hartford 
Insurance Building, the 43 story Wells Fargo Building and the 54 story Bank of 
2Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage, Splendid Survivors, 1979. 
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Figure 3. The Financial District, New and Old 
America headquarters. Starting with these buildings, and continuing unabated into the 
late 1970s, the office construction boom 3 created structures designed in the 
International Style. These structures created tremendous change in the design 
characteristics of the downtown, as highly articulated midrise buildings built to lot lines 
gave way to undifferentiated highrise buildings built in frequently functionless plazas. 4 
31n the 20 years following the early 1960s, the available office space in the 
downtown district doubled, from 25 million square feet in 1963 to 50 million in 1982. 
4Richard Hedman with Andrew Jaszewski, Fundamentals of Urban Design, 
(Washington, D.C.: Planners Press, 1984). 
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Bulk, height, materials and color of new construction contrasted sharply with existing 
buildings. The integration apparent in the light colored traditional buildings with 
skylines that accentuated San Francisco's topography was largely effaced during this 
period. 
II. Regulating Development in the CBD 
As shown in the accompanying timeline s, San Francisco rezoned the 
downtown in 1968. Until this time, the entire CBD was zoned within a single 
commercial use district. Zoning enabled developments with Floor Area Ratios of 16:1 
or less. No restrictions were placed on height or bulk. 
The 1968 rezoning created four zones, with FAR ratios ranging from 14:1 in the 
office district, to 10:1 in the retail and general use districts and to 7:1 in the support 
district located south of Market Street. While the districts were designated by use 
categories, all districts were permissive as to the types of uses that could be 
included. 6 The predominant difference between districts therefore stemmed from FAR 
requirements. 
These FAR requirements were accentuated by allowance of density bonuses 
and transferable development rights in the office district. A qualified developer could 
6"How Money and Politics Shape San Francisco's Skyline: Feinstein and Co., 
Powers that Be," San Francisco Examiner, June 17, 1986 at A-6. 




The City adopts new zoning regulations. 
August 26, 1971 
Planning Commission adopts Urban Design 
Plan. 
November 2, 1971 
Alvin Duskin sponsor's initiative to irnit 
heights of buildings to six stories. Proposi-
tion T is defeated 61 - 39 percent 
June 6, 1972 
Duskin's second initiative, designed to limit 
office highrises to 12 stories, is`defeated by 
57 percent of the voters. 
Office construction` totals 2.2 million square 
feet, with an additional 4.2 million square 
feet approved as;developers rush to beat a 
November growth Initiative. 
November 6, 1979 
Proposition 0, which would cut building 
volume downtown by one-third and clamp 
a 20-story ceiling on new towers in the 
office district, is defeated by 54.4 percent. 
• location: proximity to Market Street 
transit. 
In addition, a developer could transfer up 
to half of the permitted floor area ratio 
(exclusive of bonuses) to an adjacent lot. 
The FAR requirements established 
in the 1968 ordinance accentuated devel- 
opment trends in San Francisco. Reduc- 
tions in allowable FARs in the retail, gener- 
al and support districts, when coupled with a relatively unrestricted FAR in the office 
district, reinforced the value (and cost) of a financial district location. The bonus 
system allowed for further increases in density in this district. New construction in the 
'San Francisco, California Planning Code, Section 126. 
receive a 20% bonus for construction on 
a corner lot or a series of cumulative 
amenity-based bonuses for' 
• access: direct tunnels to a Market 
Street transit station, walkways to a 
parking structure and multiple build-
ing entrances, 
• open space: wider sidewalks, ar-
cades and plazas, 
• design: building side setbacks, 
smaller upper floors and observa-
tion decks, and 
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Figure 4.' Market Street in the Financial District 
financial district con-
tinued unabated and 
at higher densities 
than had existed 
before the 1968 ordi-
nance. 
While innova-
tive for the time, nei-
ther the bonus sys-




The bonus system 
did not establish mini-
mum urban design 
standards. Existing 
city aesthetic and 
urban design goals, established by the Department of City Planning in their 
comprehensive 1966 zoning study, 8 were strictly advisory. The absence of design 
8San Francisco Department of City Planning, Downtown Zoning Study, Working 
Paper 1, pp. 60-78, 1966. 
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review led to a proliferation of inappropriate and poorly designed amenities. This is 
particularly apparent in the design of open space provisions. The construction of 
randomly located plazas, arcades and wider sidewalks produced a legacy of uninviting 
public spaces of questionable worth. Many of these spaces actually detract from the 
continuity and aesthetics of the urban pattern, creating towers cut off from the city by 
concrete moats. 
Transferrable development rights, on the other hand, were so restrictive as to 
be barely used. TDRs were promoted as a tool for preserving historic structures. By 
allowing the development potential of the structure to be transferred to an adjacent 
site, preservation options were made more economically feasible relative to demolition 
and redevelopment options. However, since only half of the development potential 
could be transferred, much of the economic potential remained on the original 
(historic) site. Further, restricting transfers to adjoining sites both reduced the 
marketability of TDRs and concentrated the environmental and urban design impact 
of higher density made possible by the transfer onto a single site. 
On the other hand, by reducing FARs in the retail, general and support districts, 
the new zoning did effect relatively greater protection to these areas. As such, 
distinctions between the districts were reinforced. While the financial district was 
substantially redeveloped in the International Style, the remaining three districts 
retained much of their historic character. 
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III. Community Response to New Development 
By the late 1960s, development in downtown San Francisco had significantly 
altered the skyline of San Francisco as seen from the Bay (both from the east and the 
north). These views of downtown San Francisco are particularly prominent: the 
commercial district rises from the shoreline and serves as foreground to the hills of 
San Francisco. While buildings constructed during the boom years of 1906 to 1929 
generally conformed to and reinforced the topography of San Francisco, the boom 
initiated in the 1960s created taller, bulkier and more monolithic structures which 
blocked views to and from the hills. In all, 21 high-rise buildings were built in the 
downtown during this decade. These buildings overshadowed both the terrain and 
the traditional city, dramatically altering the skyline. Opposition to these developments 
continued to grow as an urbanscape that had been stable for 40 years gave way to 
a new order. 
In 1970, Alvin Duskin catalyzed this opposition through an initiative campaign 
to limit new development to six story buildings. 9 The Duskin Initiative, as it became 
known, would have required a majority vote of the electorate to proceed construction 
of any building over 72 feet tall. Full page ads were printed in the San Francisco 
newspapers. These ads argued that opposition to particular high rise buildings, such 
9San Francisco allows passage of law through the initiative process. To qualify for 
the ballot, the petition must be signed by ten percent of the voters who cast votes in 
the preceding mayoral election. 
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Figure 5. The Re-Creation of San Francisco 
as the then controversial U. S. Steel Building, was misplaced. 1° The ads contended 
that successful opposition to only one of the 23 high rise buildings planned for 
construction between 1970 and 1975, when coupled with the pro-growth stance of 
Mayor Alioto and the members of the Planning Commission, would leave the 
10The U.S. Steel Building was particularly controversial because it was to be 
constructed on waterfront property just south of the Ferry Building. Specifically, the 
project was to consist of a 550 feet office tower, flanked by a 1,000 room hotel and 
multi-story passenger ship terminal, all built on a platform constructed in the Bay. The 
Planning Commission approved the plan (4 to 2) over the objections of the City 
Planning Director. Director Allan Jacobs recommended an overall 84 foot height, 
going to 175 feet maximum on 10 percent of the site. ''U.S. Steel Wins," San 
Francisco Examiner, Sept. 11, 1970, at 8. The project was eventually stopped. 
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underlying development trend unaltered. The problem cited was one of "Manhattan-
ization" -- the wholesale restructuring of the central business district's physical and 
economic structure. The ads sited numerous studies in support of their claim that 
high rise buildings were economically and environmentally costly to the city. The most 
powerful and prosaic argument, however, was not presented in words. To 
demonstrate the impact of new development on the skyline, the ads included two 
photographs of the city's skyline: one taken in the late 1950s and the other taken 
eleven years later. YOU CAN HELP DECIDE IF OUR CITY WILL BECOME A 
SKYLINE OF TOMBSTONES declared the headline. 
The Transamerican . Building was particularly controversial. The building, 
located on the edge of the commercial district and outside the traditional financial 
district, stands 1,000 feet and 55 stories tall. Located on Montgomery Street between 
Clay and Washington, the tower is readily seen from many vantage points. Its 
pyramid shape and 240 foot spire, designed by William Pereira, are particularly 
striking. Scheduled for completion in spring 1972, Mayor Aliotto endorsed the building 
at the unveiling before review by the Planning Commission. 
The arguments laid out be Duskin laid the foundation for a change in the fight 
over high rise construction in San Francisco. The initiative was endorsed in early 1971 
by San Francisco Tomorrow, a city-wide and broad-based citizens group organized 
to "salvage" San Francisco's "delicate and unique beauty." On September 27, 1971 
the San Francisco Bay Guardian, an alternative newspaper with a stated policy for 
promoting a progressive agenda, published a cost/revenue study of high rise 
Figure 6. The Transamerican Building 
development. As noted by  the editor and  publisher of the  newspaper: 
We've been fighting high rise and high density in San Francisco ever since (our 
inception), but until the last two issues we've been fighting them exclusively on 
the architectural and aesthetic and planning grounds enunciated so eloquently 
by Lewis Mumford. Now, with out own cost/revenue study, we can fight them 
on the surest political terrain of all: on economics. 
After successfully obtaining the necessary signatures, the initiative was placed 
on the ballot at Proposition T. The measure was strongly opposed not only by City 
Hall, developers and the construction industry, but also by the Department of City 
Planning. At the height of the debate over Prop T, the Department had published the 
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Urban Design Plan for the city. Many opponents of Prop T rallied around the Plan as 
a more rational and workable approach to growth management. 
The issue became highly politicized. In October of 1972, polls showed the 
initiative to be winning by a 50 to 35 margin. 11 Mayor Alioto, running for reelection 
and campaigning heavily against the measure, nonetheless called Prop T the "single 
most important proposition" facing San Francisco voters. As part of his campaign, 
Mayor Alioto claimed that the measure would prevent the city from imposing height 
limits more stringent than those suggested by the initiative, and that "a 72-foot height 
limit would do great damage along the waterfront as well as in other areas of 
town." 12 Two other mayoral candidates, while calling the measure unworkable, 
strongly endorsed the Urban Design Plan as a basis for regulating high-rise 
development. The fourth candidate endorsed the measure to create a moratorium 
period in which a more comprehensive plan could be developed. 
By a vote of 86,799 to 142,575, the measure failed in the election. The debate 
over downtown development, however, had been dramatically changed. Duskin 
immediately filed an intention to circulate a new initiative measure with the registry of 
voters. The new initiative would set a height limit of 160 feet in the downtown area 
and 40 feet throughout the rest of the city. 13 The initiative qualified for the June 
ballot. Allan Jacobs, attacking Proposition P as fundamentally in error because it 
11 "High Rise Hot Vote Issue," S. F. Examiner, October 1972 at 1. 
13"Duskin Does It Again," San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 24, 1972 at 14. 
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labelled "all change as bad," called the measure a "naive over-simplification." 14 
 Jacobs suggested that the principles contained in the Urban Design Plan were 
considerably better suited to the sensitive management of growth than were uniform 
limits. 
Within this context of political confrontation, the Planning Commission adopted 
its own height and bulk controls. Effective February 18, 1972, the Commission 
imposed a 40-foot height limit across 70 percent of the city. In the downtown districts, 
the height limit started at 84 feet at the Ferry Building, crested at 700 feet in parts of 
the financial district and ended with an 80-foot limit at the freeway. The limits were 
specifically designed to step up to the center and down to the edges of the 
commercial core in an attempt to accentuate the hilly San Franciscan terrain. The 
controls did not allow for variances. 15 
Public hearings for these controls were generally heavily attended, with 
attendance rising from 200 citizens at the first hearing to 500 citizens at the fourth. 
In all four of these hearings, citizens consistently attacked the allowance of 80-foot 
midrise and 160 to 240 foot high-rise buildings in or near residential neighborhoods, 
but remained largely quiet on the considerably more permissive limits imposed on 
downtown. 
14"Blistering Attack on Duskin Plan," San Francisco Chronicle, May 12, 1972 at 15. 
15"40 Ft. Limit for Most of City," S. F. Examiner, Feb. 18, 1972. 
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The Planning Commission limits projects to a FAR of 14. 
Seventeen previously approved projects and the Redevelop-
ment Agency are exempt. 
September 19, 1980 
Planning Director Rai Okamoto proposes to halve the 
construction density limits for downtown lots. 
September . 28, 
Planning COmmiSSion initiates action to develop an environ-
rnentar IMPact report covering, cumulative effect of all 
development in downtown. 
December 18, 1980 
ayor Feinstein orders the Planning CoMMission to dis-
charge Planning Director Rai Okamoto due to a lack of 
"administrative. capaCities." ...One Month later, atsFeihstein's 
urging; the 'Commission names Dean Maoris planning 
director. 
March 11, _1981 
After firing Ina Dearman and Charles Starbuck, both critics 
of highrise development from the Planning Commission, 
Feinstein replaces them with pro-development appointees. 
April 9, 1981 
Mayor Feinstein asks lthe Planning  Commission to require 
`housing contributions of developers in exchange for office 
permit approvals. 
June 5, 1981 
Supervisors pass transit impact fee that requires major office 
developments to help finance Municipal Railway expansion. 
IV. Urban Design Plan 
along the otherwise low profile of Van Ness Avenue. 
Approved August 26, 
1971, by unanimous vote of 
the Planning Commission. 
The nation's first citywide 
urban design plan. Two 
measures: adopt the Urban 
Design Plan and pass a 
resolution of "intent" to re-
zone. This intent has the 
force of emergency planning 
law during the entire period 
of hearing process (18 
months to 2 years). Set 
bulk controls immediately. 
The Plan was explicitly used 
to argue against the Deskin 
initiative. 
A month after adop- 
tion of the Plan, Holiday Inn 
proposed a 251-foot hotel 
The Urban Design Plan called 
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Figure 7. The Hills of San Francisco 
for a maximum height of 88 feet, with the potential for 160 feet upon approval by the 
Commission. In one of the first tests of the Plan, the commission approved the full 25 
story building in a vote of 4 to 3. As a consequence, 10 of the 15 citizen members 
- of San_Francisco's_Urban_Resign Advisory Committee resigned in protest. San 
Francisco Tomorrow came out in full support of Proposition T. 
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January 6, 1983 
Planning Commission approves its fifteenth 
exemption from the density requirements 
set by the .. March- 1980 - resolution. The 
prOject, Philip . JohnSOn'a 580 California 
tower, is approved at 50 percent over the 
limit_ 
17, 1984 
Plannthd .:COnimittiOn ./.Otes4"..t.O 	0:40 ap- 
'Prq4 a .'condominium .tower that would 
blOCK :Sun from thinatownia only park:  the ' 
..Chinete:PlaYgroUnd:".: Though; 	never bu 
the controversy:re kindles   '.concern Over :: 
sunlighting of r4. • 
a margin of .only 50.6 to .4 percent; .  
voters rejed Proposition M. he measure 
set .priorities for the 'city's Master Plan, 
required amendment of the planning code 
to meet those priorities  and dictated impact 
fees;; for: developments that increase de-
.. Mands for public transit, housing and job 
training:* Opponents specifically argued that 
the measure was unnecessary because the 
Downtown ::Plan ;:being considered by the 
Planning-. Commission would curb overde-
velopment: *- 
V. The Downtown Plan 
San Francisco's regulations are, on 
the whole, more stringent than those in 
any other major city in the United 
States. 16 These regulations were made 
even more stringent on November 29, 
1984, when the city's Planning Commis-
sion adopted a new downtown regulatory 
system known as the Downtown Plan. 17 
 Signed into law by Mayor Dianne Feinstein 
on September 17, 1985, passage of the 
Downtown Plan culminated a six-year 
planning effort. The Plan was highlighted 
nationally, in publications ranging from 
Time to the New York Times. Robert 
Campbell, the architectural critic of the 
Boston Globe, called the plan "the nervi-
est, most sweeping master plan ever 
16Dean L. Macris, Director of the City Planning Department: "I don't think there is 
any question that we have the toughest rules to build of any big city in the United 
States." Thorpe, Rents Forcing Firms to Leave San Francisco, Wall Street Journal, 
Nov. 8, 1983, p 27 col 3. 
17San Francisco Department of City Planning, The Downtown Plan: A Proposal for 
Adopting by the City Planning Commission (Nov. 29, 1984). 
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proposed for a major American city." Noting that the Plan was the result of 15 years 
of citizen activism, Campbell found the "level of public debate here, the ability to 
articulate issues of architecture and urban design, (to) be the most sophisticated in 
the world." 18 Most tellingly, Campbell believed that the Plan had become inevitable: 
An alternative to planning here has now become unthinkable. To realize that, 
you have only to look at the San Francisco downtown of today, the depressing 
result of a long, chaotic series of collisions between the forces of growth and 
the guerrilla warfare of the anti-highrise movement. In the game of urban 
design here, there are now too many players, no court and no rules. The plan 
is bound to be an improvement. 19 
A. The Downtown EIR 
On March 16, 1984, the Department of City Planning released an environmental 
impact report of development in the downtown commercial district. The report 
predicted that under the Downtown Plan, an additional 91,200 workers would be 
added to the district by the year 2000. While industrial and warehousing jobs would 
plummet (a 32 percent drop in jobs and 42 percent drop in space utilized), hotel, 
office and retail jobs would soar. To accommodate this economic growth, 23 million 
square feet of office space would need to be constructed. At 1.5 million square feet 
18"San Francisco debates sweeping master plan," Boston Globe, June 11, 1985 at 
29. 




January 17, 1984 
City supervisors approve a moratorium on 
downtown building pending passage of the 
Downtown Plan and supporting legislation. 
June: 5; 1984 
With61'. z.percent of thevotes,..San Francis 
Pi'OPoitiOri ...K. .i . groWth control 
Measure.that , prOhibiteineW•highrise towers 
frOrit blockingleunfrOnispublic parks. 
September 10, 1985 
Supervisors enact the Downtown Plan with 
a vote of 6 to 5. 
Voters reject Proposition F, an anti-highrise 
initiative that would impose a three -year 
moratorium on major hotel and office pro-
jects. 
November 1986 
Voters adopt Proposition M, a planning and 
growth control measure designed to amend 
the Master Plan, to limit office develOpment 
to 475,000 square feet per year into the 
foreseeable future, and to promote job 
training in the city. 
Downtown Plan puts an "unusual amou 
per year, the development would equate 
to 76 new buildings of 300,000 square feet 
each.2° 
The consequences of this devel-
opment were numerous. In an already 
tight housing market, an additional 30,300 
workers would need to be housed in San 
Francisco. More dramatically, traffic on 
every form of commuting would jump at 
least 25 percent, with some suburban 
transit lines experiencing increases of up 
to 70 percent. Air and noise pollution 
would increase dramatically. 
B. The Downtown Plan 
As noted by Paul Goldberger, archi- 
tectural critic for the New York Times, the 
nt of power in the hands of the Planning 
20"Hellish downtown seen by the year 2000," San Francisco Examiner, March 16, 




the politics of San Fran-
cisco's highrise approval 
process, such discretion-
ary power is subject to 
political pressure. Cases 
of such pressure are not 
hard to uncover, particu-
larly under Mayor Fein-
stein's administration. 
While the Planning Com-
mission serves at the 
pleasure of the mayor, 
1 	most mayors changed 
allagr igaMMIMIIMMIr■eartrow 
. 	 membership of the Com- 
 mission only at the start 
Figure 8. Construction in San Francisco 
of their terms. In mid- 
term, Feinstein dismissed most of the Landmarks Preservation Advisory Board (June 
1980) and anti-highrise Planning Commission members Ina Dearmore and Charles 
Starbuck (March 1981), replacing them with more pro-development appointees. She 
21 Statement before the American Institute of Architects national convention in San 
Francisco, as quoted in "Downtown Plan: Who gets to live in The City," San Francisco 
Examiner, June 14, 1985. 
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fired the planning director and prevailed on the commission to hire Dean Macris as his 
replacement. She actively orchestrated agreements with developers for particularly 
controversial projects such as a new football stadium for the Giants and the 190-acre 
Mission Bay development in China Basin. 22 By pressing her generally pro-
development agenda to the Planning Commission, Mayor Feinstein helped initiate and 
sustain the enormous growth in office development (equivalent to 30 Transamerica 
Pyramids, each with 600,000 square feet, in 5 years). 
22"Feinstein & Co., powers that be," San Francisco Examiner, June 17, 1986 at Al 
and A6. 
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Figure 9. Historic Building Protected Under the Downtown Plan 
Within the generally discretionary powers of the previous planning system, this 
strong relationship between the mayor and the Planning Commission led to a system 
of informal review, in which many of the unacceptable aspects of developments were 
resolved before presentation to the commission. The system rarely rejected proposals 
completely, but frequently led to revisions proposed by the planning staff. Particularly 
during the transition between the system existing in the late 1970s and that imposed 
by the Downtown Plan, this review power could have significant effects on building 
design and construction timing. 
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This effect was perhaps most strikingly illustrated in the saga of 100 First Plaza, 
the first highrise to be subjected to the provisions of the Plan. 23 Located south of 
Market Street, the site was situated in a district that planners had designated to 
receive Financial District expansion. Despite this advantageous site, however, six 
distinctively different designs for the site were required between the purchase of four 
parcels at First and Mission in June of 1983 and construction in 1986. The developer 
(Michael Barker of Barker Interests) and architects (Skidmore, Owings & Merrill) were 
required to redesign the building as the city planning staff generated detailed 
recommendations for the Downtown Plan. Over the course of three years, Barker 
spent $2 million in architecture and $400,000 to produce the environmental impact 
report (which went through four drafts to reassess the environmental impacts of each 
new building design.) 
The building itself was changed dramatically as the original 550 foot height 
restriction and 14-to-1 FAR was reduced to 350 feet and 10-to-1 in late 1984. In 
—February 4985; the FARivas-again reduced, this time to 9-to,1_. Barkers building was 
allowed to stay at 10-to-1 through purchase of transferred development rights. The 
cost was $700,000. Finally, in April of 1985, the project was recommended for 
approval by the Department of Planning, only to be stopped for an additional half year 
by a moratorium imposed before final ratification of the Downtown Plan. 
23The account is described in detail by Nancy Isles Nation in "Building under the 
San -Francisco Downtown-Plan," Northem_California Real Estate Journal. December 
1986 at 26-27. 
11-23 
By the time the project was fully approved, the city had developed its system 
of linkage fees. On a 40 million dollar construction project with 400,000 gross square 
feet of office space, the project was required to provide a total of $5.2 million in impact 
fees: $1.6 million to subsidize the creation of housing, $2 million to contribute to 
transit, $0.8 million for the city's park fund (despite the inclusion of a 17,000 square 
foot plaza into the project) and $0.4 million each for publicly accessible art and 
childcare. While Barker recognized that his building was "the guinea pig" for the 
Downtown Plan and even supported the intentions of the Downtown Plan, he 
nonetheless felt that 
Given the uncertain political climate in the city about where politicians want to 
be -- to be a business town or a boutique-y tourist town -- developers such as 
ourselves will go elsewhere in the future. It makes it not worth the risk of 
buying land and taking it through the process. 24 
While much of the redesign work associated with 100 First Plaza came about 
because of uncertainty during the development of the Downtown Plan, projects that 
followed enaction of the plan faced a considerably altered process. The building rules 
imposed by the Downtown Plan set a quota of 2.85 million square feet of office space 
to be portioned out to competing developers over a three year period. With far more 
applicants than the quota allows, the commission was required to choose amongst 
projects. To this end, a standardized application process was developed. The 
process included a twice yearly competition amongst the proposed buildings. The 
	 24Nancy Isles Nation "Building  under the San Francisco Downtown Plan," Northern 
California Real Estate Journal, December 1986 at 27. 
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competition involved Department of Planning recommendations, an architectural review 
panel, public hearings and, finally, a decision by the Planning Commission. 
During the first competition, considerable controversy arose over the 
management of the process. Three projects totaling 810,000 square feet were 
entered. The architectural review panel, consisting of Deans Gerald McCue of Harvard 
and Richard Bender of U.C., Berkeley and Professor Thomas Vreeland of UCLA, 
found none of the designs to be "an awful embarrassment," but generally panned all 
three entries. 25 The Department of Planning refused to recommend any of the 
projects to the Planning Commission on aesthetic grounds. At the same time, they 
did recommend one project, the Van Ness Gateway, on economic grounds. 26 The 
review panel were generally "troubled by a sense that the architects were being too 
compliant, too quick to jump to whatever they think will get approved." 27 The project 
that they rated "most competent" was the building that "made only very minor 
alterations in order to pay lip service to the Downtown Plan." 28 The controversy 
generated by the generally negative reaction of the Review Panel, in combination with 
25"San Francisco Office Development Limitation Program: First Review Period," 
(San Francisco: Evaluation Report of the Department of City Planning, March 20, 
1986 at 23a to 34); and "How Design Review Became a Circus," San Francisco 
Chronicle, May 8, 1986. 
261-his particular building was particularly objectionable to the architectural review 
panel, which found it so "busy" that "it looks like different buildings on different sides 
and seems to invite trouble in so many ways." ("How Design Review Became a 
Circus," San Francisco Chronicle, May 8, 1986.) 
27"How Design Review Became a Circus," San Francisco Chronicle, May 8, 1986. 
28ibid, 1986. 
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the high cost associated with the contest, 29 led to widespread dissatisfaction 
amongst planners, developers and architects alike. The local chapter of the American 
Institute of Architects called on the Commission to eliminate the review panel. 
Developers who had spent up to three years creating their projects found the 
uncertainty associated with the selection process to be a form of "chinese water 
torture."3° Planners had spent an inordinant amount of their own staff time, including 
three public hearings involving commissioners, to evaluate the projects. 
VI. Proposition M 
Tenacity frequently has its rewards. Sixteen years after the first Duskin Initiative 
was launched, San Franciscans passed a powerful planning-based initiative designed 
to reduce the rate of office construction in the downtown corridor. It was the sixth 
anti-highrise measure to appear on the San Francisco ballot since 1971. A broad-
based coalition of neighborhood, environmental, planning and other groups launched 
the San Francisco Campaign for Accountable Planning (SF CAP). The CAP Initiative 
contained three provisions, of which two had potentially strong impacts on urban 
design in the city. The first established Priority Policies for the city's Master Plan and 
required that the plan be amended to accommodate those priorities. Through these 
The three entrants estimated that the cost of extra architectural work (such as 
elaborate tabletop models and poster-sized sketches), lawyers and lobbyists 
amounted to $250,000 per entry. ("S.F. Highrise 'Beauty Contest' Turns Ugly," San 
Francisco Chronicle, May 8, 1986. 
3°"S.F. Highrise 'Beauty Contest' Turns Ugly," San Francisco Chronicle, May 8, 
1986. 
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priorities, Proposition M sought to bind the Planning Commission to a number of 
preservationist policies designed to maintain the city's character and promote 
affordable housing and a diverse economic base. 31 The initiative also required that 
the City hold extensive public hearings on the City's Master Plan and that the City 
adopt an amended Master Plan by January 1, 1988 based on such public hearings. 
All zoning ordinances, development agreements and permits authorized after passage 
of the initiative were to be consistent with the Priority Policies stated in the initiative. 
31The initiative amended Part II, Chapter II, of the San Francisco Municipal Code 
by adding section 101.1. The section set eight priorities which were to form the basis 
for resolving inconsistencies in the Master Plan. Specifically, the Priority Policies 
included: 
• that existing neighborhood-serving retail uses be preserved and enhanced and 
future opportunities for resident employment in and ownership of such 
businesses enhanced; 
• that existing housing and neighborhood character be conserved and protected 
in order to preserve the cultural and economic diversity of our neighborhoods; 
• that the City's supply of affordable housing be preserved and enhance; 
• that commuter traffic not impeded Muni transit service or overburden our 
streets or neighborhood parking; 
• that a diverse economic base be maintained by protecting our industrial and 
service sectors from displacement due to commercial office development, and 
that future opportunities for resident employment and ownership in these 
sectors be enhanced; 
• that the City achieve the greatest possible preparedness to protect against 
injury and loss of life in an earthquake; 
• that landmarks and historic buildings be preserved; and, 
• that our parks and open space and their access to sunlight and vistas be 
protected from development. 
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All zoning ordinances, development agreements and permits authorized after adoption 
of the amended Master Plan were to be consistent with both the Priority Policies and 
the Master Plan. 32 
The most controversial section of the initiative was found in Part 2. This section 
of Proposition M extended a provision of the Downtown Plan imposing an annual limit 
on total square footage of office development. The existing limit of 950,000 square 
feet of office space per year (equivalent to two 25 story high rise office developments) 
was scheduled to expire in October 1988. In addition, the provisions of the existing 
annual cap allowed for exemptions such that millions of square feet over the annual 
limit had in fact been approved. Proposition M established a firm limit of 950,000 
square feet per year. In addition, the initiative required that the annual allocation of 
office development be halved (to 475,000 square feet) until such time as the total 
square footage of office space approved or reapproved between November 29, 1984 
and November of 1986 is reduced to zero at the rate of 475,000 square feet per year. 
This provision offset development preceding passage of Prop M with corresponding 
reductions following passage of Prop M. At a rate of 475,000 square feet per year, 
32As worded, virtually every major project requiring a public hearing or planning 
permit would have to meet the preservationist test embodied in Proposition M. ("6th 
Time May be the Charm for S.F. Highrise Initiative," San Francisco Chronicle, October 
31, 1986 at 8. 
The Department of City Planning was to develop a list of all office development 
projects approved by the City, the Redevelopment Agency or the San Francisco Port 
Commission after November 29, 1984. All projects in excess of 24,999 square feet 
of additional office space were to be included in the survey. The Planning Commis-
sion was to reduce the 950,000 square foot annual limit by 475,000 square feet per 
approval period until the amount of square footage remaining on the Department's list 
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the City Zoning Administrator originally estimated that it would require 14 years for the 
cap to return to the legislated rate of 950,000 square feet. 34 As permits for several 
previously approved buildings were relinquished, the backlog was reduced to 10 
years. 35 
San Francisco, with its long held reputation for extensive planning controls, 
reinforced its image as the nation's most restricted large city office development 
market. 36 Most of this reputation was based on the annual limits to new office 
development. Rapid rates of construction during the early 1980s, however, had 
yielded high vacancy rates downtown. 37 When combined with over 6 million square 
was equivalent to these reductions. 
34Between November 29, 1984 and November 4, 1986, the City, Redevelopment 
Authority and Port Commission had approved a total of 6.65 million square feet of 
office space in buildings of 25,000 square feet or more. (Memo to the City Planning 
Commission from Dean L. Macris, Director of Planning, concerning "Proposed Rules 
for the 1986-1987 Approval Period of the Office Development Limitation Program, 
dated February 2, 1987 and modified on February 5.) 
35Half of the permits withdrawn were for governmental buildings. A million-square-
foot federal building and a quarter-million-square-foot addition to Hastings College of 
Law accounted for half of the reduction. "Proposition M's 10-year bite," San Francisco 
Examiner, January 5, 1988. 
36As noted by Tom Black, director of the Urban Land Institute, at the time "no 
other city ... even contemplated those kinds of controls." ("Anti-Highrise Law 
Embraced in Neighborhoods" San Francisco Chronicle, November 7, 1987 at A4.) 
371n the 10 months preceding the passage of Proposition M, only 100,000 square 
feet of office space was constructed. By comparison, between 1970 and 1985, 
approvals and completions had exceeded 2 million square feet in all but three years 
(1970, 1975 and 1984). Between 1981 and 1985, the city had averaged over 3 million 
square feet a year. ("6th Time May Be the Charm for S.F. Highrise Initiative," San 
Francisco Chronicle, October 31, 1986 at 8.) 
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Figure 10. View from South of Market 
feet of unfinished office space and a weakening office market, the immediate effect 
38Studies commissioned by the Department of City Planning showed an overall 
vacancy rate in office space of 19%, with the back office and government office having 
a vacancy rate of 26% and a general office vacancy rate of 16%. This vacancy rate 
emerged as developers, responding to a vacancy rate of only 1% in the early 1980s, 
responded with an extraordinary rate of construction. As these buildings were brought 
on-line in the mid-1980s, the vacancy rate grew considerably above the 6% 
considered healthy. (Recht Hausrath & Associates, "Analysis of Downtown San 
Francisco's Office Market," (Report to the San Francisco Department of City Planning, 
May 1986 at 20 - 22).) 
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of the annual caps was limited. 39 ' 4° 
While relatively little national attention had been paid to the impact on 
neighborhoods of the office construction cap and the master planning sections of the 
initiative, it was here that the most immediate impacts were felt. Approximately ten 
percent of the 15,000 building permits issued by the City each year involved 
Proposition M planning restrictions.'" 
39Between 1979 and 1985, the Planning Commission had on average approved 
almost 14 major office developments per year, with 200,000 square feet per 
development. During 1986 (with ten months before the passage of Prop M), only 7 
projects were approved, with project size averaging 36,000 square feet. In a similar 
period in 1987, following passage of Prop M, new construction approved totaled 
907,000 square feet, with an average project size of 151,000 square feet. ("Anti-
Highrise Law Embraced in Neighborhoods," San Francisco Chronicle, November 7, 
1987 at A4.) 
40A study by David Birch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for 
Real Estate Development, projected a substantial drop in new construction needs 
based on projected job growth. Birch noted that growth of the nation's work force will 
slow from 2.6 percent a year to 1.7 percent as a result of demographic changes. 
While 6.24 million square feet had been annually added to the Bay Area in the decade 
preceding 1985, only 38 percent of that rate was needed over the next decade. 
Applied to the San Francisco downtown market, this would suggest the previous 
decade's rate of 2.5 million square feet per year would drop to 960,000 per year over 
the next decade. In addition, Birch projected that much of this growth would 
accommodate smaller companies as the downtown business district shifts from being 
a corporate headquarter mecca to an entrepreneurial center. ("Bay Area needs to 
tailor space, MIT study says," San Francisco Examiner, November 13, 1986 at C-1.) 
41 As noted by Robert Passmore, the city's zoning administrator: "The average 
citizen doesn't really feel the effect of Proposition M on office buildings, but it has 
made a lot of people aware of the city's master plan policies and how to appeal 
something they don't like near their house." In the year following its passage, 
Proposition M had little impact on downtown office construction. During the same 
period, city planners were "swamped with hundreds of hearing requests to protest 
demolition of homes in the Richmond and Sunset districts, construction of large-scale 
apartment projects in Potrero Hill, the destruction of historic buildings on Green Street 
and building plans that worsen parking or traffic problems in their area." ("Anti-
Highrise Law Embraced in Neighborhoods," San Francisco Chronicle, November 7, 
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A. Implementation of Proposition M Office Development Caps 
Because of the wording of Proposition M, the Planning Commission had the 
equivalent of two years of square footage that could be allocated during the first year. 
Projects totaling 2.4 million square feet were in position to request consideration. 42 
 Thus, the Planning Commission needed to establish criteria for selecting buildings. 
The process adopted created a schedule for consideration. Applications were 
to be completed by mid-February. Design review was to be conducted by the 
architectural panel in mid-March, with final building design due one month later. In 
addition, an environmental evaluation was also to be completed by mid-March. 
Based on this information, the planning staff was to identify projects that met 
minimum standards. To meet these standards, the project must: 
• further many objectives and policies of the Master Plan and have no significant 
conflicts with any objective or policy; 
• create an overall positive architectural design effect for the building, making a 
positive contribution to the visual quality of the city and responding well to site 
constraints, while generating open space that is accessible, spatially exciting, 
comfortable and provides for a variety of experiences and (if the project 
includes public art) art that works well with its surroundings; 
• be will suited to its location, as to the appropriateness of the area for office 
development, the accessibility of the site to local and regional transit, the 
accessibility of open space to serve building occupants, the urban design fit of 
the development to its surroundings and the seismic safety of the location, 
while at the same time only minimally creating negative impacts on the 
1987 at A4.) 
42Memo to the City Planning Commission from Dean L. Macris, Director of 
Planning, concerning "Proposed Rules for the 1986-1987 Approval Period of the Office 
Development Limitation Program, dated February 2, 1987 and modified on February 
5. 
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surrounding area through obstructing views, creating shadows or wind, 
displacing housing or small businesses, destroying architectural or historic 
resources, or impeding transit, traffic, freight or pedestrian movement; and 
• be consistent with Section 101 (Proposition M) priority policies. 43 
 In choosing from among projects that qualify for consideration under the 
minimum standards, the Planning Commission was to make selection based on: 
• a project's superiority to other projects based on the above stated minimum 
criteria; 
• a project's superiority to other projects in providing employment opportunities, 
meeting the needs of existing businesses, creating space for which suitable 
alternatives are not readily available, or providing a single entity with space to 
expand or consolidate; or 
• a project's use of TDRs. 
The criteria were not given any particular weight, with commissioners free to attach 
their own importance to them. 44 
43Memo to the City Planning Commission from Dean L. Macris, Director of 
Planning, concerning "Proposed Rules for the 1986-1987 Approval Period of the Office 
Development Limitation Program, dated February 2, 1987 and modified on February 
5 at 5 - 11. 
44Memo to the City Planning Commission from Dean L Macris, Director of 
Planning, concerning "Proposed Rules for the 1986-1987 Approval Period of the Office 
Development Limitation Program, dated February 2, 1987 and modified on February 





In the years immediately following World War II, a burgeoning population, 
annexation, and increasing decentralization provided strong incentives for Seattle to 
develop a master plan that would assist both in predicting and guiding future growth. 
The Planning Commission's budget was enlarged and, in 1948, the Commission was 
directed to prepare a master plan and zoning code revision. 
The plan addressed three basic elements: thoroughfares, land use and 
neighborhood/community framework. Zoning and expressway construction were the 
major tools envisioned for implementing the Comprehensive Plan.' 
Under the new ordinance, areas were divided into zones governed by a uniform 
set of regulations controlling height, bulk, and lot coverage. Areas received specific 
zoning designations based on the type of development to be encouraged under the 
comprehensive plan. The major downtown zones, Metropolitan Business (BM) and 
James A. Barnes, "Comprehensive Planning in Seattle, 1911-1954" (Seattle, 1954), 
p. 10. 
Metropolitan Commercial (CM), were intended to encourage concentrated office and 
retail development of a regional nature in the downtown area. Within these zones, 
allowable uses were specified and building size was governed by a floor area ratio 
(FAR). The BM zone had a FAR of 12:1. Buildings could assume any configuration 
within this basic constraint; less lot coverage would allow greater building height under 
the assumption that minimum standards for light and air would be satisfied with taller 
buildings if more area were left open at street leve1. 2 
The new zoning regulations guided the first wave of building construction since 
the Depression. In surface treatment, new curtain wall buildings of steel and glass 
such as the Norton Building (1959), Logan Building (1958), Washington Building 
(1960), and Municipal Library (1960) contrasted sharply with the downtown's older 
buildings. In site layout, however, these structures were mostly of a relatively modest 
scale, occupying sites similar in size to those of earlier development. While taller and 
strikingly different in appearance, they extended all the way to adjoining lot lines and 
maintained the continuity of the blockfront. These structures represented a transition 
heralding the giant, skyscraper projects occupying full blocks that followed in the next 
decade. 3 
2 Seattle Office of Policy and Evaluation, Land Use Section, Evolution of Seattle's 




In 1958, members of the City Council and officers of the Central Association of 
Seattle, an organization of major downtown business interests, agreed to jointly 
prepare a more detailed comprehensive plan for downtown. The plan was to 
provide a workable guide for future public projects to assure that public funds 
available are most wisely spent; and a plan for private development which will 
stimulate even greater investment by private enterprise in Seattle's Central 
Area. 4 
The plan was to define the role of the downtown as the "heart" of the metropolitan 
region, emphasizing its business function and its strategic concentration of power, 
leadership, financial resources, commercial transactions, and corporate headquarters. 
Goals set forth for the plan included: 
• compactness to facilitate the efficient exchange of information, merchandise, 
and services by creating short walking distances and eliminating areas of 
inactivity that would otherwise disrupt the continuity of an area; 
• improved accessibility through development of a radial system of expressways 
converging on the downtown, tied together by a circumferential route around 
the central business district and linked to strategically placed parking facilities, 
and through development of a rapid transit and local transit network linked by 
means of consolidated transportation terminals; 
• environmental enhancement by means of plazas, small parks, apartment 
development, landscaping and upgrading of the central waterfront area for 
expanded maritime commerce, recreational use, and tourist activity; 
• architectural enhancement by means of planning regulations used to 
encourage homogeneity of architecture and design within the Central Area, with 
projects lending distinctive qualities to the downtown scene also to be 
encouraged; and 
4 City of Seattle, Planning the Future of Seattle's Central Area, Criteria for the 
Development of a Comprehensive Plan, a joint policy statement, City of Seattle, Central 
Association of Seattle, 1959. 
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• redevelopment of commercial areas defined as old and blighted on the edges 
of the downtown core so that property could realize its "highest and best 
use."5  
Figure 1. The Pike Place District 
The properties included much of the central waterfront which was to be made 
more accessible to the Central Business District and developed with tourist and 
residential park and recreation facilities. 
5 City of Seattle, Planning the Future of Seattle's Central Area, Criteria for the 
Development of a Comprehensive Plan, a joint policy statement, City of Seattle, Central 
Association of Seattle, 1959, p. 1-15. 
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11. The Monson Plan 
The Central Association and City Council hired a New York consultant, Donald 
Monson, to prepare the plan. The plan was submitted to the city in 1963. 6 
The plan imposed order on downtown Seattle based on principles of spatial 
organization and circulation typically associated with suburban retail developments. 
The suburban model stressed quick and easy access. A pedestrian mall bordered 
with stores is typically surrounded by parking lots and encircled by a ring road 
providing direct access to expressways. In the downtown context, the area encircled 
by expressways would develop as a complex of glass and steel towers housing major 
office and retail uses. The plan was to be implemented through massive public 
investments and through zoning.' 
As set out in the plan, the city would invest heavily in transportation improve-
ments. Expressways, subways, bus transitways and pedestrian escalators were all 
envisioned as an integrated system. In addition, wider sidewalks, arcades and plazas 
were to be linked to facilitate pedestrian movement. 
Equally ambitious, the city was to encourage extensive redevelopment. The 
redevelopment, subsidized through urban renewal money. In particular, the waterfront 
and adjoining retail districts were to be transformed. On the waterfront, a 19 acre 
6 Donald Monson, Comprehensive Plan for the Central Business District of Seattle, 
Technical Report, prepared for the City of Seattle and the Central Association of Seattle 
under the direction of Donald Monson, February, 1963, p. 17. 
7 A. Phillip Andrus, et al., Seattle (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing 





















Monson's Proposed Transportation 
redevelopment effort was to 
convert the area into a major 
tourist attraction. Uses were to 
include a floating breakwater 
and small boat marina, motels, 
restaurants, shops, a new 
steamship terminal for the Ca-
nadian Pacific Railway, an ex-
panded commuter terminal for 
Washington State ferries, a 
heliport, and an aquarium. 
These uses were to be linked 
together by a pedestrian prome-
nade, with a moving sidewalk 
located along an elevated over- 
pass to provide access to the Pike Place Market area above. 
Further inland, the city was to redevelop its retail core. The Monson plan 
envisioned pedestrian malls along both Pike and Pine Street, linking the city's two 
primary retail nuclei. The malls would link the Westlake Mall with a park proposed for 
the site of the Pike Place Market. The plan suggested transforming the streets into 
a series of inter-related plazas, each with distinctive landscaping and architectural 
detailing. 
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Figure 3. The Waterfront 
Between the water front redevelopment and the retail core stood two districts 
scheduled for massive redevelopment. The plan presented a renewal program to 
clear and redevelop the blighted Skid Road Area, including Pioneer Square. 
Restoration of historic sites in Pioneer Square was considered and rejected. The plan 
would level sixteen blocks and recombine them into superblocks for major highrise 
office towers and parking structures. 
The proposal for the Pike Place Market district was even more massive. In 
size, it was second only to the 1962 redevelopment site of the Seattle Worlds Fair. 
The plan called for razing everything between First and Western Avenues from Union 
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Figure 4. The Pike Place Market 
to Lenora. A seven-level, 3,000 car underground garage was to be located on the site 
of the market. The garage was to be directly linked to an inner ring road. Because 
the site straddled a bluff, the  garage would require little excavation yet still not rise 
above ground level at the bluff's top. A two block landscaped plaza would cover the 
parking facility and provide Seattle with its first major downtown park. The Pike Place 
Market would be rebuilt in the same location as part of the plaza development. The 
design also called for a 1,000 unit apartment development, a major hotel, and offices 
at the southern end of the plaza. Guidelines were recommended to protect public 
accessibility to the plaza and to enhance views of the Puget Sound and Olympic 
Mountains. 
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In the words of Central Association president Ben Ehrlichman, the project would 
create "ideal view sites for high-rise apartments, ... a magnificent site for a new hotel, 
... (and) a critically needed downtown park within which the Pike Place Market can be 
rebuilt. The redevelopment would, according to Ehrlichman, enable the Market to 
"truly become a Market Place and a visitor and tourist attraction quite equal to the Los 
Angeles Farmer's Market." 8 
It is to this proposal for Pike Place Market and the controversy it entailed that 
we now turn our attention. 
Ill. Pike Plaza 
The Monson proposal for redevelopment was not unique. The spectacular 
views overlooking the Sound and its strategic location in the center of the downtown 
district had invited previous proposals. In a ten-part series on Seattle's traffic 
problems published in 1950, Harlan Edwards suggested that the market and all 
buildings covering six city blocks be demolished and a seven-story, 2,000 car parking 
garage be constructed in its stead. Edwards, a civil engineer and member of the 
planning commission, believed the garage could alleviate the city's parking problem, 
increase automobile access to the city and provide a site for a department store, a 
luxury restaurant and specialty shops. 
Acknowledging the function of the market, Edwards also proposed that the 
garage provide a place for public market stalls, with a central pickup area to enable 
8 Joyce Skaggs Brewster, "Market Wars" The Weekly September 21-29, 1981. 
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Figure 5. Edwards' 1950 Proposal for the Pike Place Market 
customers to receive purchased goods. Further, the rooftop of the garage was to be 
landscaped, creating a large city park level with First Avenue. 
Developer interest in the site was fueled by more than just site amenities. 
Property values throughout the area were depressed. The area housed and provided 
commercial services to predominantly low-income and elderly residents. Buildings 
were deteriorating through poor maintenance. Densities in the area were low. In 
short, the district was economically ripe for redevelopment. 
The district, however, had one unique feature of overriding importance: it 
housed the Municipal Market. Constructed in 1907 by the City of Seattle, the market 
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Figure 6. A Landscaped Plaza Designed for the Top of Edwards' Garage 
provided a retail outlet for farmers. The market was remarkably successful and soon 
led to the construction of public stalls extending to the north. A few years later, the 
Corner Market and Sanitary Markets were added to the east. These markets served 
as the focal point for the retail sale of local farm goods to residents of the city. 
The market remained extremely popular until the end of the Depression. 
Between 1939 and 1949, however, the market declined precipitously. From a base 
of 515 stalls rented daily in 1939, only 10% remained rented a decade later. The drop 
was caused by three basic problems. Almost half of the farmers who sold in the 
market were Japanese. Their internment during World War II removed many of them 
from farming. At the same time, the military demand for farm goods during the war 
led to concentration of farmland into the hands of fewer farmers who sold specialty 
crops directly to the government. Finally, suburban development and the advent of 
supermarkets reduced consumer demand for market produce. 
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Figure 7. The Corner Market 
As the economic health of the market declined, the resident community of 
mostly single men grew poorer and older. Physical deterioration soon became 
pronounced. The City Council considered removing city sponsorship of the market 
in 1957. The downtown business community, immediately adjacent to the market 
district, became increasingly concerned with the impact of this "urban blight" on their 
businesses. Thus, when the opportunity for urban renewal was presented, the 
business community wholeheartedly endorsed complete redevelopment of the area. 
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Figure 8. Market Environs 
With support of the Central Association, the process of urban renewal was 
initiated. A city council appointed citizen committee, Seattle Urban Renewal Enterprise 
(SURE), was created to provide advice. Most members had backgrounds in real 
estate development. Together with the Seattle Real Estate Board and the Central 
Association, SURE was appointed to review problems of urban blight and propose an 
initial urban renewal project. 
In August 1964 these groups produced a report and drawings for the Pike 
Plaza Redevelopment Project. The report proposed to demolish everything within its 
boundaries. A new market would be built atop a 3,000 car "terraced" parking garage. 
A major hotel, a 200-room motel, a 1500-person apartment complex, a park, and office 
buildings would also be constructed. By replacing the blighted area with modern 
r \ \ 
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amenities, the group hoped to lure suburbanites back into the city and increase taxes 
"a thousand percent." 
Figure 9. Hanging Out at the Market 
Not all, of course, agreed with their vision. To the residents of the area, the 
Market served as a focal point of social life. In a sea of honky-tonk growing up 
around the market, the market provided a leisurely and safe respite. 
Many, but not all, of the merchants also united in opposition. The Pike Place 
Farmers' Market Association had organized in July of 1956 to reverse the market's 
decay. Promotional campaigns had not proven particularly effective, however, and the 
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decline continued. The seeds of an organized effort to protect the market, however, 
were sown. 
Perhaps most important politically, the project was also denounced by several 
noted artists. Attracted by the color and diversity of the market, these artists were 
outraged by the proposed action. Mark Tobey, an artist of international repute, made 
known his opposition: 
Figure 10. The Life of the Market 
Landmarks with human dimensions are being torn down to be replaced by 
structures that appear never to have been touched by human hands. There 
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seems a talent today for picking the most beautiful and personal places to 
destroy--what might be called an aesthetic destructive sense. 9 
In a hearing before the City Planning Commission in September of 1963, Victor 
Steinbrueck catalyzed the opposition. An architecture professor at the University of 
Washington, he called the plan a "major catastrophe," an "unimaginative little plan ... 
not worthy of Seattle's future or appropriate to the city's unique setting." He was 
particularly incensed by the proposed "Los Angeles-style market," declaring that it 
amounted to replacing a "grandmother with a chorus girl." Together with the 
leadership of Allied Arts of Seattle (a nonprofit association of Seattle arts groups), 
Steinbrueck initiated Friends of the Market as an organization dedicated to preserving 
the market. 
Begun in the summer of 1964, the group had very little sense of what they 
could do for the market. All members, however, were clear on why they wanted to 
try. At the opening meeting, Fred Basset, a local architect, declared that the market 
reveals the face of truth. Its roughness reminds me of Seattle's beginnings, its 
lusty past, the vitality that gave it national notice long ago. It is an honest place 
in a phony time... It needs the hammer and paint brush, not the black ball of 
destruction. 
Painter Mark Tobey sent a letter from Basel which became the introduction to 
his book The World of a Market: "this fabulous array of colors and forms," wrote 
Tobey, "alive with all kinds of people from everywhere," made the market "a refuge, 
an oasis, a most human growth, the heart and soul of Seattle." Lou Guzzo, then arts 
9 Alice Shorett and Murray Morgan, The Pike Place Market, Seattle: Pacific Search 
Press, 1982 at 123-4. 
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editor of The Times, chided the city for its "blind, foolish rush to eliminate one of its 
irreplaceable treasures." 1° 
Soon thereafter, The World of a Market was published. In his introduction, 
Tobey declared 
a need to speak, today, when drastic changes are going on all around us. Our 
homes are in the path of freeways; old landmarks, many of a rare beauty, are 
sacrificed to the urge to get somewhere in a hurry; and when it is all over 
Progress reigns, queen of hollow streets shadowed by monumental towers left 
behind by giants to whom the intimacy of living is of no importance. The moon 
is still far away, but there are forces close by which are ready, with high-
sounding words, to dump you out of bed and tear from your sight the colors 
of joy. And now this unique Market is in danger of being modernized like so 
much processed cheese." 
The Friends came to sense the interactive wholeness of the market. More than 
the particular buildings, the market embodied the people as well. The market was 
therefore social as well as aesthetic, vital as well as historic. The market lived because 
of a fragile link between the physical and the social environment. If torn apart, the 
Friends believed that it could never be recreated. 
The Friends' mission was to open other people's eyes to the market. Their 
goal was preservation. In November 1964 they opened a booth in the market to 
dispense information. They raised funds by selling Tobey's The World of a Market and 
Steinbrueck's earlier Seattle Cityscape. They also sold shopping bags, two Market 
recipe books and Market sunflower buttons. Members spoke before city council and 
10 Brewster, ibid. 
11 Mark Tobey, The World of a Market, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 
in introduction). 
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Figure 11. The Multiple Functions of the Market 
the planning commission, service organizations, and church groups. They guided 
tours_of_the Marketand planted trees, shrubs, and flowers on an open hillside nearby. 
Other fundraising events--auctions, tours, parties--followed, always made part 
of the larger educational campaign. For the press and the public, Victor Steinbrueck 
co-chair of the Friends, became an ever present spokesperson for the Market. 
In 1965, compromise between the Friends and the Central Association 
appeared imminent. After meeting with Robert Ashley (co-chair of Friends), Paul 
Seibert of the Association declared that "retention of the general heart of the market 
p-ossible -anti des[rabfe Mayor-Braman appointed a Pike-Place Advisory Committee_ 
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who in turn appointed two highly respected local architects to lead its design and 
planning team. Donald Vorhees, an attorney who had previously chaired SURE and 
now chaired the Advisory Committee, stated in the Committee's June 1967 interim 
report that "we would like to preserve the market pretty much as it is" -- if the physical 
condition of the buildings made this possible. Various studies were commissioned: 
a structural survey, a sociological study, an economic feasibility study. 
At the same time, however, the redevelopment plan continued to advance. In 
September 1965 the city asked HUD (which administered urban renewal) for a 
surveys-and-planning grant. HUD provided the $370,000 requested in December 
1966. A group of 20 local investors incorporated into the Central Park Plaza 
Corporation in April 1966. Hiring the design firm of . Naramore Bain Brady and 
Johanson, the corporation also began buying property in the project area. 
In the winter of 1968, the Morse-Kirk design team unveiled five different 
preliminary plans to the Seattle Planning and Redevelopment Council. The designers' 
own preferred "Proposal 21," later modified and renamed Scheme 23, transformed the 
district into superblocks. ThpropTDsal fatiTird a "mhabititated -and expanded" market-
with a new copper roof, a 29-story hotel between Pine and Stewart near First, four 
apartment towers averaging 28 stories each, a 30-story apartment building for low-
income and elderly residents, an ice rink, parking for 4000 cars, and 300,000 square 
feet of office space. The only existing building to be preserved was the original L-
shaped market building. 
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The immediate response from the Friends was muted. With the central building 
saved and Vic Steinbrueck on sabbatical in England, Robert Ashley, now chair of the 
Friends, expressed cautious approval. At an Allied Arts meeting later that month, 
however, Fred Basset (a former partner of Morse) declared that the plan left the 
Market a refugee "isolated and adrift in an alien environment." Steinbrueck wrote from 
London that under the proposed plan, the Market could neither "retain its character 
nor continue to serve low-income shoppers nor provide space for low-income 
merchants." 
The official Friends of the Market position paper, while granting that "a sincere 
and professional effort has been made by all concerned" nonetheless warned that the 
proposal "could have a brutal and overpowering effect upon the intricate social and 
merchandising conditions in the Market." The statement called for retention of more 
farmers' stalls and old buildings, more low-income housing, assurance that rents 
would remain low enough to keep present merchants, and establishment of a "watch-
dog" committee to prevent development unsympathetic to the "established character" 
of the market. 12 
While the mayor denounced the Friends as "nitpickers" and publicly declared 
that he saw no reason to leave such a choice area in the hands of the current 
residents, the design team and the city's project managers continued meeting with the 
Friends, market operators, and other groups to modify and refine their plan. By 
September, when the City Council finally authorized submission of Scheme 23 to HUD 
12 Brewster, op cit. 
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Figure 12. In the Hands of Current Residents 
for its review, the plan had been further revised. The copper roof was gone from the 
main market building. The building would be restored "as close to an historic 
duplication as possible." The Economy and Corner Market buildings were also to be 
retained. The LaSalle and Leland Hotels were to be remodeled and kept as low-
income residences. The four original 28-story apartment buildings were redesigned 
into six towers ranging from 11 to 27 stories, while the 30-story public-housing tower 
had become a complex of buildings from five to eight stories high. 
During the six months it took HUD to review the plan, the Friends obtained 
more than 50,000 signatures petitioning the city to reconsider the plan. The petitions, 
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and the 33 hours of testimony given at public hearings, had little effect on city council. 
On August 11, 1969, the council voted unanimously to request $2 million for the first 
year of urban renewal. 
Steinbrueck and the Friends attempted a different strategy. Based on 
documents presented by the Friends, the State Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation placed two-thirds of the district (17 acres) on the National Register of 
Historic Places. Under the Historic Sites Act, public money could be spent inside a 
registered Historic Place only with prior approval by the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation. After appeal by the city, however, the Advisory Council reduced the size 
of the district to 1.7 acres. The project was once again free to move forward. 
On May 10, 1971, one day after the city received final approval for the Pike 
Plaza project, the Friends called for an initiative campaign to establish a seven-acre 
historic district and a Market Historical Commission. The initiative specified the 
organizations from which the Commission members must be selected and gave as its 
purpose 
the preservation, restoration, and improvement of such buildings and 
continuance of uses ... as ... shall be deemed to have architectural, cultural, 
economic, and historical value. 
The initiative was designed to save market "uses" as well as buildings. Within a month 
they obtained the necessary signatures to place the measure on the ballot as Initiative 
Number 1. A new group composed of political activists experienced in managing 
campaigns, formed the Alliance for a Living Market. The group augmented the 
campaign activities of the politically less experienced Friends. 
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Over the next two months, the city and development community initiated 
counter proposals. City Council, at the behest of Mayor Wes Uhlman, placed a 
second initiative measure on the ballot. This initiative, if passed, would establish a 1.7 
acre historic district. The Committee to Save the Market at 81 Pike Place was formed 
to promote the measure. With financial backing from the Committee, several 
prominent tenants of the market placed advertisements in the paper which declared 
Pike Place Merchants Ask Your Support: We've been analyzed, scrutinized 
and idolized by every hippie, do-gooder and dilettante who has needed a 
special project to earn a market merit badge. We're sick of it -- vote No. 
The final vote: 76,369 to 53,264 in favor of the Friends' sponsored initiative. 
The problems of the Market, however, were far from over. The market 
struggled along with 10 percent of its stalls rented. The building remained dilapidated. 
Code enforcement in the area had caused the resident population to drop significantly. 
The city, however, moved rapidly to implement a law it had fought hard to kill. 
City Council adopted an ordinance implementing the provisions of the initiative. Within 
the 22 acre urban renewal site, it created a seven-acre Market Historic District. The 
Council also created a Market Historic Commission to interpret the ordinance and 
establish guidelines for restoration and regulatory oversight. As required by the 
initiative, Mayor Uhlman appointed to the Commission two members from the Friends 
of the Market, two from the Seattle chapter of the American Institute of Architects, two 
from Allied Arts of Seattle, two Market property owners, two Market merchants, and 
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Figure 13. A Park Along Side the Market 
The Commission first drafted stringent guidelines to govern the district. The 
commission created a priority system for evaluating applications for use or develop-
ment: 
• as a place for the farmer to sell his produce, 
• as a place for the sale of every kind of food product, 
• as a place where citizens in the low and moderate income groups can find 
food, goods and services, and residences, and 
• as a place with the flavor of a widely varied shopping area. 
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Within that framework, the commission set out to encourage seventeen specific 
types of activity, including person-to-person sales; those offering hard-to-find goods, 
whether seasonal, ethnic, or for any other reason not readily available in the Seattle 
area; those involving light manufacturing by processes which were themselves visible 
and interesting; those catering particularly to the pedestrian, or offering goods for sale 
in a natural state as distinguished from pre-packaged; those bringing together people 
of all backgrounds, enriching the quality of life, or relating to historical Market uses or 
activities. 13 
The commission created specific regulations governing the construction of new 
structures, facades and other built objects. To maintain the character of the Market, 
new buildings must harmonize in material, scale, and form with surrounding structures. 
Buildings and facades should be of brick, stone, or concrete, preferably unpainted, 
but with approved surface treatment. Facades should have a greater proportion of 
voids than solids at pedestrian level. Commission approval as well as a building 
permit would be required before work could start on razing, remodeling, or building 
from scratch. 14 
The city planning staff began documenting the Market area, writing a Historical 
Preservation Plan, and getting the seven acres placed on the National Register of 
Historic Places. The Market Historical Commission also began to develop plans for 
the acquisition and perpetuation of the Pike Place Market and of market activities 
13 Shorett at 142. 
14 Shorett, p. 142-143. 
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Figure 14. Sur La Table, a Private Renovation 
through either public ownership or other means." A subcommittee pursued the idea 
of creating a public corporation and eventually proposed creation of a Public 
Development Authority for the urban renewal project. The Authority would work to 
restore the Market, using the financial tools of a private corporation. After state 
legislation enabled the city to establish such a corporation, the Pike Place Public 
Development Authority was chartered by the city in June of 1973. 
The P.D.A. has a twelve-member board, four appointed by the mayor, four by 
the Market Historical Commission, and four elected by the "constituency." The 
constituency was proposed as a means of encouraging public participation. Anyone 
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can become a member of the Pike Place constituency after reaching the age of 
sixteen and paying a dollar year membership fee. The Authority's mission is to 
purchase, rehabilitate, own, and manage property in the Pike Place Public Market. 15 
Figure 15. The Urban Renewal District 
Actions taken within the historic district had to fit within the pattern of the larger 
22 acre urban renewal district. As developed in a series of evening workshops at the 
Seattle Center, the governing philosophy for the renewal area was to be preserve first, 
repair second, restore third and reconstruct only when necessary. Within the historic 
15 Shorett, p. 145. 
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district, the plan called for the rehabilitation of twenty-four structures, the rehabilitation 
or replacement of seventeen others. Steinbrueck and the Friends of the Market 
opposed the plan as being too vague. The former members of the Alliance for a 
Living Market and the Historical Commission supported the plan. The city council 
approved the plan. 16 
Figure 16. The Market at First Avenue 
All told, the urban renewal project cost almost $50 million in public funds. 
Fourteen million dollars was spent on restoring the original market alone. the Corner 
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Figure 17. The Stewart House 
Market was similarly renovated. The Stewart House, once destined for demolition, 
was converted into housing offering single rooms and shared bathrooms. The wood-
frame Camp Hotel was demolished and ninety-six housing units for low-income 
tenants were erected in its stead. A forty-nine unit low-income apartment house was 
built on the site previously occupied by the LaSalle. 
The Pike Place Public Development Authority acquired deeds to the Corner 
Market in 1975, the Soames/Dunn Buildings and the Triangle Building in 1976, the 
Main Market and the Economy Market in 1977, the Cliff House Hotel in 1979, and the 
Sanitary Market in 1980. Private financing has enabled the renovation of many 
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privately held buildings, including the Fairmount Hotel; the Butterworth Building; Alaska 
Trade; the Seattle Garden Center/Sur La Table; and the new Olson-Walker Building. 
Currently the Pike Place Market is governed through six organizations. These 
include: 17 
• Preservation and Development Authority (PDA). Chartered in 1973 by the City 
of Seattle following the 1971 passage of the historic "Save the Market" initiative, 
the PDA is a public, non-profit corporation which manages 80% of the property 
contained within the seven-acre Market Historical District. PDA staff includes 
administrative personnel, janitorial and maintenance crews, and security. The 
PDA owns and manages commercial, residential and daystall properties. Four 
parking lots are also managed by the PDA. 
• PDA Council. PDA staff actions are governed by 12 volunteer Council 
members. The PDA Council is made up as follows: four are appointed by the 
Mayor's office, four are elected by the Market Constituency, and four are 
appointed by the Council itself. Each member serves a four-year term. 
• Constituency. The Constituency is a public organization made up of individuals 
interested in Market affairs. Meetings are held on a quarterly basis. Anyone 
over age 16 may join; annual dues are $1. Members receive copies of the 
Market Record, published monthly by the PDA. Four PDA Council members 
are elected by the Constituency. All officer positions are voluntary. 
• Pike Place Merchants Association. The Merchants Association jointly promotes 
the Market with the PDA. If needed, this organization acts as an advocate in 
the event of tenant/landlord disputes. The Market's Street Fair, held each year 
over Memorial Weekend, is managed by the Association, along with sales and 
production of Market posters. A health care plan on behalf of Market 
community members is administered by this organization. 
• The Historical Commission. Administered by the City of Seattle's Office of 
Urban Conservation, the Commission is an elected body of representatives 
from property owners and residents within the Historical District, grass-roots 
organizations instrumental in passing the "Save the Market" initiative, and Allied 
Arts. The Commission administers guidelines and policies regarding what type 
of businesses can exist within the Historical District, type of merchandise sold, 
17 Public Market Preservation and Development Authority, "Pike Place Market: 
Governing Organizations." 1988. 
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signage, design changes, new development or renovation to existing 
structures. The Commission helps maintain and preserve the Market's historic 
character by application of these guidelines. 
• The Market Foundation. The Foundation is an "umbrella organization" that is 
responsible for raising funds to be distributed to the social service agencies 
within the Historical District. These agencies include the Pike Market Childcare 
Center, the Pike Market Clinic, the Senior Center, and Downtown Food Bank. 
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Figure 1. The Oglethorpe Plan 
walled, with live-
stock allowed to 
graze in the 
squares, protected 
within the confines 
of the city. 
The belt of 
open land sur-
rounding the city 
was also held in 
common. Until 
1865, expansion of 
the city was locat-
ed on this publicly 
held land. In this 
context, city offi-
cials were able to 
provide for an orderly growth that conformed with the Oglethorpe plan. In all, 24 
wards and the neighborhoods to the east and the west of the original Forsyth Park 
were developed on common land over the 120 years following the founding of the city. 
In 1851, the last neighborhood built on common lands was developed around the 16 
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acre Forsyth Park. The park, laid out on axis with the original Johnson Square, 
formed the terminus to the Oglethorpe inspired plan. 
Beginning in 1865, the city of Savannah grew rapid onto the privately owned 
farmlands that surrounded the city. The city council adopted an official street and 
open space plan for the area, extending an uniform grid street system while providing 
for only two small parks. Streetcars were located to link the area to the waterfront. 
Between Gwinett Street and Victory Drive, over 400 acres of suburbs were developed 
before the turn of the century. 
During the early twentieth century, and particularly during the Depression, the 
city squares fell into disrepair. Many were unkept and covered with weeds. Half were 
little more than dirt lots. Streetcar lines pierced the squares, emergency vehicles 
regularly drove through them and an automobile club proposed paving thoroughfares 
through their centers. In 1935, the city bisected the three westernmost squares to 
create the terminus of Interstate 16. The creation of the Civic Center further eroded 
the Oglethorpe plan. 
The decay of the squares was coupled to a general decay in the housing stock 
of the historic core of Savannah. Built as a prosperous residential city, Savannah 
consisted primarily of town and row houses built of soft Savannah grey brick, often 
covered with stucco. The city, however, lost many of its residents to suburban 
development. This suburbanization began in the 1920s, accelerated rapidly in the 
1940s. 
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Between 1950 and 1960, the out-migration of residents from Old Savannah 
reached crisis conditions. Between 1950 and 1960, the district lost over a fifth of its 
population.' In 1950, only 7% of the historic district homes were owner occupied. 
Over half (53%) of all housing units were dilapidated. 2 During the next two decades, 
conditions continued to worsen in many sections of the district as the neighborhood 
deteriorated through disinvestment. Row upon row of the city's town houses were 
turned into tenements or torn down. New buildings that were constructed were 
mediocre and out of scale and character with their setting. Although from time to time 
an occasional building was saved, it was not until the 1950's that the historic district 
received serious attention. 
I. The Historic District 
Virtually everyone in Savannah, from the Chamber of Commerce to the 
suburban residents, now considers the squares essential to the slow-paced ambience 
of a walking city. The historic fabric of the city is widely admired and appreciated. 
From a base of 25,000 visitors per year in the mid 1950s, the city now attracts over 
5.1 million visitors per year. All told, these visitors spend $493 million in the local 
economy, making tourism the county's third largest industry. 3 ' 4 
1 1950 and 1960 U.S. Census of Population. 
21950 U.S. Census of Housing. 
3"5.1 million tourists visit Savannah with more to spend," The Atlanta 













ing as Figure 2. The Old City Market 
 
models of progress and suburbs depleting the central city of its population, the 
Chamber's call to progress was a call to demolition and new construction. Historic 
Savannah Foundation countered the "call for progress" of the late 1950's through the 
slogan that "in Savannah, historic preservation goes hand in hand with economic 
progress."5 The Foundation's public education campaign stressed that if Savannah 
capitalized on its unique historic and architectural assets, it could have a multi-million 
"Savannah reclaiming historic squares," The Atlanta Constitution, 
December 23, 1985 at 13A. 
5Lee Adler, personal interview. 
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dollar tourist industry and at the same time recreate an urban environment of the 
highest quality. 
With the assistance of Colonial Williamsburg and the Georgia Institute of 
Technology, the Historic Savannah Foundation was able to assess and document 
Savannah's tourist potential. Georgia Tech's study suggested that with $300,000 a 
year invested in restoration and in promotion, Savannah could produce tourist and 
convention revenues of up to 150 million dollars annually. Since that time, Historic 
Savannah Foundation has spear-headed a drive that has restored over 1000 buildings 
and reclaimed nearly 3 square miles of downtown property. These efforts have 
resulted in 400 million dollars in construction activity in restoration--approximately 55 
million dollars in related real estate activity and an extremely active market in buildings 
whose values have often risen ten to twenty times in the past twenty-five years. 6 
The first efforts at renewal of historic Savannah began in the late 1940s. These 
efforts focused on a few specific projects such as garden rehabilitation projects and 
public building restorations. The efforts, however, were not primarily oriented toward 
preservation. To improve automobile access to Broughton Street (the city's 
commercial center), the city demolished its city market and constructed an extremely 
mundane parking garage in its place. The destruction of the market, a beautifully 
crafted building, catalyzed concern that existed amongst some of Savannah's leading 
citizens. 
6Personal Interview, Lee Adler. 
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Figure 3. The City Garage, on the Site of the Old City Market 
In 1954, an effort to preserve a private residence, the Davenport House, led to 
the formation of the Historic Savannah Foundation (HSF). Before being abandoned, 
the Davenport House had been converted into a tenement where eleven families lived. 
Seven women organized the Foundation as a vehicle for purchasing the Davenport 
House. The women, unskilled in either property management or real estate 
management, promptly gave the deed to another organization. In the process, 
however, they attracted the interest of a group of businessmen who joined them. The 
HSF modelled itself after the Historic Charleston Foundation, a non-profit organization 










Figure 4. The Davenport House 
During this period, other individual buildings attracted concern. The National 
Board of Girl Scouts of America purchased and restored the Wayne Gordon House. 
The house was the birthplace of the organization's founder, Juliette Gordon Low. The 
Green Meldrim House, where General Sherman stayed during his occupation of 
Savannah, was also preserved. Efforts to convert William Jay's Owens-Thomas 
House into a public museum were also begun. Throughout most of the 1950s, 
however, the attention of the Foundation was focused on a few, select buildings. 
In 1959, the loosely-knit organization began to plan a cohesive program of 
community action. Goals were set, with initial emphasis placed on a public education 
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program. The program began to reawaken local resident pride in Savannah's historic 
and architectural heritage. Research on the potential economic benefits of restoration 
were assessed and publicized. 
Before systematic plans for restoration could commence, the Foundation 
needed an appraisal of Savannah's historic buildings. The Foundation financed a 
professional inventory of the nearly 3,000 structures in the 3 square mile downtown 
section. This survey later served as the basis for both the urban renewal programs 
and the historic zoning ordinances. Financed with $25,000 in grants from the Junior 
League and the Wormsloe Foundation, the full cost of the survey was recovered 
through sale of the published results. 
During this period, demolition of historic buildings was being encouraged by 
both economics and public policy. The soft, porous grey brick used in constructing 
much of historic Savannah was in much demand. The brick could not be easily 
duplicated and was widely desired in suburban Savannah home construction. 
Consequently, an historic brick could be sold for three times what a common brick 
cost. Given the widespread abandonment and low prices of buildings in the historic 
district, a wrecker could purchase a building and make a profit of 50% or more on the 
brick alone. Federal policy exacerbated the problem by providing FHA loans to 
homebuyers in suburban locations but not in older residential neighborhoods. 
In the early 1960s, the Foundation initiated its first highly-leveraged real estate 
operations. Up until now, buildings purchased by the Foundation had remained in the 
hands of the Foundation. No other process for preserving the buildings had been 
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identified. The Davenport House had been purchased directly by seven interested 
citizens and converted into a house museum and the Foundation's headquarters. 
Other financial techniques would be needed, however. In 1963, to save the Oliver 
Sturgess Mansion, built in 1813, the Foundation created a syndication in which many 
interested persons lent relatively small amounts of cash. An unsubordinated loan of 
$50,000 was obtained based on a $26,000 upfront investment by Historic Savannah 
Foundation. Much of the $26,000 in privately provided funds was lent to the 
Foundation interest-free. 
Historic Savannah Foundation's membership grew to a thousand as community 
enthusiasm and understanding of its goals increased. The Foundation was 
reorganized: an executive secretary and other staff were employed, the Board of 
Trustees was enlarged and an executive committee composed of the chairpersons of 
standing committees was formed. A steering committee, composed of the officers 
and businessmen, developed new organizational policies regarding methods of 
privately financing historic preservation. 
As developed by the steering committee, the Foundation sought to purchase 
buildings for resale to individuals who would restore them. The resale contract would 
contain protective covenants attached. The Foundation would stop the practice of 
restoring buildings itself. 
To execute this policy, the Foundation needed a stable source of monies. In 
1964, a revolving fund was created to provide capital to the Foundation's first 
significant effort at area-wide restoration. The revolving fund was created out of a 
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$75,000 grant from a local foundation and $125,000 in other private contributions. 
Concurrently, the Foundation developed a consortium of banks to help finance the 
purchase and resale of buildings. 
The elements of effective action had been pieced together. The Foundation 
had a core professional staff, a published inventory and access to funds through a 
$200,000 three-year revolving fund and a $500,000 line of bank credit. The first area 
restoration project was now possible. The Pulaski Square and West Jones Street area 
restoration project was launched. The area, while blighted, had rated high in the 
Foundation's professional inventory. The Foundation first optioned or bought houses 
in the area. The restoration project officially opened on November 21, 1965, with 
14,000 people in attendance. Over 90 buildings in the area were sold to homebuyers 
under covenants protecting historic characteristics of the buildings. With only $38,000 
of seed money, over $5,000,000 in private restoration occurred.' 
Across the historic district to the east, just one square south of the Davenport 
House, an urban renewal preservation effort was initiated in the ward surrounding 
Troup Square. The effort was the first urban renewal conservation program in the 
south. The city's Housing Authority accepted the Troup Ward area as a pilot project 
after Historic Savannah purchased the abandoned buildings for $24,000. The area 
included over 15 acres and encompassed 82 structures and 127 dwelling units. Using 
federal monies, the housing authority initiated a rehabilitation demonstration project. 
The city provided public investment for improvements to the streets and Troup Square. 
'Lee Adler, Personal Interview. 
Thirty-six structures were privately rehabilitated with Section 312 loans. These federal 
loans were provided at interest rates of 3% and could be subordinated to private 
mortgages. Because the loan was subordinated, a buyer could re-mortgage the 
property to obtain funds for restoration. 
Figure 5. Historic Residence 
At the same time guidelines were developed to fit in new buildings compatibly 
with their old neighbors. Sixteen criteria were developed, including: 
• height: within 10 percent of the average height of the district, 
• proportion of buildings' front facades: width to be approximately one to one 
and a half times height, 
• proportion of openings within the facade: height of windows to be twice that 
of width, 
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• rhythm of solids to voids in front facade: strong and weak elements of the 
facade to alternate recurrently, 
• rhythm of spacing of buildings on streets: building mass and open space 
between buildings to alternate recurrently, 
• rhythm of entrance and/or porch projections: entrances and porches on 
buildings throughout a neighborhood to project rhythmically, 
• relationship of materials: predominant material used in neighborhood to be 
reflected in new construction, 
• relationship of textures: predominant textures used in neighborhood to be 
reflected in new construction, 
• relationship of color: predominant colors used in neighborhood to be reflected 
in new construction, 
• relationship of architectural details: predominant details used in neighborhood 
to be reflected in new construction, 
• relationship of roof shapes: predominant roof shapes used in neighborhood 
to be reflected in new construction, 
• walls of continuity: continuous, cohesive walls of enclosure around streets to 
be maintained, 
• relationship of landscaping: mass, quality and continuity of landscaping to be 
maintained, 
• ground cover: predominant ground cover used in neighborhood to be reflected 
in new construction, 
• scale: scale of building mass, architectural details and building units to reflect 
neighborhood construction, and 
• directional expression of front elevation: the vertical, horizontal or non-
directional character of the building's front elevation to reflect neighborhood. 8 
8City of Savannah, Historic Preservation Plan for the Central Area 
General Neighborhood Renewal Area, Savannah Georgia, (Report prepared 
by Eric Hill Associates, Planning Consultants, undated) 
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Figure 6. Historic Commercial Structure 
In 1966, the Department of Interior designated the downtown area covered by 
the Foundation's inventory as a national historic district. By the late 1960s, the 
process of restoration had reached a critical mass. Before completed, the restoration 
effort would require that Historic Savannah Foundation raise one million dollars in cash 
and four million dollars in loans over a ten year period. While a substantial amount, 
the investment was able to leverage some $400 million dollars in private restoration 
and new construction. Historic Savannah's headquarters now houses an active staff 
and many activities, including an historic district tour service which produces 
$1,000,000 in revenues a year. Volunteer help and the cooperation of many city and 
county agencies have enabled the Foundation to launch a number of programs. 
Some, such as the installation of signs designating the names of squares, focused on 
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physical improvements. Others, such as the organization of an annual celebration 
commemorating the founding of the colony on February 12, 1733, seek to build public 
involvement. This festival is now a week long. Education programs also remain 
central to the mission of the Foundation. An heritage classroom has been constructed 
in the Massie School. The classroom is used to educate the children of Savannah in 
the value of Savannah's architecture, its architects, and its city plan. The education 
emphasizes Savannah's national uniqueness. The program is designed to help insure 
a constituency for the protection of Old Savannah. 
In 1973, the rehabilitation of the historic core had transformed the district. Once 
again, it was vibrant, restored, livable. From a condition of wholesale abandonment, 
the district had been renewed. The availability of historic structures for low prices had 
fueled two decades of restoration. The federal Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation found that the appraised valued of Historic District blocks grew by 275% 
between 1965 and 1978, compared to a county-wide growth of 184%. 9 The problem 
of managing the district therefore changed, from one of rehabilitation to one of 
maintenance. In this year, the city created the Savannah Historic District Board of 
Architectural Review. The Board was given authority over the area bounded by the 
Savannah River and Gwinett Street on the north and south, and East Broad w and 
9Dennis Gale, Neighborhood Revitalization and the Postindustrial City, 
(Lexington MA: D. C. Heath and Co., 1975 at 17) 
10Between the River and Broughton, the east boundary extends to 
Randolph Street. 
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West Boundary Streets to the east and west. Altogether, the district includes 2.5 
square miles and is the nation's largest urban historic district. 
Figure 7. The Desoto Hilton, in the Center of the Historic District 
The Board consists of seven members, appointed by the Mayor and Alderman 
for three year terms. Members must reside in the city and have a demonstrated 
interest in the preservation and development of the Historic District. Staff support is 
provided by the Metropolitan Planning Commission. The City Preservation Officer 
provides much of this support. 
The management of this district creates considerable difficulty. The Board 
reviews all elements of development, redevelopment, rehabilitation and preservation 
that affect the visual quality of the Historic District. Exterior architectural changes and 
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new construction are regulated. The Board reviews an average of 150 to 175 new 
petitions per year. Approximately 35 percent of these petitions involve significant 
actions associated with renovations, new construction or demolition. The remainder 
of petitions center on color changes, signs and awnings, landscaping elements and 
similar actions. 
The revitalization of Old Savannah, while extremely successful at restoring the 
architectural and design integrity of the central district, did so through considerable 
displacement. While many of the buildings originally purchased by the Foundation 
were abandoned, the widespread private rehabilitation of residences inflated rents 
throughout the district. Between 1970 and 1980, the largely low-income black 
population dropped by almost 1,000 residents. 11 Vacancies, which stood at 11% in 
1970, increased to 18% in 1980 12 as low-income residents moved to less expensive 
quarters at a rate faster than higher income residents moved in. The problem of 
gentrification was to become a central issue in the preservation efforts associated with 
the Victorian District. 
II. Commercial Revitalization 
Not all redevelopment in the historic district was focused on residential 
structures. With the decline of the housing stock, a corresponding decline in 
commercial opportunities also occurred. • Between the 1940s and the late 1960s, 
11 1970 and 1980 U.S. Census of Population and Housing. 
121970 and 1980 U.S. Census of Population and Housing. 
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demolition and reconstruction of the factor's walk and factor's row complex were 
repeatedly proposed. The complex marks the historic riverfront which spans nearly 
a mile where the city was founded. Built in the prosperous commercial days when 
Savannah served as a central port for the export of cotton, the complex links the city 
with its port on the Savannah River. As such, it was the life-line of the city. Ramps 
and retaining walls were built to preserve the 40-foot bluff along which the city was 
built. Freestanding warehouses were erected on the river level and joined to the top 
of the bluff, called the strand. Because of the height difference, the buildings are two 
stories on the city side but five stories on their balconied Savannah River side. 
In the late 1960s this complex was threatened by developers planning a 15-
story motel and apartment. These and other proposals for highrise construction on 
the river were rejected by the city. Instead, with federal assistance, the city 
constructed a $7.5 million dollar riverside plaza to reinvigorate the deteriorating 
riverfront area. River Street was repaved with block and cobblestone. The plaza, 
named after John Rousakis, the city's five-term mayor, has attracted shops, 
restaurants and other private investments totalling over $100 million. 
Chief amongst these investments includes a riverfront Hyatt that bisects the 
plaza. The original proposal called for a 15 story hotel. A lawsuit forced the city and 
the hotel to agree to a 9 story structure. The building, made of modern materials, 
textures, colors and design elements, remains in sharp contrast to the historic district 
surrounding it. 
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Figure 8. The Hyatt Regency 
III. The Victorian District 
In 1856, the Victorian District was created as Savannah's first streetcar suburb. 
Located directly south of the historic district, the Victorian District had a significantly 
different character than Old Savannah. As the first area developed on private lands, 
it contained no squares. Forsyth Park was extended into the district, and Dixon Park, 
a smaller park located at the southeast corner of the neighborhood, were provided. 
Furthermore, because the houses were located outside the city fire zone, wood frame 
houses were allowed. Construction is therefore primarily of wood, not brick. 
The Victorian District contains 900 buildings on 182 acres. The area contains 
a wide array of architectural styles. These styles in part reflect the divergent groups 
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who lived there. Many residents had immigrated from France, Germany, Ireland and 
elsewhere. The styles range from early Greek Revival to later Queen Anne and Italiate 
designs. Many of the buildings combined several different styles. Development was 
compact. Many houses hosted up and down stair apartments, with small servant 
cottages located at the rear service lanes. 
In 1950, the Victorian District was a diverse neighborhood of whites, blacks, 
and immigrants. Blocks, however, were not integrated. The 17% of the population 
that was black lived either in the land cottages or along blocks adjacent to East and 
West Broad Street. Boarders were very common, as were professional and working 
class residents. Many of the housing units were deteriorating, with 43% either 
dilapidated or lacking running water. 13 
By 1970, the resident population had shifted dramatically. Almost 90% of the 
residents were black, most were low-income and 35% were elderly. Over three-
quarters of the white homeowners had left the neighborhood, leaving less than 15% 
of residential units occupied by owners. Thirty-seven percent of the existing housing 
stock, especially the servant cottages, had been demolished. At the same time, 
housing projects of the 1930s and 1940s, and a 1950 commercial urban renewal 
project, had increased its population and its density. 
13Charles Thaddeus Crowe, Savannah's Victorian District: A Ten Year 
Evaluation of Neighborhood Revitalization, (Georgia Institute of Technology: 
Thesis for Masters in City Planning, March 1987). 
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Despite these many changes, by the early 1970s over half of the resident 
population had lived in the neighborhood for more than ten years." Problems were 
accelerating, as crime rates and overcrowding increased. Houses were extensively 
partitioned, with absentee landlords unwilling to repair properties. 15 Over 55% of the 
population was below the poverty level and almost half of all families were headed by 
females. 
In 1973, the Historic Savannah Foundation refocused some of its attention onto 
the Victorian District. An HSF survey of 361 buildings enabled the District to be placed 
on the National Register of Historic Places. As the availability of architecturally and 
historically significant houses in the national historic district diminished, homebuyers 
increasingly looked to the Victorian District. The 25% tax investment credits granted 
by the 1976 Tax Act and the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 made gentrification of 
the District an imminent threat to local residents. 
Many residents of Savannah believed that the quality of the housing stock could 
be preserved without displacement of low-income residents. One such person was 
Mills Lane. Lane, a Savannah banker, purchased and restored 50 low-income units. 
Following restoration in the mid 1970s, he placed residents back in the units at pre-
renovation rent levels. 16 
14Ci• - of Savannah surveys. 
15"Victorian restoration: Savannah Seeks to Keep Poor in Renewed 
Area," Atlanta Journal-Constitution, September 4, 1977, Section A at 6. 
16"The Private Revamping of Savannah," Washington Post, April 6, 1975 
Section A at 3. 
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Many attempts to rehabilitate the rental stock failed, however. The Varnedoe 
Chisholm Skinner Real Estate Corporation and the Boston Financial Technological 
Group purchased options on 121 units. With the 1973 national moratorium on Section 
221 and 236 subsidized housing programs, the venture was turned over to the 
Savannah Area Housing and Development Corporation (SHADCO), the development 
corporation associated with the Model Cities Program. SHADCO was also unable to 
develop an effective program before Model Cities' funding was cut. 
The district, virtually unrestored and falling down, attracted the interest of a 
group of citizens who formed the Savannah Landmark Rehabilitation Project (SLRP). 
Organized in 1974 by Lee Adler, SLRP is a non-profit housing corporation headed by 
a culturally diverse board. The board consists of 25 members, including business-
men, ministers, social workers, architects and other civic and neighborhood leaders. 
Savannah Landmark seeks to rehabilitate existing buildings into safe, sanitary housing 
for the poor. 
First, a broad spectrum of Savannah citizens formed a culturally diverse 25 
member board. The National Endowment for the Arts-Architecture Section awarded 
Savannah Landmark a $17,000 matching grant. The nucleus of a staff was employed. 
Options that had been taken out some years before by the Varnedoe Chisholm 
Skinner Real Estate Corporation were exercised. The Carver State Bank, a minority 
bank in Savannah located on the western fringe of the Victorian District, provided 
$180,000 at prime interest to help the neighborhood and strengthen the bank's 
constituency. 
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Figure 9. Renovation in the Victorian District 
A demonstration project of three houses on Price Street was initiated. The 
1200 square foot semi-detached buildings were located in an area eligible for 3% 
Section 312 HUD rehabilitation loans. Carver Bank lent the acquisition funds and the 
city awarded the project a $100,000 CETA grant. Fourteen young men and women 
were employed. A contractor with 25 years experience supervised construction and 
taught the CETA workers the building trades, both on-the-job skills and at night 
school. Thus began Project SNAP--Savannah Neighborhood Action Plan. 
Savannah Landmark, the National Endowment for the Arts, and the National 
Trust jointly sponsored a national conference on displacement. The Savannah 
Neighborhood Action Conference held in November 1977 was attended by 400 people 
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from 38 states. Participants included urban planner Edmund Bacon (who called it the 
most important conference he ever attended), columnist Neil Pearce, HUD officials, 
housing activists and planners. In workshops and seminars held in neighborhood 
schools and churches, the problems of displacement were analyzed. 
HUD announced administrative help to Savannah Landmark with a $160,000 
18-month administrative project grant through the city to continue Savannah 
Landmark's work. The Carver State Bank was joined by a consortium of local banks. 
The monies enabled Savannah Landmark to purchase additional apartments. 
Savannah Landmark had become a management-construction/housing corporation, 
with the backing of the Mayor and Council of the City of Savannah, the Housing 
Authority of Savannah, the Savannah Branch of the NAACP, the Junior League of 
Savannah, Inc., Historic Savannah Foundations, Inc., Savannah's banks and other 
city-wide organizations. 
In spite of this support, the residents of the Victorian District remained skeptical. 
A block party was held one Saturday noon. Five hundred people came, young and 
old. With $100 of hotdogs and Kool-Aid being served up by board members, the 
participants had an opportunity to help select the paint colors for the first buildings. 
The National Trust for Historic Preservation awarded Savannah Landmark a 
$50,000 loan at low interest from its revolving fund. The Ford Foundation provided 
a grant and SNAP II was begun. Savannah Landmark negotiated the purchase of 261 
apartments owned by one landlord. The Ford Foundation provided a loan of 
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$750,000, with the city providing the remaining $900,000 of the purchase price. The 
purchase was arranged. 
In May of 1982, Cranston Mortgage & Equity Corporation of Ohio and 
Washington, D.C. and Savannah Landmark as co-partners joined in a for-profit 
partnership that led to the syndication of 233 apartments, including 44 newly 
constructed ones on vacant land in the Victorian District. The innovative project 
employed 200 CETA workers during the 18 month project, of which 65% were placed 
in paying, non-subsidized jobs. The limited partners received tax benefits, while 
management and ownership of the apartments remained in non-profit hands. 
Throughout this period, the city continued to provide significant resources to 
the Victorian District. The city obtained an allocation of 500 Section 8 rental subsidy 
units from HUD and provided half of these to SLRP. The city also spent $2.3 million 
in renovating Forsyth and Dixon parks, as well as sidewalk repair and replacement, 
tree planting and street improvements. 17 
In 1981, the city instituted the Victorian Planned Neighborhood Conservation 
District. Long supported by the Historic Savannah Foundation, the district was 
nonetheless controversial. Its purpose was to conserve the architectural and historic 
integrity of the district. The review procedure requires that the Metropolitan Planning 
Commission ensure that plans for alterations and new construction were compatible 
with design guidelines developed for the district. Originally, the review procedure was 
17Beth Lattimore Reiter, Rita Jones, Leopold Adler II and Catherine 
Adler, Preservation for People in Savannah: Savannah Landmark Rehabilita-
tion Project, November 1983 at 17. 
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opposed by both the planning director of the MPC and Savannah's city manager as 
being too cumbersome. When city council agreed to hire a MPC "Visual Compatibility 
Officer" with review and approval powers within the Victorian District, the MPC agreed 
to the legislation. Beth Lattimore Reiter, formerly of HSF and SLRP, became the first 
historic preservation review officer hired by the city. 
Prior to receiving a building permit for construction, demolition, alterations, 
signs or material changes, the petitioner's plans must be reviewed and approved by 
the MPC Visual Compatibility Officer. Application is made to the Savannah Depart-
ment of Inspections and forwarded to MPC's preservation planner. A recommenda-
tion for approval or denial is made to the Visual Compatibility Officer who has final 
responsibility for certifying the proposed actions. Applications for demolition and new 
construction are reviewed by the full Commission. 
In November 1982, President Reagan and HUD Secretary Pierce gave 
Savannah Landmark a national recognition award for excellence. All told, the 
$20,000,000 housing effort is the largest scattersite urban preservation project in the 
country that joins preservation with low-income people. 
IV. Broughton Street 
While residential development continues in the Victorian District, a new program 
of commercial revitalization has been initiated on Broughton Street, the city's primary 
retail street. Located in the heart of the Historic District, Broughton Street contains 
many architecturally outstanding buildings. Most of these buildings, however, have 
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Figure 10. On Broughton Street 
been renovated with false fronts that cover-up their quality. Many of the commercial 
buildings are unused. Some notable restorations have occurred on Broughton and 
Congress Streets, but much of Broughton Street today is deteriorating and neglected. 
A plan has been proposed which would restore existing buildings and return the street 
to retail, residential, entertainment and office uses. Restoration of the old street car 
system is also envisioned. 
A city-commissioned study conducted by Urban Partners, E. L. Crowe and 
Strauss Greenberg, identifies 150 million dollars of retail potential within 4 miles of 
Broughton Street. Based on this assessment, a Broughton Street development 
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Victorian District and the riverfront: a strong city--private effort. The partnership 
optioned over 30 buildings on Broughton Street to assure tenants that the street would 
be restored. 
Figure 11. Commercial Revitalization 
The project emphasizes the architecture that is behind the present fronts of the 
old buildings. Drawings showing the original architecture of the buildings were 
developed based on research at the Georgia Historical Society. The drawings showed 
widespread use of distinctive arches, fan windows, and architecturally significant styles 
from different eras. The Partnership's first project was a mixed use project -- 400,000 
square feet; 150,000 square feet of office; 125,000 square feet of housing plus 
125,000 square feet of retail and entertainment, all designed to reutilize the buildings 
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I. Historic Context 
Baltimore is a port city built on transportation, commerce, industry, and 
immigration. Located 20 miles from the Chesapeake Bay and over 150 miles from the 
Atlantic Ocean, its inland location proved highly advantageous to its early develop-
ment. Tapping a hinterland rich in forests, farms, pasturelands, water power, and 
coal, early residents of Baltimore built a city whose population was second only to 
New York. 
The city was quick to adopt new forms of transportation technology. The city 
designed and built the famous "Clippers" which dominated much of sailboat-based 
commercial trade in the early 1800s. With the invention of the steam engine, the city 
quickly shifted to construction of steamboats. Baltimore also initiated construction of 
the 400 mile Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at a time when the longest railroad in the world 
was 14 miles long. 
These technological advances enabled Baltimore to sustain its economic growth 
into the early twentieth century. This growth was reversed by the impact of the 
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Depression and by new technologies of transportation that emerged following World 
War II. With the emergence of truck hauling and other more flexible forms of general 
cargo hauling, the city lost much of its general cargo business. While remaining a 
dominant force in bulk cargo shipments, the loss of the more profitable general cargo 
business seriously altered both the economy of the city and the function of the port 
and railroads. 
These changes in port activity were coincident with a major shift in demograph-
ics. As an immigrant city, Baltimore had a strong tradition of neighborhoods and 
housing development. Over 300 distinct neighborhoods can be identified, each with 
its own identity and frequently with its own culture and traditions. After a decade of 
economic stagnation during the 1930s, the city experienced very rapid growth in the 
early 1940s. As a major industrial and shipbuilding center, Baltimore required 
considerable labor to staff the defense industry during World War II. The resulting 
immigration of poor southern black workers into the city led to a condition of 
overcrowding in many neighborhoods. With the development of suburban communi-
ties following the war, middle class outmigration from the city fueled housing 
abandonment as owner occupied housing was sold to absentee landlords and 
eventually abandoned. 
In turn, the rapid decline in housing quality fueled further declines in tax 
receipts, in downtown commerce and in general economic activity. The 1954 closing 
of O'Neill's Department Store, one of the city's largest, symbolized years of declining 
downtown retail sales. Only one major new office building had been constructed in 
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the downtown in 25 years, six major employers had recently moved out of the 
downtown, the vacancy rate was as high as 25 percent in some downtown blocks and 
property assessments were falling.' 
The city, then, entered the 1960s with a declining economy and severe fiscal 
constraints. The city was frequently perceived as a city without a future, a way station 
between New York and Washington. Seen from within this context, the plans and 
activities of the civic leaders demonstrated considerable vision and entrepreneurial 
spirit. 
II. The Formative Years: The Downtown Plan 
When in 1956, the city's planning director published a bold vision of Baltimore 
as "one of the most exciting cities in the world," a water oriented city similar to 
"Stockholm, Rio de Janeiro, Venice and Copenhagen," 2 most residents were 
skeptical. Baltimore had become a city of dilapidated housing and deteriorating 
neighborhoods. Its downtown was losing its focus as a retail center. Its waterfront 
was crowded with vacant warehouses. The decline of the city's industrial, commercial 
and residential base was widely evident. 
Yet within the city there were those who shared the aspirations expressed in 
the plan. The plan, while vague and futuristic, nonetheless envisioned a vibrant 
'Baltimore City Department of Planning, The Baltimore Harbor, (Baltimore: Report 
of the City Department of Planning, 1984, p. 80). 
2Arthur McVoy, "Prospectus for Downtown Baltimore," The Evening Sun, July 16, 
1956. 
V-3 
downtown linked to a revitalized waterfront. These aspirations were shared by 
members of both the Committee for Downtown and the Greater Baltimore Committee. 
The consequence of these overlapping interests was the formation of one of the 
strongest public-private joint ventures to be established in the United States at the 
time. 
The Committee for Downtown was established in 1954. Under the leadership 
of Jefferson Miller, executive vice-president of The Hecht Co. and director of the Retail 
Merchants Association, downtown merchants initiated a study of how other cities were 
managing similar problems. The merchants, quickly realizing that they could not 
resolve the issues alone, linked with utilities, banks and other downtown property 
owners to form the Committee for Downtown. The expressed objective of the 
committee was to address issues of downtown revitalization. 
One year later, 100 top executives of Baltimore's major corporations formed the 
Greater Baltimore Committee. While the overall focus of this organization was on 
metropolitan issues, the committee took a particularly active interest in downtown 
revitalization. In 1956, the Greater Baltimore Committee formed The Planning Council, 
a wholly owned subsidiary created to address issues of redevelopment. With 
$150,000 contributed from the Committee for Downtown and additional $75,000 from 
the Greater Baltimore Committee, The Planning Council initiated a comprehensive 
study designed to create a plan for revitalizing the downtown. 
David Wallace, a young but well respected planner and architect from 
Philadelphia, was commissioned for the study. The team headed by Wallace 
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conducted five major studies: inventories of existing buildings and space use, surveys 
of business conditions and downtown transportation, and a forecast of central 
business district trends. The initial examination focused on 220 acres located in the 
center of downtown. From this analysis, Wallace felt certain that investor confidence 
would not improve unless "drastic action" was taken. The team proposed a single, 
dramatic project to anchor future downtown redevelopment. 
Figure 1. Charles Center and the Downtown 
The project, known as Charles Center, called for complete redevelopment of 
14 city blocks (33 acres) of downtown land. As a linear redevelopment on a north-
south axis, Charles Center runs almost the full length of the downtown district. With 
the financial district to the east and the retail district to the west, the Charles Center 
project was designed to link the two districts to each other and to the waterfront. 
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The Wallace team presented its plan to Mayor Thomas D'Alesandro, Jr. in 
March 1958. The city received the plan with enthusiasm. After detailed review and 
feasibility studies by the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing Agency, the state 
legislature authorized and the city voters approved an urban renewal bond issue for 
the project. By March of 1959, the City Planning Commission, the Board of Estimate 
and the City Council had each officially adopted the project as a component of its 
urban renewal program. 
The Charles Center plan's adoption created on of the nation's most vibrant 
public-private partnerships for its time. The partnership went far beyond a sense of 
shared objectives between city government and downtown business interests. To 
implement the project, the city and business community created the Charles Center 
Management Office in 1959. The office was run by J. Jefferson Miller, a retired 
department store executive, for the salary of $1 per year. The office was a private 
nonprofit development corporation whose sole client was the city. Mr. Miller reported 
directly to the director of the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing Agency. By 
contracting with the office to implement the urban renewal plan, BURHA was able to 
link the flexibility of a private corporation with the unique resources of the public 
sector. The office was therefore able to draw on the city's tax-free bonding powers 
to raise capital and on powers of eminent domain to assemble land, while at the same 
time engaging in decision making that was more decisive than is typically found within 
the governmental bureaucracy. 
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The office was remarkably successful at persuading developers to invest in the 
project and to make commitments early. Much of the project was implemented in the 
1960s and early 1970s. When fully developed in the mid-1980s, Charles Center had 
required $165 million in private expenditures and $40 million in public monies to 
become a reality. 
Figure 2. Charles Center at Lombard Street 
While largely successful at accomplishing its intended goals of reinvigorating 
Baltimore's downtown, Charles Center was less successful as an urban design 
concept. The buildings, designed in the International Style are a sharp divergence 
from both the older, more traditional buildings and many of the buildings constructed 
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more recently in Baltimore. More problematically, the project is set dramatically apart 
from the city. Designed to provide a new order distinct from the old city, the project 
is not organized around the traditional city street grid system. Rather, it is organized 
internally around three plazas. The plazas created a backbone of open space around 
which development was organized. Considered the centerpiece of the new Charles 
Center plan, the open space was visualized as being intensely used, "in its own way, 
as concentrated as the City around it." 3 The plazas were connected by means of an 
overhead walkway called a skywalk. The skywalk was elevated to separate 
pedestrians from vehicular traffic and to link the plazas. 
In breaking with the traditional street system, the system of plazas and skywalk 
isolates internal pedestrian movement from that of the city streets and sidewalks. The 
shifting of pedestrian traffic onto a separate system reduced the intensity of pedestrian 
activity on the street level. More importantly, the location of internal plazas created 
multiple opportunities for buildings to locate entryways. Traditional street arrange-
ments create a clear hierarchy of front entry doors and facades facing public streets 
and service entries facing back alleys. In Charles Center, the hierarchy has been 
reversed, with the internal plaza space serving as the focus of attention and the public 
streets serving back alley functions. As a result, many of the buildings also have their 
primary entries oriented internally onto plazas located above street level. 
3Barbara Wilks, Mary Beth McDonnell, Sean Ludviksom and john Srygley, 
"Creating the Public Realm," NA Urban Design Committee, June 8, 1988. 
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The effect on surrounding streets is dramatic. Buildings abut onto city streets 
with uninviting back service entries. The resulting edge is hard and frequently 
impenetrable. On Charles Street, the principle street upon which the project abuts, 
the impact is readily apparent. On the east side, a clearly defined street front links 
buildings of generally similar scale. The sidewalk is easily traversed. Entries to 
buildings, many of which serve pedestrian retail needs, are at street level. 
In contrast, the Charles Center side provides little enjoyment and many 
obstacles to pedestrian movement. A series of parking ramps, large retaining walls 
and faceless buildings combine to isolate the pedestrian from the activity that occurs 
within the buildings and to place the pedestrian in direct conflict with vehicular traffic 
seeking entry to the project. Streets located within the project, such as Fayette Street, 
are specifically designed to exclude pedestrians. In adopting the design of the 
highway rather than the street, the architects forcibly separated the two functions of 
the street. No longer would streets provide a shared domain in which both vehicles 
and pedestrians coexisted, nor would they provide a symbolic "public" function in 
which pedestrians interact with a rich array of urban uses. 
As a direct consequence of this attitude toward the street, Charles Center 
required the development of a separate pedestrian system. The skywalk was to be 
the new pedestrian bridge, a bridge designed to link the plazas by spanning over 
vehicular traffic. The skywalk has three impacts. First, by isolating skywalk pedestrian 
activity from the street, the skywalk weakens street level activity, especially along 
Howard Street. Second, unlike the grid street system, which provide multiple choices 
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to pedestrians, the skywalk is a linear path. By providing consistent movement only 
along a north-south axis, the walkway reduces the choices available to pedestrian 
travel and provides a more monotonous urban experience. Third, unlike a sidewalk 
which is clearly defined between the edge of buildings and streets, the skywalk has 
no such clear definition. The path is confusing and frequently unpleasant as it 
meanders through and around buildings and plazas. In recognition of some of these 
problems, those sections of the skywalk system that are redundant of the existing 
sidewalk system, particularly when they create deeply shaded areas below, are being 
removed. 
Figure 3. Conflicting Interaction Between Pedestrians and Vehicles 
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In addition to problems with its relationship to the downtown district, the internal 
public spaces leave much to be desired as well. The skywalk at times shares the 
problem of the city streets below as it runs along the uninviting backs or sides of 
buildings. Including Convention Center Plaza to which Charles Center abuts, the 
project is anchored by two large, monumentally designed plazas designed as stage 
fronts for the buildings they adjoin but providing little amenity to the pedestrian. 
Convention Center Plaza is a massive, raised platform which provides views of the 
Inner Harbor but little else. Center Plaza, enclosed in a ring of highrise office and 
apartment towers, provides a greater sense of enclosure. Its scale allows for its use 
in ethnic festivals and musical events, but remains largely empty during much of the 
year. Center Plaza is currently being rehabilitated to deal with some of its problems. 
Two plazas are more successful. Charles Plaza was recently redeveloped to 
bring retail functions back onto Charles Street. Designed with outdoor seating to 
provide a marketplace atmosphere, the plaza is linked to small specialty shops, 
restaurants and a food court. Hopkins Plaza provides even more opportunity for 
public uses. The Plaza is a smooth stoned plaza with a large fountain, outdoor 
seating, and an edge used actively by restaurants located in several of the buildings 
adjoining it. It also affords some interesting views of downtown Baltimore. These 
strengths sustain the plaza despite its two major weaknesses: 
• the overscaled design creates a weak center to the plaza, with the fountain 
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Figure 4. Hopkins Plaza 
• the Federal Building, which dominates the southern edge of the plaza, consists 
of a massive set of stairs that cuts across the entire front of the building and 
thereby prevents any public uses of the edge. 
Notwithstanding these problems, Hopkins Plaza remains the only plaza that allows for 
large scaled public interaction, and hence is used as a nucleus for fair weather 
outdoor entertainment. 
Despite the inadequacy of the urban design, Charles Center nonetheless 
remains,a highly successful venture. The speed at which the project was developed 
and its impact on the local economy changed the way in which Baltimoreans viewed 
their downtown. It was this change of view that enabled the principles of redevelop- 
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ment that had been used in Charles Center to be applied to the considerably larger 
Inner Harbor. 
Ill. Development of a Political Culture 
In his inaugural address of May, 1963, Mayor Theodore McKeldin, Jr., 
acclaimed the public-private partnership that had conceived and implemented the 
Charles Center plan. It was this partnership between the private interests (as 
represented by the Committee for Downtown and the Greater Baltimore Committee) 
and the public interests (as represented by the Department of Planning) that had 
enabled construction to advance as rapidly as it had. During his inaugural address, 
Mayor McKeldin also announced the redevelopment of the Inner Harbor. The project 
was to encompass considerably more land area and was to again build on partnership 
between public and private interests. In so proposing, Mayor McKeldin reaffirmed the 
compatibility of such a partnership with the long term development objectives of 
central Baltimore. 
As the mayor of Baltimore, Theodore McKeldin was in a powerful position to 
commit the city to this partnership. Baltimore, with its strong mayor system of 
governance, empowers the mayor with considerable control over both line agency 
actions and the budgetary process. The city charter empowers budgetary decision 
making to a five member Board of Estimate. The mayor is authorized to appoint three 
of the Board members and traditionally appoints himself as one of those members. 
The City Council, with 18 members elected through district elections, represents the 
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divergent interests of their ethnically diverse constituencies. Within this context, the 
formal power of the mayor has been accentuated by traditionally strong executive 
leadership. 
The urban design efforts of the mayor are channeled through two main 
governmental offices: the Department of Planning and the Baltimore Urban Renewal 
and Housing Agency. The Mayor's Office, through its physical development 
coordinator, uses both formal and informal powers to coordinate actions between 
public agencies such as these and private agents engaged in redevelopment activity. 
Over the years, development coordinators assigned to the Mayor's Office were 
typically been given considerable access to the mayor and were broadly empowered 
to promote implementation of the mayor's redevelopment agenda. 
In the early years of Baltimore's renaissance, the City Department of Planning 
was central to the redevelopment process. During the 1950s and 60s, the Department 
helped generate the vision necessary to initiate Charles Center and then worked 
closer with the Baltimore  Urban- Renewal- and  C-ommittee-for-
Downtown and the Greater Baltimore Committee to coordinate activities of the Charles 
Center Management Office. This cooperative relationship was explicitly praised by 
Mayor McKeldin in his inaugural address. Over the next five years, the public-private 
relationship was to strengthen considerably as both public and private agencies were 
reorganized to facilitate coordinated actions. 
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IV. The Inner Harbor 
When Mayor McKeldin envisioned an "enthralling panorama of office buildings, 
parks, high-rise apartments and marinas" around the Inner Harbor, many found his 
vision hard to imagine. The long economic decline of Baltimore Harbor had been felt 
particularly strongly by the areas around the Inner Harbor. 
Begun in 1729, the Inner Harbor had served as the central core to Baltimore 
Harbor since its inception. As the port grew to include 42 miles of shoreline, more 
modern and specialized facilities rendered the economic functions of the Inner Harbor 
obsolete. By the 1950s, rundown wharves and dilapidated markets and warehouses 
dominated the harbor's northern and southern shoreline, while high volume roadways, 
parking facilities and underutilized railroads dominated the western edge. A proposed 
superhighway was designed to cut along the base of Federal Hill (to the south of the 
harbor) and then bridge the harbor, effectively cutting the harbor off from the city. The 
water was polluted. With access restricted by roadways and industrial buildings and 
virtually no activity to attract residents to the water's edge, the harbor was effectively 
isolated from the city. 
Thus, when Mayor McKeldin called for reuse of the land, few argued over the 
necessity for action. The task, however, was overwhelming. While the Charles Center 
project had involved 33 acres of redevelopment in the heart of downtown, the Inner 
Harbor project envisioned redevelopment of 240 acres of largely dilapidated and 
decaying industrial structures. 
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Notwithstanding its disadvantages, the Inner Harbor had several unique 
advantages as the site for redevelopment. With the decline of the steamboat and 
railroad shipping industries, large tracts of land were underutilized and available for 
redevelopment. The harbor basin was sufficiently small and well defined to form a 
nucleus for urban activity. With the shoreline enclosed by the city on three and a half 
sides and located immediately adjacent to downtown and Charles Center on the 
northwestern edge, the harbor offered considerable opportunity for providing a focus 
to future city development. 
A. The Development of the Plan 
In 1963, when Mayor McKeldin evoked the image of a revitalized waterfront, he 
was building on ideas generated by Arthur McVoy and others in the 1950s. More 
directly, he was also building on the already apparent success of the Charles Center 
project. The momentum for redevelopment generated by Charles Center created the 
impetus for both the Inner Harbor project and for the process used to manage the 
project. 
Once again, The Planning Council was given the lead role in commissioning a 
study of the Inner Harbor. The Council again hired David Wallace's firm, Wallace-
McHarg, to conduct the study. This time, however, the $25,000 each provided by the 
Greater Baltimore Committee and the Committee for Downtown was matched with 
$35,000 provided by the city. The partnership between public and private agencies 




Figure 5. Inner Harbor's North Shore (1988 View) 
In 1964, Wallace unveiled a 30-year redevelopment plan for the Inner Harbor. 
Covering 240 acres of land, the program called for $260 million in investments for 
cultural, hotel, office, convention and residential facilities. While the city owned the 18- 
scre_western_shoreline,the_ prognam involved over 700 pieces of property. The 
problem of coordination would be massive. 
The master plan did not attempt to strictly define land uses, but adopted a 
general redevelopment scheme within four broad programmatic objectives. The 
shoreline was to be transformed through construction of cultural and recreational 
facilities and public open space. Office, hotel and convention development would link 
the northwest corner of the harbor to Charles Center. Residential development, 
ranging from row houses to-higftrises, was to be constructed around the eastern 
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mouth and the western shore of the Inner Harbor. Finally, the north shore of the 
harbor was to be linked to a proposed municipal center through an 150 foot wide civic 
mall. 
The development plan was phased. Phase I focused on the 95 acres adjacent 
to the water-front. Public investments along the waterfront, including parks and 
recreational facilities, was designed to lure private investment into the downtown areas 
immediately adjacent to the waterfront. Phase II consisted of 68 acres to the west of 
the harbor. The redevelopment was to include a major convention center to the 
northwest and major commercial and residential development south of the convention 
center. In Phase III, the remaining acreage to the northeast of the harbor's channel 
was to be redeveloped for high density residential uses. Redevelopment of the 
municipal center to the north was to occur simultaneously with Phase I, while the 
Federal Hill residential area to the south was not linked to the master plan. 
In the 1964 election, even before the plan was officially adopted, city voters 
immediately redefined the first phase by rejecting the $4.5 million bond issue needed 
to construct the new government buildings while at the same time authorizing $2 
million in bonds to finance the first steps of Inner Harbor redevelopment. Plans were 
officially made public in 1965 and, following voter approval of $12 million in additional 
funding in 1966, City Council and the Mayor officially approved the plan in 1967. One 
year later, the federal government provided $22.4 million in urban renewal grants. 
With these funds, the city expanded the western edge by building new bulkheads and 
adding considerable landfill. At the same time, the city initiated the purchase and 
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Figure 6. Inner Harbor's West Shore (1988 View) 
clearance of old warehouse and industrial structures and construction of public 
improvements such as parks and promenades along the shoreline. Completion of 
Phase I would eventually require $17 million in local public monies (including a $5 
million bond issue approved by the voters in 1982), $35 million in federal monies and 
$240 million in private and institutional investments. 
B. Building the Institutional Capacity to 'Implement the Inner Harbor 
Initiative 
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The contribution of city funds to The Planning Council sponsored study of the 
waterfront was the first step in a long series of public and private institution building 
activities. The massive scale of the master plan program required the development 
of new institutional arrangements for implementing urban design and redevelopment 
ideas within the project area. In 1965, the first step in this process was initiated. 
1. Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management Inc. 
Recognizing that management of the project was likely to require specialized 
skills and powers, public and private interests transformed the Charles Center 
Management Office into Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management Inc. The company 
was incorporated as nonprofit, no-stock corporation. The city is the corporation's only 
client and provides its full operating budget (approximately $850,000 per year). CC-1H 
was formally placed under the authority of first BURHA and, after city reorganization, 
latter placed under the Department of Housing and Community Development. The 
corporation serves under contract to the city to perform five primary functions: 
• to coordinate planning and implementation of the Inner Harbor by various city 
agencies, to ensure the timely delivery of infrastructure and other public 
improvements, 
• to recruit developers, to oversee the process of their selection and to ensure 
that developers provide for the timely delivery of private improvements as 
expounded in a development agreement, 
• to negotiate with both the private developers and the city as to the respective 
project development initiatives to be conducted by the city and the private 
developer, 
• to oversee the Otterbein Homesteading project, and 
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• to initiate studies and analyses as necessary to support the coordination, 
negotiation and supervision roles of CC-IH. 
Thus, the CC-IH was to act as pointman between the city and private developers, 
ensuring that timely delivery of development from both. The city was to set policy and 
provide operating funds, while CC-IH was to use the flexibility inherent in a private 
corporation to facilitate business transactions. 
The role of CC-IH expanded as private development in the Inner Harbor was 
being initiated. Problems with financing the large projects envisioned by the city 
required that the city play a more active role in development than originally intended. 
Baltimore, through the CC-IH, negotiated a number of joint venture partnerships with 
developers. Foregoing the usual techniques of tax abatements, CC-IH instead relied 
on financial tools such as land lease arrangements that saved the developer up front 
costs, subordinated ground rents which decrease the risk of default to private financial 
institutions and direct public financing where private financing is insufficient, as well as 
public improvements both off-site and on-site. 4 
The impact of CC-IH goes beyond the facilitation of project development in the 
Inner Harbor. CC-IH, while primarily an implementation agency, has played an active 
planning and design role in the area as well. At the policy level, CC-IH engaged in 
studies and recommends to the city changes in policy. Recommendations were made 
to the Department of Housing and Community Development who was responsible for 
4article in Urban Land, at 148. 
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setting policy. Because the CC-IH has had very effective relationships with the 
mayors, its recommendations are considered seriously. 
More directly, CC-IH was empowered to review the quality of urban and 
architectural design within the urban renewal area. The Architectural Review Board 
was created within the CC-IH to judge the quality of proposed projects. The Board 
consisted of prominent non-local architects, designers and planners. Development 
packages solicited and received by CC-IH based were reviewed by the board. All 
packages reviewed by the Board included designs and financial statements, but 
removed references to architects and developers. Such "blind" review was designed 
to promote objectivity in the review process, though on large-scale projects to ability 
to maintain anonymity is questionable. The process has been criticized by many local 
architects both because it excludes local architects from the process and because of 
a perceived bias toward nationally famous architects and developers. The quality of 
individual projects has also been the subject of considerable controversy. 
The system created by CC-IH has worked remarkably well at facilitating 
development in the Inner Harbor. Including the original Charles Center Management 
Office, the system has provided a consistent link between the city and the develop-
ment community that has spanned 30 years and five mayors. During the entire 
period, the CC-IH has retained public confidence in its professional approach to 
development. While controversy has existed over the design quality of some of the 
development and the influence of CC-IH over city policymaking, the CC-IH has 
enjoyed an extremely supportive relationship with City Hall. Not until many years after 
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the inception of CC-IH, when the corporation began working on the Harbor Keys 
project adjacent to the residential South Baltimore in the mid-1980s, was the 
relationship between CC-IH and the city policymaking process seriously questioned. 
The Board, on the other hand, generated considerably more controversy as individual 
projects of questionable merit were built around the harbor. 
Much of the credit for the success lies with the leadership of CC-IH. Charles 
Center-Inner Harbor Management Inc. was initially chaired by J. Jefferson Miller. 
Martin Millspaugh, a one-time Assistant Commissioner of the U.S. Urban Renewal 
Administration, served as President. A strong linkage between private and public 
interests was therefore reflected in the leadership of the organization itself. This 
linkage was strengthened in 1970 with the addition of Walter Sondheim as vice-chair. 
As both a prominent businessman and former chair of the Baltimore Urban Renewal 
and Housing Commission, Mr. Sondheim was well prepared for the role he was 
stepping into. In 1972, upon the death of Mr. Miller, he was elevated to the position 
of chair. 
2. Restructuring City Government 
During this same time period, Mayor McKeldin restructured the agencies most 
directly involved in the redevelopment process. After appointing David Barton as 
Chairperson of the City Planning Commission in 1968, Mayor McKeldin requested that 
the Department of Planning be restructured to facilitate management of planning 
issues facing the city. At the same time, the mayor unified all housing and community 
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development functions under the Department of Housing and Community Develop-
ment. This agency, which combined the functions of both the Baltimore Urban 
Renewal and Housing Agency and the code enforcement functions of the Public 
Works Department, provided a single agency to direct the city's development activities. 
DHCD is headed by a commissioner. The commissioner reports directly to the 
mayor, serves as executive director of the Housing Authority of Baltimore, sits on the 
Planning Commission in an ex officio capacity, and has direct responsibility for setting 
policy for CC-IH. Together with the mayor, the commissioner of DHCD shares 
considerable power over the public management of urban redevelopment efforts. The 
success of redevelopment efforts is therefore closely tied to the abilities and interests 
of the commissioner and the mayor. The first commissioner, Robert Embry, proved 
remarkably successful at building the strengths of his agency, linking the agency more 
closely to the neighborhoods, encouraging creative and technically competent staff 
work and obtaining federal grants. 
Mayor McKeldin and his successor Mayor Schaefer, were equally essential to 
the success of redevelopment efforts. In addition to their support of the activities of 
DHCD and CC-IH, the mayors created the support necessary to initiate and implement 
the Inner Harbor initiatives. In particular, William Schaefer, elected in 1971 and 
remaining in office until the mid-1980s, has had a profound effect on the redevelop-
ment process. Mayor Schaefer's intense commitment to the city was readily apparent. 
His style of governance, which involved immersion in the details of city governance 
V-24 
while at the same time encouraging new ideas and innovation, facilitated the rapid 
progress experienced in the Inner Harbor and elsewhere in the city. 
C. Physical Redevelopment Process 
Redevelopment of the Inner Harbor dramatically altered the physical environ-
ment and use of the harbor. Construction of an expanded shoreline bulkhead began 
in 1968. The purpose of the project was to return the shoreline to public uses. 
Landfill on the west side, in particular, provided space between Light Street (which had 
been widened to the water's edge in the 1950s to expand traffic capacity) and the 
water. Pier 1 on the northern shoreline was rebuilt in 1972 as a berth for the U. S. 
Constellation. The oldest fighting warship of the U. S. Navy, the ship was brought in 
as a sculptural symbol of Baltimore's shipbuilding days. 
By 1975, a wide brick promenade was built around the north, west and 
southern shorelines. The promenade connected a series of public cultural and 
recreational facilities, including playing fields, parks and commons. Most of the land 
was left open, with minimal landscaping. As such, the harbor provided considerable 
flexibility in its use, with activities ranging from individuals walking to large groups 
celebrating in festivals. Public uses spilled out into the harbor. By the early 1980s, 
over 25 cultural and recreational attractions had been added. Some, such as the 
marina, piers, rental boats, water taxi and maritime museum, extended out into the 
water, thereby capturing the water for public uses. 
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As the public and recreational capacity of the waterfront expanded, the city 
engaged in a deliberate strategy of reintroducing local residents to the harbor. An 
intensive schedule of activities and free events was developed. In the early 1970s, the 
city developed "Sunny Sundays" by attracting a mix of flea markets and simple fairs 
coupled to free concerts and water events. The Baltimore City Fair was shifted to the 
water's edge in 1973. The event was begun in 1969 to celebrate the city's neighbor-
hoods. Conducted around Labor Day weekend, over 2 million people now attend the 
Fair. As we shall discuss later, the Fair became so popular in the late 1970s that 
widespread community opposition developed when Harborplace, a specialty and food 
retail pavilion, was proposed for the waterfront area. Residents feared that the project 
would displace the Fair from the waterfront. This fear proved partly true, as the City 
Fair was relocated to Marketplace, the Pratt Street Boulevard and Piers 5 and 6 in 
1981. 
Other major events were further developed. The program of fairs has been 
—expanded. In 1280 the city- initiated- a series of city-spunsoredeekend ethnic 
festivals and activities. Between April and September, over 13 different ethnic 
neighborhoods each co-sponsor (with the city) their own festival. The 13 weekend 
International Festival therefore attracts intensive use throughout the summer months. 
In 1976, the bicentennial celebrations were held. A special committee of city 
residents and local corporations was able to attract eight of the Tall Ships after their 
rendezvous in New York Harbor. This spectacle lasted 10 days, and attracted over 
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two and a half million visitors. While many of these visitors came from out-of-town, a 
significant contingent were attracted in from local suburbs. Thus was the refurbished 
Inner Harbor introduced to residents throughout the area. What had been a 
deteriorating industrial district had emerged as a regional recreation center. 
In addition to public investments, the early 1970s saw the gradual emergence 
of new private developments. In 1972, Christ Lutheran's Harbor Apartments became 
the first building completed in the Inner Harbor. The building provided an important 
link between the waterfront urban renewal area and the Otterbein neighborhood to the 
west. This adjacency later proved important when in 1973, after collapse of a 
proposal by Japanese architect Kenzo Tange to redevelop the Otterbein district, the 
city developed programs for preserving the homes and rebuilding the residential area. 
This success was followed in 1973 by the U.S.F. & G. home office building. 
One of Baltimore's tallest buildings, the building is surrounded by a concrete, raised 
plaza. Architecturally undistinguished, the building nonetheless provided an important 
anchor to development in the waterfront. 
By the mid 1970s, a series of additional buildings were completed. Between 
1975 and 1977, the IBM office, the Maryland Science Center, the Harbor Campus of 
the Community College of Baltimore, the C & P Telephone Co. and the World Trade 
Center were all completed. 
I. M. Pei's World Trade Center illustrates some of the effort needed to 
implement these early projects. While scheduled to begin in 1966, the project was 
repeatedly delayed. With costs doubling and financing commitments being rescinded, 
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city officials finally obtained the necessary funds to finance the project from the state. 
The 30-story Trade Center, located directly on the waterfront, both dominates and 
provides sculptural interest to the harbor. On the top floor is located The Top of the 
World, located on the top floor, is operated by the Baltimore Office of Promotion and 
Tourism. Opened in 1979 as an observation deck, the floor ensures public access 
and allows for panoramic views of the harbor. The access brings residents into the 
building, while office workers from the building in turn intensifies activity on the 
promenade that adjoins the harbor. 
Housing was also slowly being added to the renewal area. By the early 1980s, 
over a thousand units (including 250 luxury townhouses, 100 rehabilitated historic 
townhouses, 490 subsidized apartments for the elderly, and a 220-bed nursing home) 
were in place. Thus, by the late 1970s, the success of the Inner Harbor as an urban 
center and a gathering place for the region's residents was reasonably assured. What 
was not resolved, however, was the final form of the waterfront and how it would be 
used. Two development projects, Harborplace and the Convention Center facilities, 
were to test the implementation capacity of CC-IH and the city. 
D. Harborplace 
More than a decade after the Inner Harbor project was initiated, controversy 
erupted over its proposed uses. The original plan called for commercial uses along 
the western shore at Light Street. By 1977, as many of the initial projects reached 
fruition, conditions necessary for retail activity had improved significantly. A number 
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of merchants and restauranteurs located in areas adjacent to the harbor (Little Italy 
and South Baltimore) actively opposed commercial development based on fears of 
competition. Residents from these neighborhoods were also anxious to defend the 
harbor's open space from incursions. 
The concerns of these two groups lay largely dormant until 1978. At that time, 
the Rouse Company proposed to construct a retail development at the corner of Light 
and Pratt Streets. To enable the project (called Harborplace), city council amended 
the urban renewal plan. The amendment expanded the originally designated 
commercial district to include part of the northern waterfront area along Pratt Street. 
The proposal and the amendment quickly galvanized opposition. A citywide coalition 
was formed. Called Citizens for the Preservation of Inner Harbor (CPIH), the group 
coordinated actions to protect open space along the harbor. The group was 
particularly effective at raising concerns amongst participants of the harbor's many 
festivals. Citizens, who had been greatly pleased by the construction of the first 
phase, feared that the waterfront would be privatized over time. They believed that 
commercial development could just as easily be accommodated away from the 
shoreline, and that the waterfront should be maintained as public land. The Black 
community, feeling that lower income residents would be excluded from the expensive 
shops proposed, joined the fray. Through the referendum process, the CPIH 
succeeded in placing the issue on the ballot for city-wide vote. 
The debate over the future of the Inner Harbor intensified as the election 
approached. City Council, at the behest of the mayor, placed a countermeasure on 
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Figure 7. Harborplace 
the ballot. The countermeasure enabled construction of the two pavilions while also 
ensuring that 26 acres around the Harbor basin would remain as park space forever. 
Rouse appealed directly to the Black community (which constituted half of the 
population) by pledging that Blacks would hold at least 25% of the construction jobs 
and that a special effort to train and include minority businesses in the retail pavilions 
would be developed for Harborplace. The countermeasure had the clear backing of 
business groups, the city and many civic organizations. 
On November 14, 1978, the city passed the countermeasure with a vote of 
54%. To a large extent, the measure passed because of the minority participation 
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program (Baltimore's first privately sponsored plan), the architect's careful attention 
to design and the potential tax benefits to the city. Final design of the buildings, 
together with a tight construction schedule, enabled the project to be opened on July 
2, 1980, thereby attracting the summer crowds and building the credibility of the 
project. 
Figure 8. Lexington Market 
As designed, Harborplace consists of two pavilions, separated by a 200 foot 
plaza/amphitheater. On a 3.2 acre site and containing a quarter of a million square 
feet in gross building area, the project cost $20 million to complete. Given the high 
levels of public space created in the pavilions, only 60% of this building area was 
leasable. The architects, Benjamin Thompson & Associates, worked with the CC-IH, 
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the Department of Housing and Community Development and a citizen's group called 
the Mayor's Design Advisory Group. 
  
Both in 
form and in scale, 
the pavilions re-
flect the architec-
ture of the wharf 
buildings that had 
previously existed 
on the site. Porti-
cos, roof lines 
and flags contrib-
ute to the effect. 
Figure 9. Detail of Lexington Market 
 
By splitting the project into two buildings, the design reduced the mass that would 
have existed in a single building and provided a visual and physical entryway to the 
waterfront from the downtown. Height of the buildings was restricted to two stories 
by the city, thereby ensuring that rooflines would not rise to the level of the 
Constellation's bowsprit. 
The two pavilions each have a unique identity. The larger of the two buildings, 
located on Light Street, contains the Colonnade Market. Built on the image of 
Lexington Market (located west of downtown Baltimore), the Colonnade offers a wide 












operations. The smaller pavilion contains specialty shops and more formal 
restaurants. On opening day, out of 140 businesses, 90% were locally owned. 
Located on the corner of the harbor that lies closest to the downtown, the site 
maximizes interaction between the harbor and the city. The pavilions reflect this dual 
linkage by opening to both the waterfront and the city side. The city retains ownership 
of the land, with Rouse paying $100,000 per year for land rent. The partnership 
arrangement also provides the city with 25% of cash generated after debt service. 
The enormous success has led to a substantial increase in the number of jobs offered. 
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E. The Convention Center 
The Baltimore Convention Center, completed in 1979, provides 110,000 square 
feet of exhibit space and 45,000 square feet of meeting space. Financed by a $35 
million state bond issue and $10 million in city financing, the Center provides meeting 
space for national and international conventions. 
Figure 11. The Convention Center 
For the Convention Center to succeed, however, the city needed an adequate 
supply of hotel rooms in the immediate vicinity. After two hotel proposals failed to 
materialize, CC-IH entered into negotiations with Hyatt Corporation to construct a 
major hotel adjacent to both the Convention Center and the Inner Harbor. The deal 
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that developed demonstrates the intricacies of the relationship between the city 
(through CC-IH) and private corporations in their efforts to forge a partnership. To 
build a 500 room hotel in a still uncertain market, the financing package included the 
following: 
• Equitable Insurance provided a $20 million first mortgage at 10% interest plus 
a 1% kicker, 
• the city provided a $12 million second mortgage at 7% interest primarily 
through UDAG monies and built a $4 million garage (to be repaid out of garage 
income), and 
• Hyatt invested $1 million in up-front capital and loaned the project $3 million at 
prime rate plus 1%. 5 
Both the Hyatt and the city money were subordinated to the Equitable mortgage. 
Hyatt manages the property under a 4% of gross revenue management fee, 
plus an incentive fee. The land is leased from the city for $200,000 per year for 34 
years and $400,000 per year for another 20 years. The hotel pays full property taxes. 
The profit is divided one-third to Hyatt and two-thirds to the city. The hotel, opened 
in 1981, has proven to be one of the Hyatt's most successful hotels. 
During the same year that the hotel was completed, the city also opened the 
Aquarium. Built entirely with city monies, the $21.5 million building houses 5,000 
specimens of aquatic and tropical life. The building was designed by Peter 
Chermayeff of the Cambridge Seven Associates, and provides a stunning addition to 
its setting. The Aquarium has been designated by Congress as the National 
5Douglas Wrenn, Urban Waterfront Development, (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land 
Institute, 1983 at 151. 
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Figure 12. The Baltimore Hyatt 
Aquarium, which has helped increase its visibility. In the first year after its opening, 
the Aquarium received 1.6 million visitors, a full million more than originally projected. 
V. Key Highway Renewal 
On March 12, 1986, the city of Baltimore embarked on a new effort to renew 
the waterfront. Directly adjacent to the southeastern terminus of the Inner Harbor 
Phase I urban renewal area, the Key Highway renewal area provided numerous 
opportunities for redevelopment. The Highway was to serve as a high capacity on- 
- — --- 	 — ---  _ 
grade arterial linking I-95 and, via a proposed Flarbr-TUnnel, the entire-InnerHarbor 
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In conjunction with roadway improvements needed to handle the expected vehicular 
demand, several major redevelopment projects were also proposed. 
In the tradition of Baltimore's approach to urban design and redevelopment, the 
city requested that Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc., in conjunction with 
the Neighborhood Housing Administration of the Baltimore Department of Housing and 
Community Development (NPA/DHCD), develop the plan for the area. As passed by 
City Council on March 12, 1986, the plan included the 42 acre former Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation ship building site, as well as approximately 20 additional acres in 
roadways and adjacent properties. The renewal area was located at the base of 
Federal Hill, a residential neighborhood located within the larger neighborhood of 
South Baltimore. The Bethlehem Steel site, located along the waterfront, was clearly 
the most desirable, and controversial, of the project sites located within the renewal 
area. 
Unlike earlier renewal plans, the Key Highway plan sought to minimize public 
investments. Rather, it explicitly created a process of design review to which private 
development would be subjected. As a last resort, if private developers refused to 
develop in a manner consistent with the plan's objectives, the Neighborhood Progress 
Administration was empowered to enjoin construction and to acquire the land through 
eminent domain powers. 6 The city, however, clearly sought to encourage and 
regulate new development without major commitments of public monies. 
6Neighborhood Progress Administration and the charles Center-Inner Harbor 
Management, Inc., "Key Highway Urban Renewal Plan," City of Baltimore Ordinance 
622, March 12, 1986, p. 7-8. 
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To assure harmonious development and rehabilitation within the Key Highway 
project area, the urban renewal ordinance required the approval of all development 
plans for demolition, alteration and reconstruction within the area by the Neighborhood 
Progress Administration. Review of the plans was to focus on urban design 
standards, site planning, building heights, architectural treatment, materials, colors, 
landscape design, views, public and private access to the waterfront, location of uses 
and construction.' The city had created a powerful tool for regulating development 
on a valuable and sensitive site located at the entrance to the Inner Harbor. 
Unlike previous renewal plans, which had been generated largely upon the 
initiative of the business community, actions leading up to the development of the Key 
Highway renewal plan included a significant component of community involvement. 
While previous projects had focused largely on downtown sites, or residential areas 
that had experienced widespread abandonment, the Key Highway project abutted the 
Federal Hill and other South Baltimore neighborhoods. Fifteen thousand residents live 
in South Baltimore. In part because of the success of the Inner Harbor renewal, South 
Baltimore was experiencing a resurgence. Housing and commercial abandonment of 
the 1950s and 60s was being replaced with increasing demand for inner city housing 
locations. The neighborhoods located in South Baltimore were dynamic neighbor-
hoods linked to the harbor both through proximity and employment. Political 
'Neighborhood Progress Administration and the charles Center-Inner Harbor 
Management, Inc., "Key Highway Urban Renewal Plan," City of Baltimore Ordinance 
622, March 12, 1986, p. 6. 
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organizations, built around the ward system, empower neighborhoods with a 
potentially powerful voice. 
In late 1984, Mayor Schaefer requested The South Baltimore Task Force review 
plans for Harbor Keys (a proposed development on the Bethlehem Steel site) and to 
develop a strategic plan for the management of the site. The Task Force, made up 
of neighborhood residents and community organizations, worked with the consulting 
assistance of American City Corporation, a subsidiary of the Rouse Company. The 
Task Force objected to the development of an exclusive high density, high income 
intensive use development that was isolated from the community. The Task Force 
was specifically concerned about the loss of industrial jobs along the waterfront, the 
potential for congestion, the impact of gentrification and blockage of visual or physical 
access to the waterfront. 8 
The Task Force recommended that it 
propose and negotiate a proactive, on-going and cooperative relationship with 
the Harbor Keys developer and the City for a comprehensive planning and 
development process for the entire Key Highway area, including the Harbor 
Keys site. 9 
Substantive recommendations included: 
• review of economic impacts of redevelopment and creation of an economic 
development strategy, 
8The South Baltimore Task Force, "Proposed Strategic Plan: Harbor Keys and Key 
Highway Properties, Baltimore Maryland," Prepared for the Honorable William Donald 
Schaefer, Mayor, City of Baltimore, February 1985, pp. 1-8. 
-1-11e South Baltimore Task Force, "Proposed Strategic Plan: Harbor Keys and Key 
Highway Properties, Baltimore Maryland," Prepared for the Honorable William Donald 
Schaefer, Mayor, City of Baltimore, February 1985, p. 9. 
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• minimization of impact on property values and taxes to avoid real estate 
speculation and displacement, 
• creation of a mixed use development with a variety of economic opportunities 
and a diversity of residents, 
• public pedestrian access to the waterfront, 
• design and development standards, 
• integration of the project into the community, and 
• comprehensive review. 10 
The Task Force also proposed a process for review of the proposal. The proposed 
process would 
• officially designate a city task force (consisting of the representatives from the 
Mayor's Office, Neighborhood Progress Administration, Baltimore Economic 
Development Corporation, Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc., City 
Planning Department, the South Baltimore Task Force and Harbor Keys Joint 
Venture Developer Representatives) to oversee the planning and development 
of the project, 
• designate the City Planning Agency as lead agency for coordinating City 
agency responsibility, preparing the plan and assisting the community, 
• authorize additional funding to the South Baltimore Task Force for continuing 
consultant assistance, and 
• establish a workplan for the process. 11 
10l-he South Baltimore Task Force, "Proposed Strategic Plan: Harbor Keys and 
Key Highway Properties, Baltimore Maryland," Prepared for the Honorable William 
Donald Schaefer, Mayor, City of Baltimore, February 1985, pp. 14-16. 
11The South Baltimore Task Force, "Proposed Strategic Plan: Harbor Keys and 
Key Highway Properties, Baltimore Maryland," Prepared for the Honorable William 
Donald Schaefer, Mayor, City of Baltimore, February 1985, pp. 16-18. 
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While many of the specifics of the proposal were not enacted, the city's creation of an 
urban renewal plan was a specific response to many of the suggestions made. 
Throughout 1986, the Harbor Keys partnership (Harborview Properties 
Development Company, headed by Richard Swirnow and Malcolm Berman) sought 
to obtain preliminary approval for a master plan. Despite continued attempts, the city 
blocked approval. After repeated failure, Malcolm Berman left the partnership. The 
development firm hired the urban design firm of Sasaki Associates to work more 
directly with the city and the community to develop an alternative plan. In October of 
1987, after months of negotiation, the Neighborhood Progress Administration 
Commissioner Mirion Pines preliminarily approved the project. 
The plan, while not meeting all of the concerns of the community, was 
considered a substantial improvement over earlier proposals. View corridors were 
opened significantly, massing of highrise buildings was reduced, the neighborhood 
street structure was incorporated into the project, and public access to the waterfront 
was improved. The South Baltimore Key Highway Task Force, the community group 
that met with the developer, gave tentative support to the preliminary approval while 
clearly stating their continued apprehension over several design considerations. 12 
 The Task Force, in conjunction with the South Baltimore Design Review Committee, 
specifically objected to problems associated with ground level use of the buildings, the 
12"From Shipyard's ashes, vision for Harbor Keys rises," The Baltimore Sum, 
October 14, 1987, p. 1G and 7G. 
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location of open space several levels above ground, massing and definitions of space 
within the project. 13 
After additional redesign, the Department of Planning recommended approval 
of the Final Subdivision and Development Plan for Harborview's project on December 
3, 1987. 
Throughout this process, the relationship between the city and the developer 
was increasingly defined by the Neighborhood Progress Administration and the 
Department of Housing and Community Development. The traditional dominant role 
of Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management was substantially undercut by the more 
complex political environment that was emerging around the Harbor Keys project. 
With the project located adjacent to a politically organized neighborhood, CC-IH was 
required to work substantially more directly with citizen groups who objected not only 
to aspects of the project, but to CC-IH's traditional freedom of decision making. In 
addition, when Mayor Schaefer left office to run for governor, CC-IH lost a powerful 
ally. Mayor Clarence "Du" Burns, his successor, lacked the political clout to ensure 
implementation. Finally, with the election of Kurt Schmoke to office, the access and 
power afforded to CC-IH was altered significantly. In June of 1988, Mayor Schmoke 
specifically authorized Dr. Bob Hearn, director of the Department of Housing and 
Community Development, to oversee the development project and to coordinate all 
13Letter to Marian Pines, Director of Neighborhood Progress Administration, from 
Susan Arrington, Chair of the South Baltimore Design Review Committee, dated 
October 6, 1987. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BOSTON: THE TENSIONS ILLUSTRATED 
Major urban design decisions alter the distribution of goods and services in 
society, and hence create controversy. Until recently, planners and designers 
engaged in the practice of urban design focused their skills almost exclusively on plan 
preparation and technical analysis, leaving implementation and conflict management 
to political and judicial decision makers. This approach to urban design has serious 
deficiencies. Most importantly, traditional approaches frequently promote adversarial 
relations which cripple the urban design process. The result is unnecessary in many 
disputes, for cooperation and joint problem solving could prove more beneficial to all 
disputants. 
This chapter argues that effective urban design implementation frequently 
requires architects and planners to work explicitly at resolving conflict generated by 
their activities. In this context, the skills of consensus building, negotiation, and 
mediation are essential. 
VI-1 
I. Implementation in Urban Design 
Successful urban design implementation depends on the ability of design 
proponents to deal effectively with fundamental sources of disagreement. These 
sources include not only the substantive issues at hand, but also more fundamental 
disagreements over the management of uncertainty, decision making procedures and 
basic social structures. 
The comprehensive model of urban design works best when people share a 
common viewpoint and similar values. Throughout most of this century and in most 
communities of the nation, residents and public officials promoted the benefits of 
urban development. Urban expansion and infrastructure development were widely 
hailed marks of progress. Using their skills of analysis and design, architects and 
planners helped improve economic efficiency, rationalize land use, and protect 
community interests in the development process. In this context of shared values, 
architects and planners involved in urban design were widely regarded as applying 
their skills objectively towards the betterment of the community. 
This commonly held view of the public interest has changed substantially in 
recent years. Development is no longer held in such universal esteem. Competing 
goals have come to the forefront of urban design practice. In this context of 
competing interests, traditional approaches to design implementation frequently 
promote adversarial relations where cooperation and joint problem solving would be 
more beneficial. 
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Traditional approaches to managing conflict within urban design implementation 
have proved unable to cope with the rapid rise in development disputes for several 
reasons. Ours is a pluralistic society that does not condone the raw use of power. 
Government regulations and systems of judicial review have been established to curb 
past injustices associated with abuse of power. As a consequence, many avenues 
for ensuring procedural justice are available to citizen and business interests alike. 
Litigation, however, does not provide a forum for resolving differences over the 
substance of disputes, but rather focuses controversies narrowly on issues of legal 
procedures. In this system, adversarial relations are promoted, and compromise 
inhibited. Moreover, the frequent use of the courts to resolve conflict have 
overburdened the judicial system, causing major delays in decision making and hence 
increasing the costs associated with implementation of planning decisions.' 
Since the mid-1970s, urban designers have increasingly come to act as brokers 
and mediators in political conflict. 2 This evolving role seeks to resolve procedural, 
substantive, and uncertainty-based conflict and to moderate structural conflict through 
dispute management processes. These processes are designed to promote rational 
'Julia Wondolleck (1985). "The Importance of Process in Resolving 
Environmental Disputes," Paper Presented at the Conference on "Emerging 
Issues in Environmental Analysis and Planning," Cincinnati, Ohio, April 12. 
Michael O'Hare, Lawrence Bacow, and Debra Sanderson (1983). 
Facility Siting and Public Opposition.  (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold 
Company). 
2Lawrence Susskind and Connie Ozawa (1984). "Mediated Negotiation 
in the Public Sector: The Planner as Mediator," Journal of Planning 
Education and Research, 4(1): 5 - 15. 
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problem solving through the mobilization and involvement of many interest groups 
within the structure of a neutral, facilitated negotiation. As such they are procedurally 
rational instead of analytically rational, and while they are incremental in their problem 
solving, they seek to solve the conflict at hand in as comprehensive a manner as is 
feasible. 
The characteristics of planning controversy, problems with traditional 
approaches to planning, and the effectiveness of conflict resolution are well 
demonstrated in two cases. The cases have much in common: both involved a 
significant controversy over large-scale development projects proposed for downtown 
Boston and adjacent to inner city residential neighborhoods. Located within a mile of 
each other, both were proposed in the early to mid-1970s and included plans for a 
major hotel and extensive office and commercial space. In the case of the Park Plaza 
redevelopment project, two planning agencies -- the Boston Redevelopment Agency 
and the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs -- each supported different 
sides of the controversy. The two agencies took strong positions based on the 
analysis of their planners, but very much tied to their different perspectives. Neither 
made a significant effort to resolve the controversy and in the end, neither agency 
achieved what it sought. In the case of the Copley Place proposal, on the other hand, 
the Office of State Planning had a major commitment to resolving the conflict through 
facilitated negotiations involving citizens and the developer. The planners clearly 
sought to develop a mutually acceptable solution, and achieved that result. 
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II. Conflict Management in Planning Controversies: Two Case Studies 
A. Park Plaza: Controversy Without Resolution 
The Park Square district was ripe for redevelopment. 3 In the early 1970s, the 
district contained predominantly small buildings on narrow, winding streets. The area 
was largely underutilized. Located precisely between the two primary centers of 
growth in downtown Boston and adjacent to Boston's two large downtown parks, it 
offered opportunities for much more intensive use. Private developers, however, had 
been unable to assemble economically feasible parcels out of the crazy quilt of small 
lots and streets. 
As part of its redevelopment planning, the Boston Redevelopment Authority 
(BRA) designated the district as the Park Plaza urban renewal area. The BRA 
awarded development rights to Boston Urban Associates (BUA) based on a 
competitive review process. The Plaza was to be developed in two stages, with the 
most lucrative location being fully developed before construction of the more difficult 
— — — — — — — — — — — — — 
parcels began. The first phase called for a $260 million mixed-use development 
consisting of 1,400 luxury apartments, a 1,000 room convention hotel, and 1.5 million 
square feet of retail and commercial office space located in a 50-story tower. The 
project would add 150 residential units for the elderly if public subsidies became 
available. No plans were submitted for the development of second stage parcels. 
3Colin Diver (1975). "Park Plaza, Cases A, B, and C." (Boston: 
Intercollegiate Case Clearing House, Boston University). 
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During public hearings for the project, opponents raised a number of 
substantive concerns. Current residents and tenants would be displaced with little 
hope of finding similarly affordable accommodations. In addition, the project had three 
troubling uncertainties: (1) the eventual development of Phase II parcels, which 
included the most dilapidated sites, was highly unlikely without more concrete upfront 
commitments from BUA; (2) the financial plan for the project was weak, and the track 
record of the development firm unproven; and (3) the environmental impacts of the 
low- and high-rise buildings could damage the Public Garden and Boston Common. 
In December of 1971, after a number of stormy hearings, the City Council 
approved the plan with few revisions. By state law, the plan had to be further 
approved by the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs (DCA). The Urban 
Renewal Bureau of the DCA found the plan significantly wanting. Most importantly, 
the Bureau planners seriously questioned the completeness of the redevelopment 
plan. Phase II contained most of the sites considered by the Bureau to be sufficiently 
blighted to warrant urban renewal, but no reassurances existed that they would 
eventually be redeveloped. The staff also disputed the financial soundness of the 
plan. The Boston Redevelopment Authority could not dispel these reservations. 
Consequently, in early June the Commissioner of DCA disapproved the plan. 
Within days, the outpouring of support for the project escalated the seriousness 
of the controversy. Spearheaded by the Mayor of Boston and with the support of all 
three city newspapers, the State Legislature moved to eliminate the requirement of 
DCA approval. The business community was in vocal support of the project. An 
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estimated 20,000 construction workers demonstrated in its favor. Negotiations over 
the plan led to some revisions, but in February of 1973 the city's resubmittal was again 
disapproved. The project was eventually approved by the state only after the 
Commissioner of the DCA resigned in protest. 
With state approval in hand, however, opposition to the project 'became 
increasingly organized. Tenants and owners in the project area joined with 
environmental and civic groups to appeal the plan approval to the courts. Based on 
procedural inadequacies in the urban renewal planning and in the environmental 
impact assessment process, the courts blocked construction of the project. Not until 
the mid 1980s, after substantial changes and many years of conflict, was the project 
built. 
While planning for Park Plaza clearly has many unique features, it underscores 
the basic dilemmas of conflict in planning. In this and many similar cases, traditional 
planning, political, and judicial processes for decision making failed to effectively 
resolve conflict. In the next case study, we examine an alternative approach to 
planning which explicitly seeks to resolve conflict through facilitated negotiations. 
B. Copley Place: Conflict Resolved 
Copley Place was a large scale mixed-use development proposed for the city 
of Boston. 4 Unlike Park Plaza, however, the project went from proposal to initial 
4Rob Hollister and Tunney Lee (1979). Development Politics: Private 
Development and the Public Interest. (Washington, D.C.: Council of State 
Planning Agencies). 
VI-7 
construction in under four years. Built in air rights above the Massachusetts Turnpike, 
the project incorporated many recommendations proposed by a citizens' review 
committee convened to advise the state. In large part, this process, used to resolve 
conflict amongst the myriad of competing parties, was responsible for the rapid 
progress. 
Figure 1. Copley Place, viewed from Copley Square 
Copley Place is located adjacent to major commercial and retail development 
in the center of Boston. The site offered some very attractive advantages to 
developers: a 9.5 acre parcel with easy access from affluent local and suburban 
communities and requiring no displacement of tenants and no land assembly. At the 
same time, the site had a number of distinct problems: the air rights construction over 
 	—Alexandra Schweitzer (1983). "Citizen_Participation at_Copley Place."  
(Boston: John F. Kennedy School of Government Teaching Case Series). 
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a major turnpike, between wealthy Back Bay and a diverse but generally poor South 
End, required difficult and expensive design solutions. 
Early in 1977, the Urban Investment and Development Company (UIDC) 
approached the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) with a proposal that included 
an 800-room luxury hotel, two department stores, over 100 shops and restaurants 
located in a central mall, and over half a million square feet of office space. The 
developer had substantial financial support and a proven track record of large scale 
development. The state decided to forego competitive bidding and to assign 
development rights to UIDC subject to an extensive citizen review process. The 
choice to initiate the review process was closely tied to the continuing conflict over 
Park Plaza, and was designed to give citizens a vehicle for constructive involvement 
to resolve differences early in the planning process. 
The Citizen Review Committee was organized by the Office of State Planning 
(OSP) in June of 1977 and submitted recommendations by September. The 
Committee was open to any resident or public interest group with a stake in the 
outcome of the proposal. Over 50 civic and political leaders representing constituen-
cies with widely varying stakes participated in 11 planning meetings and numerous 
other working sessions to hammer out agreement on recommendations. Included 
were the Council of Building Trades, the Chamber of Commerce, residential groups, 
city and state agencies, and public interest groups. The CRC process also actively 





The participants met to agreement on specific requirements to be included 
in the Copley Place air rights lease. The range of opinions was wide. Most 
vehemently opposed was the Tent City Task Force: a decade-old group of South End 
political activists that believed that Copley Place would contribute to displacement of 
low- and moderate-income residents by attracting upper middle income households 
into the neighborhood. Major support came from the building trades. Several resident 
organizations (composed largely of upper middle class professionals) and local 
business associations were skeptical but open to discussion. 
The CRC process was designed with three major objectives in mind: to 
substantially increase the level of shared knowledge about the project among 
participants in the CRC, to make community concerns explicit as quickly as possible, 
and to provide constructive input into the design of Copley Place through recommen-
dations based on the consensus of the Committee. The process involved consensus-
building and negotiation among citizen groups and between these groups, U I DC, and 
state representatives. The process emphasized workshops and numerous informal 
meetings. Unlike ptIblihearings, -these mee-ting-s-were designed to be interactive, to 
facilitate dialogue, and to develop recommendations through that dialogue. Early 
workshops provided basic information and helped articulate the concerns of the 
various participants. Technical support was provided by state planners and hired 
consultants. Later workshops formulated demands and developed guidelines to be 
presented to the state. 
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In September, the CRC submitted guidelines that set general development 
standards for all major aspects of the project, including amelioration of environmental 
impacts, design criteria governing architectural improvements, pedestrians and 
automobile access, staging of development, minority hiring, neighborhood shopping 
services, parking, and inclusion of low-income housing. For nine months, redesign 
of the project proceeded amidst negotiations between UIDC and the Office of State 
Planning. Implementation of the CRC guidelines depended on how effectively the OSP 
pressed for inclusion, since the guidelines were only advisory to the state planning 
agency. In light of the OSP commitment to the CRC process, however, the redesign 
largely reflected the guidelines established. After CRC review and further examination 
of outstanding issues, the UIDC and the state signed the lease on December 15, 
1978. 
While opposition to aspects of the project persisted, the review process had 
secured broad community support for Copley Place. In sharp contrast to Park Plaza, 
the project proceeded on schedule without significant challenge_ While the issues that 
divided proponents from opponents were equally large, the CRC process had brought 
on two significant changes that promoted community support. First, the process dealt 
explicitly with all sources of community opposition. Structural, procedural, substantive, 
and uncertainty concerns were raised within a framework of mutual problem solving. 
While not all concerns were met, many were incorporated into the final guidelines. 
Second, the Copley Place lease agreement incorporated most of the guidelines, and 
hence decision making  was perceived  by most participants of the process to be fair. 
VI-11 
While compromises 
and pressure to 
quickly complete the 
process weakened 
consensus on many 
aspects of the agree-
ment, the final deci-
sion was widely sup-
ported. 
In the next 
section, we examine 
traditional urban de-
sign approaches to 
resolve differences 
through comprehen-
sive analysis, as illus-
trated by Park Plaza. 
Figure 2. Copley Square, Viewed from Huntington Avenue 
We then compare this approach with alternative modes of implementation, as ex-
emplified by Copley Place. 
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Ill. The Urban Designer as Participant in Conflict 
A. Design and Conflict: The Traditional View 
In the professions of architecture and planning from whence urban design 
springs, the appropriate role of professionals in political conflict is widely debated. 
Competing schools of thought offer differing conceptions of the scope, issues, and 
activities appropriate to the field. The emergence of these competing theories of prac-
tice is, however, relatively recent. From the early 1920s through the 1950s, consensus 
existed around the conception of architects as the client's designer and planners as 
comprehensive land use managers. During this period, redefinitions of government 
intervention into land and development markets were successfully integrated into the 
beliefs and values of these professional. In the 1960s, with widespread changes in 
values held in society and by architect and planning professionals, traditional practice 
was unable to reconcile the client oriented design model and the comprehensive 
planning model with the reality of political decision making. 5 
B. A Critique of Traditional Professional Roles 
In its pure form, the traditional model has never worked because planners do 
not possess sufficient knowledge to avoid error comprehensively. Planning knowledge 
is insufficient both for setting goals based on a single standard of the public interest 
and for translating goals into means through technical analysis. Equally important, 
5Thomas D. Galloway and Riad G. Manhayni (1977). "Planning Theory 
in-Retrospect_ The Process of Paradigm Chang_e."  American Institute of 
Planners Journal, January, pp. 62 - 71. 
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planners do not possess the ability to secure agreements necessary for the 
implementation and control of comprehensive plans. 6 In this context, the traditional 
separation of private design decisions and public land use managment decisions has 
weakened. These deficiencies became increasingly apparent as the structure for 
public decision making shifted from cohesive political settings to competitive and 
fragmented settings in the 1960s. 
A close examination of the Park Plaza case will help elucidate problems with 
traditional urban design implementation. 
1. Perceptions of the Public Interest. A wide number and diversity of 
perspectives existed, each based on different values and stakes in the outcome. 
Supporters of the urban renewal project looked .to the advantages of economic 
development and rationalization of the area's infrastructure and land uses. Detractors 
saw disadvantages in poor urban design, displaced residents and businesses, 
overloaded municipal services, increased pollution and congestion, destruction of the 
city park system, and a lucrative deal by which a few developers would be enriched. 
To plan comprehensively, the planners in both the BRA and the DCA needed to 
assume that these alternative community perspectives did not represent fundamental 
differences in values, that goals for the project could be based on a single hierarchy 
of values, and that as planners they were uniquely qualified to determine this 
6Aaron Wildaysky (1979). Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft 
of Policy Analysis. (Boston: Little Brown and Co.). 
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hierarchy. In practice, these claims were difficult to sustain. The planners' reliance 
on professional judgments and values was challenged both by other planners (with 
DCA and BRA planners in open disagreement) and by groups claiming greater validity 
for their own institutions' (the mayor of Boston and the residents of Park Plaza, to 
name two). In the absence of a normative theory for integrating divergent views or 
for coping with conflict between special interests, both DCA and BRA planners 
adopted rigid positions. As is frequently the case, the architects and the city planners 
equated the public interest with the interests of dominant political and economic 
parties. 8 The state planners, on the other hand, based their view of the public 
interest on principles that ignored political realities, such that the commissioner was 
forced to resign over his refusal to compromise. With the rise of political conflict over 
this issue, planners eventually adopted a pluralistic concept in which the public interest 
was seen as a constellation of special interests mediated through processes of 
political decision making. In this atmosphere, planners became increasingly involved 
in working with _groups with varying interests and conflicting objectives. 
'John Friedman (1971). 'The Future of Comprehensive Planning: A 
Critique." Public Administration Review,  31:315-325. 
Alan Altshuler {1965). The City Planning Process. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press). 
8M. Christine Boyer (1983). Dreaming the Rational City: The Myth of 
American City Planning. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press). 
Alan Kravitz (1970). "Mandarism: Planning as Handmaiden to 
Conservative—PoliticV -in Planning and -Polltics, had Beyle_and_Gearge 
Lathrop, eds. (New York: Odyssey Press). 
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2. Limited Expertise. The Park Plaza case highlights the difficulty of sustaining 
the architect and planner's claim to expertise. Two problems existed: 
First, designers and planners do not possess a monopoly on rational analysis. 
The emphasis of architects and planners on physical development as the primary 
determinant of urban quality was challenged by other scientists specializing in social, 
economic, engineering, and political processes. In particular, the failure of Park Plaza 
proponents to adequately account for environmental impacts was challenged 
successfully in courts based on expert witness. 
Second, public debate discourages open discourse. The formality of political 
debate hinders the use of design, analysis and technical studies to resolve conflict by 
encouraging their use for partisan purposes. While design and technical studies 
generally seek to separate the efficient achievement of objects from the process of 
goal setting, the simplifying assumptions that occur in these studies have buried within 
them implicit goals and values. The debate therefore masks a broader debate over 
desirable outcomes and patterns of coping with uncertainty and risk. 9 In Park Plaza, 
a number of uncertainties existed over the scope and consequences of the proposed 
project and the financial stability of the principal developers. Analysis could have 
contributed to a more open political discourse by clarifying the potential and likely 
consequences of these uncertainties and the tradeoffs between implicit objectives, but 
this was not done. In large part, analysis was used in much the same way as other 
9Laurence Tribe, Corinne Schelling and John Voss (1976). When Values 
Conflict: Essays on Environmental analysis, Discourse, and Decision. 
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing). 
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sources of power were used: to compel change in the behavior of opponents. As 
such, it was a blunt instrument for skewing political debate, with little claim to 
objectivity and only partial claim to rationality. 
3. Political Ignorance. The ineffectiveness of planning at proMoting a timely 
decision for Park Plaza indicates a major failing in planning. Empirical studies show 
that planning is generally unable to shape the development of cities in accordance 
with the rational criteria of a comprehensive planning process. 1° Within a cohesive 
political system in which consensus exists around goals, the planner could use 
specialized skills to scan alternatives and design approaches for achieving those 
goals. In Park Plaza, however, power was fragmented. Particularly for the state 
Department of Community Affairs, the political effectiveness of the planners was limited 
by their isolation from decision makers and interest groups most concerned with 
urban growth and development, and hence from the sources of political conflict. By 
focusing on technical issues and leaving political action to others, the planners of both 
the DCA and the BRA could neither mobilize support for their proposals nor broker 
a consensus from among competing community interests. 11 
10John Friedman (1971). "The Future of Comprehensive Planning: A 
Critique." Public Administration Review,  31:315-325. 
11 Francine Rabinowitz (1969). City Politics and Power. (New York: 
Atherton Press). 
Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield (1955). Politics, Planning and 
the Public Interest. (New York: The Free Press). 
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Over the past twenty-five years, controversies similar to Park Plaza have been 
repeated in many forms throughout the nation. As cities have moved increasingly to 
manage urban design through negotiations and joint problem solving, a process for 
managing the public/private dialogue needed to be developed. While the cases 
discussed in this report have demonstrated a wide range of alternative approaches, 
the techniques employed in Copley Place and in several other project developments 
over the past decade suggest closer examination. 
C. Managing Conflict in Urban Design Implementation 
In Copley Place, both architects and planners focused their skills and resources 
directly on the process of resolving community disputes. For these design 
professionals, the notion of the public interest took on a new dimension, one in which 
the common good could be best promoted by bringing together many people with 
various viewpoints to resolve their differences. While they constructed detailed 
analyses used in the design of the project, they did so by focussing their analysis 
more sharply on issues that were central to the policy debate and within the context 
of joint problem solving amongst the participants. As such, Copley Place is one 
example of the use of alternative dispute resolution approaches in planning decision 
making. In the city of Boston alone, this model has been adapted to address disputes 
over the New England Life Building, the Prudential Center redevelopment and many 
others. 
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In each of these disputes, a non-partisan facilitator has assisted contending 
parties in resolving their differences. As would occur in labor and other private sector 
disputes, the facilitator manages the process of dialogue, feedback, and negotiation. 
The facilitator seeks to ensure that the process is fair and unbiased in the eyes of the 
negotiating parties. In addition, however, facilitators in most development disputes 
participate more actively in the decision making process. Active facilitators are 
concerned with the quality of the outcome as well as the fairness of the process. The 
active facilitator seeks to ensure that the process is fair and open to all affected 
parties, whether or not they are active participants to the dispute and including the 
community-at-large. In addition, the active facilitator seeks an outcome reached as 
efficiently as possible, one that promotes dialogue and joint problem solving and that 
produces stable, workable agreements that effectively meet the interests of the parties 
to the dispute. Most of the uses of alternative dispute resolution processes in 
public disputes involve active facilitation because the complexity of public policy issues 
requires considerable orchestration. Parties to the dispute are often numerous, 
dispersed, and hard to identify. Their stake in the dispute varies widely, with different 
parties focusing alternately on structural, procedural, substantive, or uncertainty-based 
aspects of any given conflict. Participants to negotiations will have vastly different 
access to power, resources, and the skills necessary for effective negotiation. The 
negotiation is likely to be ad hoc, with procedures subject to redesign with each new 
dispute. Finally, implementation of agreements usually requires the support of many 
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parties not at the negotiating table. Facilitators must therefore be prepared to take 
responsibility for the integrity of the dispute resolution process and its outcome. 
In the remaining sections, we will examine the uses and approaches to conflict 
resolution in urban design disputes. We examine the usefulness of facilitated 
processes of conflict resolution and the conditions under which these processes are 
appropriate; describe generic steps in conflict resolution with particular attention to 
differences between structural, procedural, substantive, and uncertainty conflicts; and 
conclude with a discussion of the role of conflict resolution in urban design. 
IV. The Practice of Conflict Resolution in Urban Design Implementation 
A. Preconditions for Facilitated Conflict Resolution in Policy Disputes 
Facilitated conflict resolution processes can help resolve differences over many 
but not all planning disputes. For projects such as Copley Place, such processes 
build consensus by promoting dialogue and compromise among the disputing parties. 
The appropriateness of facilitated conflict resolution, however, varies with a number 
of conditions associated with conflict. 
In particular, four conditions seem most important. First, the controversy 
should be complex and multifaceted with numerous and diverse disputants. In the 
case of simple disputes with few parties, traditional approaches to decision making are 
likely to be more efficient than facilitated conflict resolution. Care is needed in 
assessing the likelihood of controversy, however. In Park Plaza, the Boston 
Redevelopment Agency's original assessment grossly underestimated both the 
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number and diversity of opponents to the project. In Copley Place, on the other hand, 
considerable effort was made to identify all community leaders that might perceive 
themselves as having a stake in the project. This effort uncovered almost 40 
organizations, associations, and public agencies with an active concern. 
Second, the necessity of facilitated conflict resolution is enhanced when the 
implementation of the planning decision can be blocked or delayed by affected parties, 
and these parties do not have ready access to traditional processes of decision 
making. Basic to any facilitated conflict resolution are the incentives of conflicting 
parties to negotiate together. Only when each party to the dispute believes that 
achieving agreement provides more benefits than is possible through their best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement 12 is a negotiated settlement likely. In the 
Copley Place case, the developer was open to negotiation largely because citizen 
groups had proven to be formidable opponents in the Park Plaza controversy. These 
groups had used access to administrative and judicial systems of review to block 
decision making for Park Plaza, but never obtained access to constructive negotia-
tions. In the face of continual public opposition and challenges, the project remained 
deadlocked for 12 years. The CRC process in Copley Place opened decision making 
to these groups, thereby replacing legal confrontation with constructive engagement. 
Third, facilitated conflict resolution is most appropriate when the possibility of 
joint gain among the disputant parties is greatest. In particular, joint gain is more likely 
12The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is further 
explored in Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981) Getting to Yes (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company). 
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when a number of complex issues are intertwined and when disputing parties have an 
ongoing relationship. 13 Multiple issues increase the possibility that parties to a 
dispute with different stakes in the outcome may be able to design an alternative 
where each party gains. Continuing interactions increase the likelihood that disputants 
will care about the quality of their relationship and the potential for its improvement 
through negotiation. In Copley Place, the governor of Massachusetts and many of his 
cabinet appointments had developed a working relationship with community and 
grassroots organizations. These relationships were important to their ongoing political 
success, and strengthened their commitment to the CRC process. At the same time, 
members of these organizations were open to participation in the CRC process in 
large part because of their trust in the facilitator, the state planning director, and the 
governor. 
Fourth, facilitated conflict resolution is unlikely to succeed when conflict is 
basically structural and disputants are focused on long-term goals rather than 
short-term gain. Under these conditions, incentives to reach agreement are muted by 
the fundamental differences that separate the parties. Those in power will not wish 
to legitimize the positions of the opposition, while those seeking change may wish to 
use conflict strategically to further larger objectives. Under many conditions, however, 
the issues surrounding a particular dispute can be isolated from these structural 
concerns. In Copley Place, the Tent City Task Force was engaged in a structural 
13Howard Raiffa (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
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conflict with the city of Boston over gentrification and political control of the low- and 
moderate-income housing market in the South End. The group used the CRC 
process to air these concerns, and sought to leverage the Copley Place proposal to 
force change from the city. While many participants in the process agreed with the 
objectives of the group, support for such leveraging was not forthcoming. Rather, 
most participants wished to focus on the substance, uncertainty, and procedures 
associated with the issue of Copley Place. The demands of the Task Force were 
therefore isolated from the current negotiations. 
Facilitated conflict resolution, then, is most appropriate when these four 
conditions exist: (1) the project is complex and multifaceted with diverse disputants, 
(2) affected parties who lack access to traditional decision making power can 
nonetheless block implementation, (3) the opportunity for joint gain exists, and (4) the 
issues are primarily, but not necessarily exclusively, focused on substantive, 
procedural, and uncertainty-based conflict. Under these conditions, facilitated conflict 
resolution has proven efficient at promoting fair and implementable agreements. 
These conditions, while indicative of the appropriateness of conflict resolution, do not 
assure successful negotiations. Planners who have served as facilitators and 
mediators have developed a number of approaches to conflict resolution that further 
enhance the likelihood of agreement. These approaches are discussed in the next 
section. 
B. Processes for Resolving Conflicts 
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Facilitated conflict resolution processes are designed explicitly to resolve 
complex disputes. As such, they almost invariably cope with several sources of 
conflict in the same dispute. Projects such as Park Plaza and Copley Place, as well 
as the numerous forms of conflict to which these techniques have been applied, 
frequently intertwine disputes over substance, procedure, and uncertainty. Many also 
contain elements of structural conflict. If conflict resolution is to succeed, the process 
must accommodate differences in perspectives and priorities. 
Fundamentally, facilitated conflict resolution processes are designed to identify 
the interests of the stakeholders, to promote dialogue and understanding around 
these interests, to invent new options that either allow for mutual gain or resolve 
differences through compromise, and finally to develop consensus. To achieve these 
objectives, planners have designed a number of approaches to conflict resolution. 
Some of these approaches have been incorporated into forums for public participa-
tion, 14 including the CRC process for Copley Place. Others have been applied only 
in more innovative forums for public policy mediation. In general, these approaches 
- - 	 - - - - - - - - - - - 
can be divided between activities designed to promote-fair pToedbres, -toetuce 
differences generated by uncertainty and knowledge, and to reach consensus on the 
substance of an agreement. These approaches directly promote resolution over the 
three most common sources of planning conflict. 
'Lawr-ence-Susskind and Michael Elliott,eds.(1983). Paternalism,  
Conflict, and Coproduction: Learning from Citizen Action and Citizen  
Participation in Western Europe. (New York: Plenum Press). 
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Approaches to Resolving Procedural Conflict. Facilitated conflict resolution 
begins with the design of a fair and unbiased decision making process. How the 
process is structured has important consequences for the outcome of the conflict 
resolution process. As in Copley Place, the stakeholders must usually be identified 
and representatives of those interests selected to participate. These participants must 
be organized so as to facilitate negotiations. The procedures and ground rules 
governing the process must be established, usually by the participants themselves. 
Finally, training and team building should be provided so that all participants share 
basic negotiating skills. 
Selecting participants for a facilitated negotiation is the first and among the most 
crucial aspects of process design. Selection can affect the legitimacy of the entire 
process and directly alter outcomes. The intentional or  de facto exclusion of a party 
to the dispute from the negotiation table can constitute an infringement of these 
stakeholders' relative opportunity to influence the outcome, and as such opens the 
process to procedural attacks and judicial review. 15 At the same time, since public 
policy frequently has wide ranging effects, stakeholders can be loosely viewed as 
including many parties with only indirect stakes in the outcome. The choice of key 
stakeholders is therefore a delicate task. The key to selection is to focus not on the 
most vocal parties currently involved in a dispute, but rather on the interests that have 
a legitimate claim to participation. In Copley Place, these parties were identified by the 
15Sam Gusman (1983). "Selecting Participants for a Regulatory Negotia-
tion," Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 4(2): 195 - 202. 
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facilitator working with many trusted community and business leaders familiar with the 
controversy. The facilitator identified likely impacts of the project, matched these 
impacts to the parties who would be most directly affected, and extended an invitation 
to community leaders most directly associated with these parties. 
Participation goes beyond identification of stakeholders. Since negotiation 
requires relatively limited numbers of participants, interest groups must be represented 
by a spokesperson. As was true in Copley Place, leaders of existing organizations 
can frequently serve as representatives of interests. In some cases, identification of 
legitimate participants will be more difficult. Disputes can arise over what interests 
should be present at the table and over the legitimacy of representatives to speak for 
a particular stakeholder. These disagreements can often be resolved through 
negotiation, and must be dealt with early in the conflict resolution process. 
Once spokespersons are selected, the participants must be organized so as 
to facilitate negotiations. When stakeholders are numerous, a system for limiting the 
number of parties  at the negotiation table must be established. Most commonly, 
parties with common interests are organized into cohesive negotiating teams. This 
arrangement allows negotiations to occur both between teams with substantially 
different interests, and among parties on the same team with overlapping but distinct 
stakes in the outcome. For example, in a negotiation over an investment strategy for 
a small New England city, three teams representing citizen, business, and city 
government interests were formed. The participants negotiated in teams to formulate 
a single statement of problems and possible approaches to their resolution. A 
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member from each team was then brought together to form tripartite committees to 
refine proposals for each of six substantive areas of interest. These representatives 
to the working committees reported back to and received guidance from their 
respective teams through intra-team negotiation sessions. The committees collected 
and analyzed data and prepared draft problem statements and recommendations, 
which were then renegotiated by the teams at large. 16 This arrangement allowed 
participants to work more effectively without endangering consensus-building within 
and between teams. 
For facilitated conflict resolution to work effectively, the procedures and ground 
rules must be established early and articulated clearly. Openness of discourse and 
freedom to propose compromises depends in part on the risks involved in participat-
ing in this give and take. Because negotiations over public policy disputes occur in 
a context of public attention, a free exchange of ideas is inhibited by fears of public 
(or constituent) reaction and by the possible manipulation of suggestions by other 
stakeholders. Rules governing issues of confidentiality, access to the press, 
constraints on the facilitator, and—participant-behavior (both around and outside-the 
bargaining table) help clarify and limit the risks associated with open negotiation. 
Moreover, procedures governing the availability and allocation of resources (such as 
technical assistance, analysis, and information exchange) promote equality and 
strengthen norms of open exchange among participants. 
16Lawrence Susskind and Denise Madigan (1985). "New Approaches 
to Resolving Disputes in the Public Sector." (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law 
School Program on Negotiation, mimeo). 
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Finally, training and team building are necessary so that all participants share 
basic negotiating skills and bargain from a well articulated statement of their interests. 
Many participants in facilitated conflict resolution have little or no experience in 
negotiation, which hampers their productivity and creativity. Parties to the dispute who 
can effectively articulate their concerns are more likely to bargain clearly and openly. 
Furthermore, agreements within teams is necessary if the team as a whole is to 
attempt joint problem solving with confidence. The facilitator must therefore help train 
individuals in skills of collaborative problem solving and negotiation, while strengthen-
ing consensus within teams. 
Approaches to Resolving Uncertainty-Based Conflict. Much that separates 
parties to public policy conflicts is based on uncertainty. Uncertainty exists at a 
number of levels. Experts and various publics may disagree over the likelihood of 
physical impacts. Technological systems for controlling impacts may be untested. 
The future behavior of other stakeholders is frequently unpredictable. Information and 
analysis available to one party may be unavailable to another. With imperfect 
information and indeterminate predictions, presumptions about future events are likely 
to be biased in favor of preferred options. 
The tendency to bias beliefs to favor desired outcomes cannot be rectified by 
further analysis. As we have seen in the critique of traditional planning, analysis is 
inevitably based on simplifying assumptions that are open to attack, and hence 
analysis is often reduced to an instrument for legitimizing political positions. Moreover, 
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values and distributional concerns are frequently imbedded into technical assumptions, 
thereby masking policy choices beneath a veneer of technical rationality." 
Facilitated conflict resolution seeks to manage uncertainty-based conflict 
through several approaches. Technical assistance is most common. In Copley Place, 
the CRC facilitator actively engaged in education to clarify aspects of the development 
process and its potential impacts. He also arranged for technical support from 
planning staff and several specialist consultants to help judge the reasonableness of 
claims made by the developers. Access to analysis and technical expertise helped 
equalize negotiating power between citizens and developers and led to more realistic 
positions based in comprehension. At times, analysis increased agreement over the 
likelihood of impacts. This occurred around issues of economic spillover effects of the 
project's retail stores on neighboring commercial activity. At other times, differences 
of interpretation continued, but agreement on the impossibility of achieving greater 
certainty led to compromise on the substance of the issue. 
Uncertainty can also be managed through joint fact-finding. Participants to the 
dispute can jointly frame research questions, specify the method of analysis and the 
researcher, interject their negotiated preferences when value-laden assumptions are 
to be incorporated into analysis, monitor the study, and evaluate its findings. Joint 
"Connie Ozawa (1985). "Mediation, An Interactive Approach to 
Science-Intensive Public Disputes," Paper presented at the Conference on 
"Emerging Issues in Environmental Analysis and Planning," Cincinnati, Ohio 
April 12. 
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fact-finding increases both lay comprehension of technical advice and the likelihood 
that the analysis will meet participant information needs. 
Equally important, facilitators must seek to reduce uncertainty associated with 
the implementation of agreements. Final agreements are usually signed to document 
the agreement and to commit the individuals (and possibly their organizations) to work 
for implementation. The agreement should include a plan for implementation specific 
measures to bind the parties to the agreement. These measures may include 
contractual obligations, the posting of bonds, and consent decrees issued by 
courts. 18 Decision makers with legal authority may also be linked either formally or 
informally to the negotiations to enhance the likelihood of implementation. Finally, 
agreements should specify arrangements for renegotiations if specific situations are 
expected to change in unpredictable ways. 
Approaches to Resolving Substantive Conflict. Ultimately, most disputes center 
around issues of substance. Resources are  to be  allocated,  policies prioritized, and 
services provided. To most stakeholders, including those at Copley Place, the 
outcome of decisions are more important than the process of decision making. But 
these questions of substance (such as the proper allocation of resources in a 
particular situation) are frequently resolvable by focussing on the process of arriving 
at a decision (such as how to make a complex and controversial decision for 
18Lawrence Susskind and Alan Weinstein (1980). "Towards a Theory of 
Environmental Dispute Resolution," Boston College Environmental Affairs  
Law Review, 9(2): 311 -357. 
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allocating resources). 19 In many ways, attention to the procedural and uncertainty 
aspects discussed above helps resolve substantive conflict. 
Consensus around the substance of a dispute can also be directly promoted 
by focusing attention on interests, not positions, and by developing options for joint 
gain. 20 Interests cause people to make decisions, to take positions. While opposing 
positions seem unresolvable, some of the interests behind the positions are likely to 
be shared, while others may be incompatible. Talking explicitly about interests helps 
identify zones of agreement and sources of disagreement and sets the stage for 
developing options for joint gain. 
Inventing alternatives requires creativity. Most disputes are negotiated in 
facilitated conflict resolution processes only after disputants feel that no easy solution 
exists. Frequently, deadlock has occurred because the solutions are defined too 
narrowly. The likelihood of mutual gain increases when a range of linked consider-
ations will be resolved simultaneously, and hence trades become possible. 
Compensation can expand the range of options. Compensation can include direct 
payment of money to affected individuals or groups, but in public policy disputes 
conflict of interest laws may inhibit such trades. Contingent promises can provide 
buffers against impacts should they occur. Particularly promising are in-kind 
19Julia Wondolleck (1985). "The Importance of Process in Resolving 
Environmental Disputes," Paper presented at the Conference on "Emerging 
Issues in Environmental Analysis and Planning," Cincinnati, Ohio, April 12. 
20Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981). Getting to Yes. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin). 
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compensations which balance loss in one aspect of impacts with improvements in a 
similar aspect. The invention of alternatives involves the exploration of many options. 
Through brainstorming sessions and a focus on interests, the facilitator can promote 
this invention. 
V. Conclusions 
Urban design is deeply involved with contradictions inherent in urban 
policymaking. The approriateness of development and the design that shall govern 
its shape can be highly politicized. Many of our cities can be characterized by a 
growing proportion of poor and unemployed residents; a decline in the city's tax base 
coupled to a loss of businesses and middle class residents; deteriorating infrastruc-
ture, housing stock, and municipal services coupled to rising costs in municipal 
service provision; and continuing struggle over the appropriate use of scarce land. 
Attempts to resolve these and other problems frequently escalate into conflict. Those 
affected by public policies but who lack equal access to decision making processes 
have used litigation and administrative review to halt development projects and to 
block implementation of public policy. When taken over by the courts, the terms of 
the conflict are limited by legal frameworks. Courts and review boards generally focus 
on narrowly defined procedural issues not central to the dispute and do not 
encourage disputants to engage constructively in conflict resolution. As a conse-
quence, differences of opinion over planning and public policy lead to adversarial 
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confrontation when cooperation and joint problem solving is frequently more beneficial. 
The problems of traditional approaches to conflict resolution and the promise 
of alternative approaches have been highlighted through two Boston urban design and 
development projects: Park Plaza and Copley Place. At first encounter, the Park 
Plaza project seemed noncontroversial. The project provided for the redevelopment 
of an area that was widely regarded as needing help. The project, however, was 
intensely debated for more than a dozen years. Local residents, city and state 
officials, and developers disagreed sharply over the merits of alternative redevel-
opment proposals for this unique site. The debate was still deadlocked when a 
second development project that could prove equally contentious was proposed on 
a nearby parcel of state land. To promote a timely decision, the State Office of 
Planning used a participation process specifically designed to build consensus among 
the parties that had effectively blocked the Park Plaza project. The site planning was 
completed without major opposition within two years. 
The examples of Park Plaza and Copley Place underlined the emerging 
involvement of planners in conflict management and consensus building. This involve-
ment represents a substantial shift in the traditional role of planning, one in which 
planners moved from an almost exclusive concern with technical advice-giving for land 
use decisions to a more wide-ranging concern with the implementation of planning 
proposals. As a consequence, planners have developed new approaches for coping 
with the controversy their activity generates. Through consensus building, 
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negotiation, and mediation, planners promote the resolution of conflict and the 
effectiveness of planning. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ATLANTA: TENSIONS RESOLVED 
Atlanta is not a city known for its urban design. Rather, it is an efficient and 
modern city, known more for the rate of its development than for its quality. In the 
context of rapid expansion and competition with suburban land locations, the city has 
done little to actively promote or manage urban design. 
Within this context of laissez faire development, it is perhaps even more 
remarkable that the city has stepped forward with a major piece of urban design 
legislation. Focusing in on the historic elements of the city, the legislation creates an 
innovative and comprehensive system for promoting historic preservation and for 
integrating historic buildings into the fabric of the city. The system for achieving 
consensus on this legislation was through a facilitated urban design policymaking 
process. 
This concluding chapter presents the Atlanta case as an example of what can 
be achieved through the concerted efforts of citizens who are interested in urban 
design and are conscious of the political context. Through the application of 
mediation techniques to historic preservation issues in Atlanta, the city has successful- 
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ly redefined the relationship between development and historic preservation. In the 
first section the chapter explores the process leading up to the legislation, while the 
second section focuses on the elements of the legislation itself. 
I. The Policymaking Process 
Between the summer of 1987 and today, the city of Atlanta has been 
developing and implementing a comprehensive historic preservation ordinance. The 
ordinance and implementation plan were created by means of an extended mediation-
negotiation process involving a wide range of community leaders. These leaders 
including preservationists, neighborhood advocates, developers, leading business 
leaders, city councilors, the mayor and local government administrators. This process 
resulted in an agreement which the involved parties signed in June of 1988. 
The mayor was the first to sign the agreement. Nine months earlier, he had 
initiated the consensus building process by describing his vision for the rebuilding of 
Atlanta as a "new international city." He had also gained national attention by 
describing two controversial historic structures as "a hunk of junk" and "a dump." To 
him, these structures stood in the way of progress. But on June 29, 1988, after 
considerable dialogue and negotiation, Mayor Andrew Young declared historic 
preservation to be in the public interest, praised the consensus building process as 
being in the best tradition of Atlanta's style of open political dialogue, and signed a 
statement outlining a comprehensive program designed to preserve historic properties 
and districts throughout the city. 
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Joining the mayor in signing this document were the 16 other community 
leaders responsible for designing the comprehensive program. As representatives of 
the major interest groups, these 17 individuals constituted the Historic Preservation 
Policy Steering Committee. Through their perseverance and openness, these 
participants fashioned a detailed plan and program that included (1) a new system for 
categorizing, designating and protecting historic properties, (2) extensive programs 
for ensuring the economic viability of historic structures, as well as an innovative 
process for determining economic hardship, and (3) recommendations concerning the 
disposition of 91 income-producing historic buildings in the midtown and central 
business areas of the city. 
In the process of reaching this agreement, however, participants on the historic 
preservation policy committee passed through five identifiable stages: stabilizing the 
conflict, initiating the mediation process, scoping the issues, building a consensus, 
and implementing the plan. In all five stages of the process, mediators assisted the 
participants. This section examines the role of the mediators, the organization and 
management of the negotiations and the techniques used to promote dialogue and 
consensus during each stage in the process. 
Stabilizing the Conflict. In the spring of 1986, historic preservation became 
increasingly controversial. Two major events came together. First, three important 
historic structures, each proposed for designation as historic properties by Atlanta's 
-Urban -Design-Commission, were-threatened The -mayor vetoed _a city _cotinciL 
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legislated moratorium on demolitions and approved the applications for demolitions 
against the advice of the Commission. During the same time period, the Urban 
Design Commission nominated to city council 85 buildings and 16 districts for 
designation under the city's urban conservation law. Three competing bills were 
introduced to the council to either strengthen or weaken the designations. Little 
consensus existed as to how to handle the issues being raised. 
To help resolve these issues, a small task force was established by representa-
tives of city government and the business and preservation communities. In early 
discussions, the vice-president for the business-oriented Central Atlanta Progress 
suggested the use of mediation. While interested, the executive directors of both the 
Urban Design Commission and the Atlanta Preservation Center remained skeptical. 
For answers to their questions, they approached the co-directors of the Southeast 
Negotiation Network, located at the Georgia Institute of Technology, to discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of such an approach. 
Following these discussions, the task force resolved to enter into a mediation 
process. Between May and September, the task force raised $66,000 to conduct the 
process. The money originated from four sources: half was provided by the National 
Trust for Historic Preservation; the remainder was matched by Central Atlanta 
Progress, the City of Atlanta and the Atlanta Preservation Center. The monies were 
allocated with 40 percent to the mediation process, 30 percent for technical support 
to the overall planning process and 30 percent for community outreach following the 
mediation process 
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Initiating the Process.  In February of 1987, the task force selected mediators 
following a nationally announced Request For Qualifications and interviews. The 
mediation team consisted of the Southeast Negotiation Network (Georgia Institute of 
Technology) and the Institute for Environmental Negotiation (University of Virginia). 
The joint venture between the Network and the Institute created a mediation team with 
a strong local presence as well as direct experience with historic preservation. 
Under direction of the Task Force, both the city government and the Atlanta 
Preservation Center served as the hiring agent for the mediation team. Finalizing the 
employment contract proved difficult. Mediation services did not fit standard city 
consultant categories. Because of complications, contract procedures took seven 
months and a contract was not officially issued until September. 
Beginning in July, the mediators interviewed approximately 50 stakeholders in 
the preservation conflict to outline the sources of conflict and issues at stake, to 
identify potential representatives and to establish the groundrules and agenda. The 
mediators assisted members of the task force to design processes for selecting 
negotiating groups to represent government, business and preservation interests on 
the Policy Steering Committee. The mediators also nominated specific individuals for 
consideration and took an active role in ensuring that the full range of interests was 
represented. In addition to the mayor, this committee consisted of four city council 
members, the Commissioner of Community Development, the Chair of the Urban 
Design Commission, the director of the Central Atlanta Progress (a business alliance), 
four prominent regional developers, the director of the Atlanta Preservation Center, the 
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chair of the Preservation Council (a coalition of historic neighborhoods) and three 
other prominent preservation activists. 
To assist the Steering Committee in its deliberations, a Resource Group was 
also created. The Resource Group consisted of seven professionals with expertise 
in preservation and development law, programs, design and economics. Members 
of the Resource Group provided information at the Plenary Sessions of the Steering 
Committee and actively participated in caucus and working meetings involving 
subgroups of the Steering Committee. This organization allowed for wider participa-
tion while maintaining a core committee size of 17 individuals, thereby facilitating 
communication. 
Scoping the Issues. From the prenegotiation interviews, several issues 
emerged as crucial. During the initial phase of the negotiation process, participants 
examined these issues in depth. Four plenary sessions of the Steering Committee 
were organized to accomplish this goal. These sessions were held monthly between 
September,1987, and January, 1988. The first session provided an overview of issues 
and perceptions of the participants in a somewhat casual atmosphere. Following a 
two hour introduction, participants met over cocktails and dinner at the Ritz Carlton 
for further discussions. Each of the following three sessions was organized to focus 
discussion on one major class of issues. The sessions lasted three hours each and 
featured an outside expert selected by the mediators and agreed upon by the 
participants. The-experts- included-Robert-Freilich-on preservation and_planninglaw, 
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Richard Roddewigg on economic impacts of preservation and tools for mitigating 
those impacts on property owners, and Frederick Williamson on standards for 
evaluating historic sites and districts. Each wrote a paper addressed at the issues 
raised by participants, presented an overview of these issues to the participants and, 
with the help of the mediators, facilitated an in-depth discussion of the issues. Each 
session also featured presentations about and discussions of local conditions, with 
members of the Resource Group providing the background. 
Building a Consensus. From the first four sessions emerged a clear statement 
of the goals and a general outline of the substance of the historic preservation 
program. Following a raucous February plenary session during which the entire 
program was outlined and discussed, the goals and program were committed to a 
single negotiated text. From this point on, both the pace of negotiation and the depth 
of discussion increased dramatically. Between the February meeting and the June 
signing ceremony, the n egotiations involved-six additional plenary  seven-
caucus meetings and eight work group meetings. 
The Plenary Sessions provided a forum to work out general policy directives 
and to provide general feedback on the single negotiated text as it evolved. These 
sessions were open meetings. While discussion was largely limited to the 17 
members of the Policy Steering Committee with input from members of the Resource 
Group, members of the general public could and did attend in increasingly large 
numbers. The -detail-work-associated-with revising the-text, however, was conducted 
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in the caucus and work group meetings. 
Caucus meetings allowed the representatives of single interest groups to 
explore issues and suggest changes with the mediators. Each caucus (i.e., 
government, business and preservation) also had at least one member of the 
Resource Group that took responsibility for conducting further analyses for the caucus 
and for providing more detailed feedback to the mediators between meetings. The 
mediators took responsibility for altering the single negotiated text in response to this 
feedback. Difficult issues were discussed one-on-one with participants or referred to 
the working group for further negotiations. 
The work group was created to facilitate more direct negotiations between the 
three interest groups. With 17 members of the Policy Steering Committee, seven 
members of the Resource Group and an average of 15 members of the general public 
and press, the Plenary Sessions did not provide the intimacy necessary for extensive 
face-to-face negotiations. The work group involved ten members of the Steering 
Committee and Resource Group and provided a more intimate forum for negotiating 
difficult issues. The most frank discussions, the most carefully crafted compromises, 
and the most creative solutions came from this group. In particular, the group 
focused primarily on clarifying the conditions for declaring a designated historic 
structure to be an economic hardship to the owner, establishing a system of redress 
under conditions of economic hardship, creating an interim ordinance to govern 
alterations and demolitions of historic structures until implementation of the program, 
and developing recommendations as to permanent designations for virtually all of the 
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income producing historic properties in the central business areas of Atlanta. 
Throughout this consensus building period, the importance of information and 
analysis associated with the specific conditions of Atlanta continued to grow. 
Questions that required further analysis continued to arise as participants delved more 
deeply into issues. Analyses to answer many of these questions were conducted 
locally by either the mediation team or by members of the Resource Group. Many of 
these analyses were quick assessments of current situations with a heavy emphasis 
on information display. In particular, the team found that highly visual displays of 
information were most useful because such displays helped many participants 
understand the issues more concretely. Examples of locally generated analyses 
included an appraisal of the impact of various definitions of "economic hardship" and 
"reasonable return" on historic preservation programs across the country, an analysis 
of rates of return in several rehabilitated buildings in Atlanta, an assessment of 
previously demolished historic structures and the disposition of the land thus cleared, 
and a display of th4 bction—and—physical -characteristics of—structures currently- 
designated under the existing conservation ordinances. Other issues, however, 
required more extensive analysis by outside neutral experts. In addition to the three 
papers commissioned early in the process, five additional studies were commissioned 
on issues ranging from creative financing to designation criteria to the fiscal impact of 
tax incentives for historic preservation. With the exception of the fiscal impact paper, 
most of these studies were designed to assist the implementation team in refining the 
work of the Policy Steering Committee. The fiscal impact paper, on the other hand, 
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contributed directly to the debate over the reasonableness of city tax incentives. 
Implementing the Plan.  By the June 29th signing ceremony, the negotiated text 
provided a detailed outline for designing the historic preservation program. Its 57 
pages of text represented the result of extensive problem solving, consensus building 
and compromise. An implementation strategy was incorporated into this agreement. 
This strategy specified a process for translating the programmatic and planning 
elements of the agreement into legislation necessary to implement the program. It 
specifies both a timeframe and responsibilities. An Advisory Group comprised of 
members of the Policy Steering Committee was created to oversee the process. 
Since June of 1988, all legislation necessary to implement the program has 
been implemented. The first legislation required was an interim control ordinance 
providing temporary protection to over 100 commercial properties. This legislation 
was passed 13 to 1 in the City Council and effected the period between July 1988 and 
July 1989. To prevent demolitions between the publication of the list and the 
enactment of the law, Mayor Young issued an executive order enforcing the conditions 
of the proposed ordinance until City Council review. 
The constitutional amendment enabling Georgian cities to assess historic 
properties at a differential rate in order to promote preservation goals was passed by 
the general electorate of the state of Georgia that November. Several pieces of state 
legislation were enacted during the General Assembly in early 1989. Finally, city  
counciLactecL on the entire program during spring and early summer of 1989. 
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Legislation enacting the full set of recommendations of the Steering Committee were 
consequently passed within the one year time horizon established in the implementa-
tion plan. The Urban Design Commission is now in the process of designating historic 
structures and districts and implementing the provisions of the law. 
II. The Agreement 
This final section of the report examines the details of the agreement as 
developed by the Steering Committee. After nine months of often intense face-to-face 
negotiations, Steering Committee members reached agreement on ways to protect 
historic resources and integrate historic preservation into downtown planning that will 
have far-reaching consequences for the future development of the City. Specifically, 
members were able to agree on: 
• the goals and objectives for historic preservation in Atlanta, 
• the process that should be used to designate particular historic properties and 
districts for regulatory protection, 
• mechanisms for dealing with the economic issues associated with preservation, 
including rehabilitation incentives, compensation and determinations of 
economic hardship, and 
• ways to integrate preservation programs with ongoing downtown planning and 
development decisions. 
A. Goals 
At the most fundamental level, the Historic Preservation Steering Committee 
developed consensus around a set of goals and objectives. After deliberation, all 
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members came to believe that historic preservation has an important role to play in 
making Atlanta a unique and vital city. The Candler, Hurt and Atlanta Life Insurance 
Buildings remind the city of decades of corporate leadership. Generations of Atlantans 
have made their homes in historic neighborhoods still prized by their residents. The 
Martin Luther King-Sweet Auburn District captures the spirit of the civil rights 
movement and the emergence of the new south. Preserving these things which are 
"uniquely Atlanta" builds community pride and makes Atlanta a special place for its 
citizens, businesses, and visitors. Historic preservation is an important area of public 
policy which Atlanta needs to address more comprehensively than it has in the past. 
It was furthermore the consensus of the Historic Preservation Steering 
Committee that the City of Atlanta would be best served through development and 
implementation of a Comprehensive Historic Preservation Program. The program 
developed by the Committee extends Atlanta's tradition of promoting the city's vitality 
through new development, while at the same time conserving historic resources that 
make an irreplaceable contribution to the livability and quality of Atlanta. The program 
clarifies the city's intention to maintain and conserve its historically significant 
landmarks and districts, defines the interrelationship between this conservation goal 
and Atlanta's other development and planning policies, and outlines a comprehensive 
set of programs and policies that will govern historic preservation in the city of Atlanta. 
In the view of the Steering Committee, the goals of Atlanta's historic preserva-
tion program should be: 
• to preserve and maintain sites and structures that serve as significant visible 
reminders of the city's social and architectural history, 
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• to contribute to the economic development and vitality of the City, 
• to preserve the character_ and livability of Atlanta's neighborhoods and. 
strengthen civic pride through neighborhood conservation, and 
• to integrate historic preservation more fully into Atlanta's city planning system. 
The Steering Committee believed that these goals could best be implemented 
through a comprehensive program that incorporated several elements. The City 
needed a program for identifying and designating historic landmarks and districts that 
had the confidence of the entire community. Also needed were a tax abatement 
program, an Endangered Buildings Program, a preservation revolving loan fund and 
other incentives to encourage the upkeep and rehabilitation of designated historic 
properties determined to be in the public interest to preserve. Finally, the City needed 
to be sure that the City's historic preservation goals and program were carefully 
coordinated with other public actions in the areas of planning, zoning, and urban 
design. 
Once- it- had -a -comprehensive- preservation program_in place, Atlanta also 
needed to do a better job of "marketing" its designated historic properties and districts. 
The Steering Committee committed the City, the Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Atlanta Preservation Center to work together to develop ways to feature these 
resources, seek potential clients to lease or purchase renovated historic structures, 
and make it easier for visitors to find and appreciate these attractions. A successful 
preservation program was thought to require more than the identification and 
protection of our historic resources. The city must maximize the contribution these 
--- 
 — — — 	 — — — — — — 
buildings and districts make to the attractiveness and economic vitality ortfte -City—of- 
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Atlanta. 
In keeping with these basic goals and perspectives, the Historic Preservation 
Steering Committee recommended that the Comprehensive Historic Preservation 
Program consist of six elements: 
• a process for identifying, nominating and designating historic properties and 
districts; 
• categories of historic properties with particular regulations governing renova-
tions or demolition of designated properties; 
• availability of incentives and other benefits to historic properties and districts 
designated to each category; 
• information, marketing and other programs to support preservation efforts; 
• a system for integrating historic preservation into comprehensive planning; and 
• an implementation plan which deals explicitly with changes required in the 
administrative structure for historic preservation, resource issues and transition 
issues. 
B. PROCESS 
One of the fundamental purposes of the negotiations was to agree upon a 
process for identifying and designating historic resources that would have the 
confidence and support of the entire community. That purpose was achieved. The 
essential elements of the process on which agreement has been reached include: 
• use of criteria established by the National Register of Historic Places to identify 
the inventory of historic resources in Atlanta, 
• five categories of protection and administrative review to which sites and 
districts can be nominated, including a new landmark category, 
• evaluations prepared by the Urban Design Commission and the Department of 
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Community Development, with input from property owners, and neighborhood, 
business and civic organizations, 
• designation decisions made by City Council and the Mayor, 
• criteria for determining the appropriateness of requests by property owners to 
demolish or alter designated properties, 
• a special review panel of qualified experts to decide cases where owners of 
designated historic properties assert economic hardship as well as guidelines 
to assist this panel in its determinations, 
• a list of income-producing buildings and districts located in the downtown and 
midtown business district to be proposed for nomination to specified categories 
during the first round of nominations, with the understanding that other 
buildings and districts throughout the City will also be considered for nomina-
tion either simultaneously or subsequently, and 
• an interim control ordinance that protected these first round buildings as well 
as the existing stock of Urban Conservation Sites until July 1, 1989. 
The process endorsed by the Steering Committee was one that was firmly 
grounded in the guidelines established for historic preservation by the National Historic 
Preservation Act of 1966. It also included features which are unique to Atlanta. Using 
the nationally accepted criteria to identify historic resources ensures consistency 
between Atlanta's program and those found elsewhere around the country. Once 
resources are identified, however, it is up to the community to decide which ones 
should be protected and to what extent. Before a particular building or district was 
designated, simultaneous evaluations were to be conducted by the Urban Design 
Commission and the Department of Community Development. 
Historic buildings and areas have merit in their own right, and also serve City 
goals and policies related to housing, retail mix, and attractive streetscapes. One can 
also expect, however, that at times preservation will find itself in direct conflict with 
other City goals and policies for a particular area. It is important to have opportunities 
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within the designation process to weigh those conflicting public costs and benefits and 
the dual evaluation process by the Urban Design Commission and the Department of 
Community Development with a final decision by the Council and MayOr allows for 
this. 
C. INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
An effective preservation program requires a combination of regulations and 
incentives. It is not enough just to put limits on the demolition of historic structures, 
steps must also be taken to actively encourage rehabilitation and re-use of these 
structures. A range of financial incentives available to help "close the gap" on historic 
rehabilitation projects which cannot otherwise be profitable was therefore necessary. 
Specifically, the Steering Committee recommended that the City adopt: 
• a tax abatement program allowing for a freeze on taxes for any building 
designated as a landmark or a contributing building in a landmark district for 
ten-years from the point of designation, 
• a tax abatement program allowing for the abatement of taxes on the increased 
value resulting from rehabilitation of historic structures following the formula for 
tax abatements in housing enterprise zones, 
• a revolving loan fund for historic rehabilitations to be financed through public 
and private contributions with efforts to encourage banks to provide loans for 
rehabilitating historic properties, and 
• a program for seeking out endangered buildings and taking steps to encourage 
their preservation and rehabilitation, including offering financial incentives. 
In addition, the City will work to encourage eligible corporations to take advantage of 
tax credits available for certified historic rehabilitation projects. The combination of 
more traditional financial incentives with a corporate investment and endangered 
buildings programs would make Atlanta's incentive package one of the most 
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innovative of the country. 
D. INTEGRATION WITH EXISTING PROGRAMS 
Negotiations about historic preservation in Atlanta did not take place in a 
vacuum and, in fact, great emphasis was placed on integrating the values of historic 
preservation into the City's planning and zoning strategies. Negotiations specifically 
addressed concerns about retail activities, housing and animated streets in the central 
business districts, and maintaining the character, ambience and livability of Atlanta's 
historic neighborhoods. 
Considerable time was spent during the negotiations to identify existing City 
programs that should be strengthened or expanded to encourage preservation. 
Specific recommendations included: 
• expanding the use of preservation easements, 
• use of the revitalization program for neighborhood commercial areas to 
combine neighborhood preservation and revitalization, 
• review of code enforcement procedures to be certain they reinforce preserva-
tion goals, and 
• assigning new building inspectors to preservation related inspection. 
III. Conclusion 
• Atlanta's preservation program is a product of the mediation process itself. In 
a city where urban design captures no clear vision, in which good urban design is 
frequently equated with-rapid-development, the-civic and_political leaders of the city 
have built a new consensus. Through an explicit process of dialogue between leaders 
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with differing perspectives, Atlanta has integrated preservation into broader City goals 
and objectives. By doing so, Atlanta will put itself in the vanguard of preservation 
planning in this country. What cities like Atlanta are now recognizing is that to achieve 
the kind of mix, vitality and character desired in downtown areas, policies and decision 
processes must be established that allow growth and change without destroying the 
identity and fabric of their city. 
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